



Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-071
Friday
12 April 1991

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FBIS-SOV-91-071

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Akhromeyev Views Security Issues

LD1104220191 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Oleg Moskovskiy, Igor Peskov and Leonid Tomifeyev]

[Text] Moscow 11 April TASS—The United Nations and the Security Council can play a decisive role in the creation of a global security system to ensure peaceful settlement of disputes and—in the final account—peace to all nations and countries of the globe, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, adviser to the Soviet president, said during the Moscow-Washington-Paris television space bridge.

The direct television communication link between the capitals of the Soviet Union, France and the United States was organized on the initiative of the French Military Academy within the framework of the international forum "Security in Europe at the turn of the century" held at the academy. In Washington, Presidential National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and in Paris, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner took part in the programme along with other prominent politicians from a number of European countries.

Speaking about the regional security system on the continent, Sergey Akhromeyev said that the basis for it can be provided by the charter for a new Europe and the conventional forces in Europe treaty signed in Paris and the security centre set up under these documents.

Akhromeyev noted that the global and regional security systems "must not hamper or contradict each other". Each of them has its own objectives and responsibilities before nations and states.

The regional security system, Akhromeyev said, should focus on the prevention of wars and the settlement by peaceful means of disputes between European countries. It may also undertake the organisation of negotiations on the reduction of armed forces on the continent.

"The reduction of war danger and the easing of tension in the second half of the eighties," Akhromeyev said, "created conditions for ensuring security in Europe not on the bloc basis but on the basis of collective security, with the participation of all European countries, the United States and Canada".

Along with this, the marshal stressed that the creation of such a system cannot be expected to be completed within a short period of time.

According to Akhromeyev, it is necessary to eliminate the NATO military organisation while possibly retaining its political structures, as well as specifying the military tasks set before the West European Union.

Academic Defends Arms Treaties

91WC0089A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 9, Mar 91 pp 25-27

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences: "Polemics: DOMOSTROY and Security"]

[Text] "Fifteen Questions to a Retiring Minister" were addressed to Eduard Shevardnadze by three USSR people's deputies in the newspaper DOMOSTROY. The article was published in late January, after a new minister of foreign affairs had already been appointed. Yet the "witch hunt" goes on.

Those behind the campaign currently underway are attempting to prove that the agreements reached between East and West in recently years on disarmament and other problems have allegedly undermined our country's security.

Do We Have Too Few Tanks?

The main target of critical attacks by deputies V. Alksnis, Ye. Kogan and N. Petrushenko is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, signed in Paris in November 1990.

The first question concerns the method of calculating the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Since the Warsaw Pact has virtually ceased to exist and Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are more "inclined to redeploy their troops along their eastern borders than their western ones and make no secret of their desire to join NATO," in the opinion of the three deputies "in the present situation it is more advantageous for the United States and NATO to recognize and preserve the former structures, in order to force the Soviet Union as one component of total Warsaw Pact forces to lower its level of defensive capability." They rhetorically ask: "But what will be the correlation of forces if the weapons of the aforementioned Eastern European countries are added to those of NATO?"

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact definitely is not something about which to be elated. But that is a political problem, not a military one, and it would be at the very least unfounded to blame the West for it. We are reaping the effects of the "alliance" policy which has been conducted with regard to the GDR since 1953, Hungary since 1956, Czechoslovakia since 1968 and Poland since 1981. The stance taken by our former comrades-in-arms in the future will depend primarily on the USSR's policy. If we place those states in the enemy camp right from the start and develop forces to counter them, something which the authors of the article in DOMOSTROY do in fact urge, then that would be the surest means of prodding them into taking undesirable steps.

But the Paris Accord is not to blame. Furthermore, it provides certain guarantees for the USSR's security from unforeseen turns of events in the future, setting acceptable levels of forces and arms not only in Europe, but also in its individual regions. Specifically, the treaty provides for deployment of NATO troops at distances of

1,000 kilometers or more from our western borders. In Central Europe (excluding the territory of the former GDR) NATO cannot have more than 7,500 tanks, 5,000 artillery pieces and 11,250 armored vehicles, while the Soviet quota allows us to keep over 13,300 tanks, 13,700 artillery pieces and 20,000 armored vehicles in the European portion of our territory.

If contrary to expectations NATO should decide to increase its forces in Central Europe or move them closer to our borders, or if any of the Eastern European countries should join NATO, that would constitute a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the treaty and would give the USSR legal grounds to take reciprocal measures, including expansion of its armed forces or redeployment of troops from beyond the Urals. This fact serves as a strong constraint against any such actions. But all this will be true only after the treaty takes effect; in order for that to happen we must remove the disputes which have arisen as a result of several measures taken by the Soviet side.

Another aspect of the treaty which concerns the three deputies pertains to the fact that it "provides for essentially unilateral destruction of armored equipment by the Soviet Union... Destruction of tanks will cost the Soviet people a handsome sum." They propose to save money by mothballing armaments and storing them in regions far removed from Europe.

In fact, only a small portion of the total number of Soviet tanks comprising the difference between their actual number (41,500) and the final level agreed upon in the treaty (13,300) is actually subject to conversion. Over the past two years 16,100 tanks have been redeployed beyond the Urals, and 4,000 of the oldest models have been scrapped. In view of these figures only 8,100 of the Soviet Union's tanks will now have to be physically destroyed. At the same time NATO will undergo a reduction of over 5,000 tanks. Where is the unilateral disarmament, if at the start of the negotiations the East exceeded the West by almost 30,000 tanks?

In political terms the massive redeployment of Soviet military equipment beyond the Urals (as well as the reassignment of a portion of it to the Soviet Navy) for the purpose of avoiding large-scale reductions is a source of great dissatisfaction in the West. By their logic, whoever has the greatest number of weapons should be the one to make the greatest reductions until equal and lower arms levels are attained (and the USSR had more weapons in all categories except combat helicopters). We should not criticize the treaty, but rather those who in past decades accumulated mountains of arms while at the same time claiming that there existed "approximate parity" between the two alliances on the European continent, taking advantage of the complete absence of oversight by the public or a parliament.

But now that tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment have been redeployed beyond the Urals (without notification, incidentally, either of our treaty partners or the

members of our own parliament), they should not be brought back so that they can be destroyed. In this respect the three deputies' suggestion seems to be a reasonable solution to the problem: we could mothball the redeployed equipment in remote storage depots under the supervision of the other side, with the equipment to be destroyed in the future under less strict deadlines.

The deputies point out that the treaty "extends to the USSR and to the NATO countries in Europe; but to what extent does it affect the United States' armed forces?" Again, they pose a rhetorical question: "Does this mean that we are disarming unilaterally in the face of the United States?" (Incidentally, in a recent interview in PRAVDA even Dmitriy Yazov, minister of defense, stated that he was "very concerned about the unilateral concessions.")

It is true that American territory is not included in the reduction zone, though the United States' conventional forces in Europe (from where they can really threaten us the most) are being limited and reduced by roughly 2,400 pieces of military equipment. It is equally important to note that the treaty forbids the deployment of a large contingent of U.S. reinforcements from the United States to Europe. Yet that is not all. Soviet territory beyond the Urals is also outside the scope of the treaty. In addition to Central Asia, in Siberia and the Far East alone the USSR originally had 12,600 tanks, 14,600 armored vehicles, 16,400 artillery pieces and approximately 2,000 warplanes. Now, following redeployment of equipment from Europe, these figures have risen to over 16,000 tanks and an overall total of 60,000 pieces of military equipment. Outside of Europe the United States, including its home territory, has approximately 10,000 tanks and 3,000 warplanes (including naval aircraft).

True, not all Soviet forces beyond the Urals are being used to counter the United States; there are also other potential opponents there. But American units are also intended for use in other theaters of operations besides the USSR, such as in the Persian Gulf and other regional conflicts. Thus there are not any grounds for speaking of unilateral disarmament in this regard, either.

Concessions on Missiles, Too?

In the article the claim is made that under the INF Treaty the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to destroy OTR-23 operational-tactical missiles (systems in the Oka or R-400 class) with a range of approximately 400 kilometers, whereas the topic of negotiation was destruction by both sides of missiles with a range of 500 kilometers or more. Furthermore, it is stated that "great economic and military harm was done to our country. The Americans and NATO are deploying similar systems."

In fact, the inclusion of 200 missiles of the Oka class in the treaty made it possible to eliminate the American Pershing-1A missiles (170 units), ban the production and deployment of the new Pershing-1B, and get the FRG to pledge not to modernize and to remove from their arsenal 72 Pershing-1A missiles.

It is also incorrect to state that NATO is presently deploying systems of this type. If was precisely in view of the INF Treaty and under the influence of other Soviet steps in the area of disarmament that the United States and NATO dropped their plans to deploy the extended-range Lance-2 missile. They retained only 120 old Lance-1 missiles with a range of under 150 kilometers, and France has 30 similar Pluton missiles. In Europe alone the Soviet Union has a 12:1 superiority in this class of weapons. At issue is the development of an American air-to-ground missile system of the TASM type, with a range of up to 500 kilometers. In this connection it would be appropriate to recall that Soviet medium-range bombers have long carried hundreds of dual-purpose air-to-ground missiles with ranges of from 180 to 500 kilometers. These issues must be resolved at tactical nuclear arms talks.

It is also claimed that at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks we made "a clear concession to the United States by agreeing to their demand that we allow them to break the ABM Treaty."

It should be borne in mind that the ABM Treaty itself, like any other international accord, stipulates the right of each party to abrogate the treaty with six months' advance notice, if exceptional circumstances connected with the content of the treaty present a threat to either side's "highest interests." In order to exercise their right to abrogate the treaty the Americans do not need any permission from us at all; therefore there is no cause to speak of a Soviet concession. But if they do decide to take that step, then we will have an equal right to abrogate not only the ABM Treaty, but also the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation Treaty, which will contain a similar article with analogous wording. Therefore the most rapid conclusion and implementation of a treaty reducing offensive arms by half will be a real political guarantee against abrogation of the ABM Treaty.

The deputies complain that at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks "the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a concession to the United States by agreeing not to count sea-based cruise missiles, approximately 4,000 of which could be deployed within the near future." They also object to reductions in our heavy missiles, "which serve as a deterrent factor against the Americans."

In actuality we are talking about limiting cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at a separate level of 800 units, with the USSR's rights on a par with those of the United States. Cruise missiles with conventional warheads, which the authors included in that figure of 4,000, could also be deployed by the USSR in unlimited number. These matters should be discussed at future naval talks, the path to which passes through implementation of a conventional forces treaty in Europe.

As for heavy ICBMs, a reduction in them by 50 percent combined with an overall arms reduction by one-half is not only logical, it is actually essential to our security. If there were no proportional reduction in heavy ICBMs, then there

would arise a serious imbalance in the Soviet triad: 3,000 warheads, i.e. over one-half of the total permitted number (6,000) would be concentrated on just 300 large missiles comprising fewer than 20 percent of all launchers (1,600 total). In that case instead of being a "deterrent factor" they would be a target for the Americans, especially considering the fact that ICBMs in their launch silos are now vulnerable to modern precise and powerful warheads with independently targetable projectiles. Under these conditions, by concentrating such a large proportion of warheads on heavy missiles, we would not be able to adequately disperse our forces onto more viable land-mobile launchers, submarines or bombers.

Where To Save Money

The authors produce a table indicating that the expense of eliminating arms and monitoring the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms will cost R830 million [rubles], that the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe will cost R1.65 billion, and that overall (including the INF Treaty plus nuclear testing and chemical weapons treaties) the total cost of disarmament in 1991-95 is estimated at R3.16 billion. The methodology followed in arriving at these figures is unclear: one can only assume that they were obtained by the authors from competent military sources.

This is in fact quite a large sum of money. However, the deputies' conclusion that the treaties are unfeasible "at a time of perestroika and economic crisis" seems false. What is really absurd in our severely difficult economic situation is to keep on forging such a large quantity of arms that we are subsequently forced to reduce them on a large scale in order to establish parity with the other side and prevent reciprocal expansion (which would then require counter-measures by our side, and so on endlessly).

Incidentally, if the three deputies are so concerned about saving the people's money, then they should ask why the 1991 military budget increased from R71 million to R97 million. This increase was once again the result of arms purchases, not concern for improvement in the army's living conditions, specifically construction of housing for officers who have no apartments.

In their reasoning as published in DOMOSTROY the deputies complain that "our military cutbacks are being carried out immediately, while the Americans and NATO countries are still by and large merely planning theirs." The authors sarcastically propose unilateral disarmament of the USSR by the year 2000 in order to convince everyone of our "long-range love for peace."

Yet is there any cause for sarcasm here? Yes, in recent years we have made unilateral cuts in a number of categories of conventional arms. Yet in all those categories we previously had substantial superiority over the United States (and in a majority of them over NATO as a whole). And even after those reductions we were not below the other side's level in a single category. As for the United States, in the past it, too, has repeatedly made unilateral cuts in its armed forces and defense budget.

Just one of numerous examples: the withdrawal of 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe in the 1980's. In the very recent past the United States has eliminated more than 20 major new weapons systems, while a number of programs have been cut back (this was the fate of the Stealth bomber and the Trident submarine).

We also must not forget that as we reduce we are also modernizing the majority of our types and classes of weapons, and on a larger scale than cost-conscious America. It is just that the Soviet public and the Supreme Soviet do not yet deem it necessary to make that known.

It is clear that no one is proposing that we disarm unilaterally. We are talking about ensuring a realistic and publicly justified sufficiency of defense. Treaties on arms limitation and reduction do not contradict efforts to ensure sufficiency; on the contrary, they aid in those efforts. They increase military stability and the predictability of mutually lowered levels in the strategic balance on both a global and a regional scale. Agreements also make it possible to decrease the wastefulness of competition and focus our efforts on the qualitative aspects of defense (including the quality of life for military personnel), technical reliability and our army's combat readiness.

One cannot help but be alarmed by the whole philosophy reflected in the three deputies' critical comments. It is this: the Union's security can be ensured only if its armed forces are in no way inferior to the combined armed forces of all probable opponents together, opponents which include the United States, the European NATO member countries, China, Japan and other countries. If we attempt to oppose all the largest powers in the world simultaneously as "potential adversaries," then

they will inevitably become our real enemies and will in response close ranks and expand their military efforts. It is true not just of the USSR, which finds itself in a state of the deepest domestic crisis, but of any other power: no one country could bear up under that kind of confrontation. We have already taken that route in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, and it has cost our state colossal expenditures which have transformed it, to use the words of Colonel Alksnis himself, into "an Upper Volta with missiles."

The new political thinking proclaimed in the mid-1980's set a goal of breaking out of this vicious circle and using political means to break the endless spiral of increasing military confrontation. Soviet policy has achieved considerable success in that direction in just five years. Thanks to major political decisions, treaties and unilateral steps toward partial arms reductions the USSR's national security has not been weakened, but instead has grown substantially stronger in military and strategic terms. The principal threat today is not the military threat from without, especially since in the majority of weapons categories we are still ahead of any world power. The real threat stems from the disintegration of our economy, still overloaded by a huge military burden, and from our acute ethnic and sociopolitical problems, i.e. from those areas in which perestroika has unfortunately not been adequately developed. If we, as the authors put it, "are begging for alms" from other countries, then it is precisely because of this approach to ensuring our security reflected in DOMOSTROY, not because we now have fewer missiles.

Only continuity in our political course, along with long-overdue radical internal transformations, can guarantee an end to our country's crisis and restoration of its status as a great power on a fundamentally new basis.

U.S., Israeli Role in Mideast Peace Assessed

LD1104161391 Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS international observer Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's second Mideast tour since the end of the Gulf war has certainly helped clarify the positions of the main participants in the conflict.

Along with this, Baker has been able to pinpoint problems awaiting solution within the framework of Washington's new peace initiative. Frankly speaking, many of them appear unsurmountable.

However, Washington seems to stick to the principle that the beginning is the most difficult part of any road. Contacts and talks are expected to settle numerous contradictions and provide a firm ground on which to base compromise solutions. So help them God.

The United States seems to have discarded the fear that an international conference on the Middle East, once convened, is sure to become a tool wielded by Moscow to consolidate Soviet influence in the region.

Nevertheless, according to James Baker, the time is not yet ripe to translate the idea into reality. Baker is clearly following in the wake of Tel Aviv's policy with its readiness to do anything at all to avoid the convocation of a forum in which all five Security Council permanent members are expected to take part. This seems to have motivated the proposition to convene a regional conference under auspices of the Soviet Union and the United States and with the participation of all direct participants in the conflict.

In principle, this idea can hardly be objected against. A regional forum is certainly a fair practical opportunity for the sides to meet at a round table.

However, Israel stresses that the formal opening of the conference should be followed by direct separate talks with representatives of Arab states. Tel Aviv agrees to involve Palestinians in the talks, but only if they appear as members of the Jordanian or the Pan-Arab delegation.

Arab countries, in turn, regard a Mideast conference as a tool with the help of which to implement U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. In these resolutions the return of the territories occupied by Israel to their legitimate owners is regarded as the basic component of the Middle East settlement. Damascus, for instance, is fully committed to this provision.

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, however, sticks to the viewpoint of Israeli extremist circles and hence makes no bones about declaring that he has no intention whatsoever to part with the lands seized from Palestinians. Many people, including James Baker, regard this as a direct attempt to torpedo the opportunity, that has offered itself after the Gulf war, to reach peace in the Middle East.

Western media stress that the most difficult link in Baker's tour is Damascus, where he is due to arrive today. But it would be more correct to say that the most difficult stage of Baker's tour is already behind him—in Tel Aviv, where he suffered some losses.

Syria's stance is after all based on the clear-cut position of the world community of nations, which can hardly be ignored. The Israeli stance, on the other hand, is based on approaches which largely lack a sober-minded, comprehensive analysis of the newly-emerging situation in the region.

It should be said in plain English, leaving diplomatic circumlocutions aside, that Israel was and remains the main obstacle to the implementation of any peace initiative, including the latest American one.

EC, UN Response to Enclave Proposal Cited

PM1104125191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 91 Union Edition p 7

[IZVESTIYA press service report: "European Council: No Place for Saddam Husayn in Civilized Community"]

[Excerpts] "The European Council cannot imagine how Iraq could return to the community of civilized states as long as Saddam Husayn remains in power," Jacques Santer, the Luxembourg head of government, has stated.

He made this statement on behalf of the leaders of the 12 West European states who had gathered for a routine meeting in Luxembourg. [passage omitted]

Those taking part in the session also unanimously supported the proposal from British Prime Minister John Major for the creation of a "security enclave" in northern Iraq for the Kurdish refugees. Addressing the press conference, J. Major reported that this proposal has been brought to the attention of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and that London intends to seek support for this idea from the Soviet Union and China. He stressed that the plan for creating this zone is not an attempt to divide Iraq; it will exist temporarily—until the Iraqi authorities cease the repressions against the Turks. But UN Secretary General X. Perez de Cuellar, answering journalists' questions about the possibility of creating such an enclave, said: "It would be very complex, although I do not consider it impossible." He reported that the United Nations intends to send a special mission to Iraq to study the position of the Kurdish population on the spot. [passage omitted]

United States & Canada

Current Status of Relations With U.S. Viewed

PM1104151791 Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA*
in Russian No 12, Mar 91 (Signed to Press 19 Mar 91)
pp 14-15

[Article by Igor Malashenko: "USSR-United States: Halfway to Where?"]

[Excerpts] Can we expect any new breakthroughs in Soviet-U.S. relations after James Baker's visit to Moscow?

To all appearances, Washington is on the verge of reassessing its policy of constructive cooperation with the USSR which it has followed over the last 18 months. What has happened? And where do Washington and Moscow go from here in their mutual relations—further forward or further back? [passage omitted]

Trust Called Into Question

Recent events in the Soviet Union are not the only argument employed by advocates of a review of Soviet-American relations. Problems have arisen in the area of arms limitation and reduction, which has retained its key significance, and complications have also appeared in the course of the Persian Gulf conflict.

Ratification of the CFE Treaty is under threat—the United States and the whole of the West view the movement of Soviet military hardware beyond the Urals as a violation of the treaty, but the main objection is the hasty transfer of three divisions of Soviet infantry forces, which are subject to cuts to the coast defense force, which is not subject to cuts.

The confidence that exists between the USSR and its foreign partners, which has required a good many years and considerable efforts to achieve, has been placed in jeopardy. The situation threatens a deterioration in the USSR's relations with the surrounding world.

Many people in Washington are convinced, or pretend to be convinced, that in striving to put an end to the conflict in the Persian Gulf zone by peaceful means, the Soviet Union went too far toward accommodating Iraq and thus acted contrary to the interests of the United States. A whole set of complaints were directed at the USSR, ranging from partially justified reproaches for tactical mistakes during talks with the Iraqis to the completely absurd accusations that in putting forward its peace initiative Moscow was attempting to provoke Washington into an early start to military operations for which U.S. troops were not prepared.

It must be said that right-wing pressure during the conflict did not make a particular impression on the Bush administration: The administration has reliable control of the U.S. political center ground and has notched up too many points thanks to its success in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. leadership preferred to stress the

purely positive side of Soviet-U.S. cooperation during the crisis, emphasizing the importance of Soviet support for United Nations resolutions, and admitting the usefulness of the USSR's efforts to bring about peace and, most important of all, the need for the USSR to participate in shaping a postwar security system in the region. On the whole it was in this spirit that Secretary of State Baker acted during his tour of Near East capitals, and afterwards in Moscow he continued to discuss the set of problems linked to a postwar settlement.

The Near and Middle East was one of the basic regions where the U.S. policy of "containing" the Soviet Union was implemented. Therefore a review—even a partial one—of this approach may be viewed as evidence that the Bush administration is prepared to go "beyond the framework of containment" not just in word but in deed as well. Of course, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and therefore we still have to convince ourselves of the extent in practice to which the Americans will consider the Soviet Union's interests in this region adjacent to its borders.

However, the Bush administration is in no hurry to go "beyond the framework of containment" in certain other areas of Soviet-American relations, and first and foremost in the area of arms limitation and reduction.

It looks as though U.S. inflexibility on the issue of getting out of the deadlock which has developed around the CFE Treaty is linked not just with the actual complications that have arisen but with declining U.S. interest in this agreement in the light of Soviet troops' withdrawing from Eastern Europe, a process that cannot now be halted. It seems that Washington has also decided to try to get as much as it can out of a solution to the remaining contentious issues at the strategic offensive weapons talks by openly linking them with CFE problems and remaining undeterred by the danger of the talks dragging on and the possibility of a further postponement of a summit meeting. In this case Soviet-American relations will not be given the new impetus which in recent years has come first and foremost from summits, and will continue to lose momentum. And although the secretary of state's visit has brought about one or two slight shifts, it hardly promises a new breakthrough in relations between the two countries. And so, even if the administration is not going to make a decision to return to a waiting game until some time in the near future, in reality we may be in precisely this situation.

Whose interests does this satisfy? Hardly our own: We have not lost interest in a reduction in the level of the military budget, in political cooperation with the Americans in key regions, or, especially, in the need for trading and economic cooperation—in a word, in multifaceted cooperation with the superpower which, let us put it like this, has emerged from the "cold war" with significantly fewer losses than our country. The Americans' interests are hardly served either: Today, when the Soviet Union is passing through a period so critical that the situation

18 months or two years ago seems almost the embodiment of stability. Baker's old remark that inactivity is of no benefit to the United States is just as true as ever.

The ministers have met. Over to the presidents?

Alleged 'Secret' Yazov Visit to Germany Denied

PM1104105191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

["Rejoinder" by Major General G. Kashuba, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Press Center: "How Many Hats Does Mr. Gerts Have?"]

[Text] On 4 April THE WASHINGTON TIMES published an article by its employee B. Gerts [name as transliterated] under the headline "Yazov's Trip Introduced Tension into Soviet-German Ties." Citing an anonymous spokesman for the FRG Embassy in Washington, the article's author reports that in March this year Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, made a "secret" trip to East Germany. The word "secret" also defines the substance of the article, which is couched in the spirit of the "cold war" times. It includes claims of perfidious plans for secret operations by the Soviet military leadership against the FRG, insinuations about the political and moral state of personnel of the Western Group of Forces, and distortions of obvious facts.

Frankly speaking, I feel sorry for readers of THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Mr. Gerts probably holds such a low opinion of them that he considers them capable of constantly swallowing such base misinformation. Judge for yourselves.

On 5 March 1991 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published the information report "Visit to the Western Group of Forces." It stated, in particular, that "Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR minister of defense, visited the Western Group of Forces 2-3 March. During his brief stay in the Western Group of Forces the defense minister presented to a group of officers and generals orders and medals conferred by a USSR presidential decree and addressed the officers of Wuensdorf Garrison." On the same day SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA, the daily newspaper of the Western Group of Forces, carried the reportage "For Loyal Service to the Motherland" illustrated with photographs of the USSR defense minister presenting state awards to officers and generals of the Western Group of Forces.

Let us remind you that Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov arrived in the group of forces Saturday afternoon, 2 March, and the awards were presented on Sunday 3 March—which in itself attests to the purpose of his trip. As is known, the USSR presidential decree conferring awards on a large group of Soviet Army and Navy servicemen was pegged to the 73d anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces, 23 February.

So, Mr. Gerts described as "secret" a trip which was reported by two daily newspapers, including a central one. Is there any need, after this, to speak of the authenticity and objectivity of his entire article?

However, it cannot be ruled out that the readers no longer take seriously such "revelations" by this employee of THE WASHINGTON TIMES. The false, inflammatory, provocative nature of B. Gerts' fabrications about the "secret" plans of the Soviet Union and, in particular, its military leadership" [quotation marks as published] has been exposed repeatedly in the press.

Incidentally, there can be no doubt that this topic has become the object of his professional specialization. Recently, for example, at the height of the conflict in the Persian Gulf zone he tried repeatedly to present public opinion with malicious fabrications about the Soviet Union's stand on that crisis. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA described one such attempt, in particular, on 25 January this year, when it showed the flimsy nature of the allegations of B. Gerts, who once again cited nameless analysts and officials and wrote about the presence of Soviet military advisers in Iraq and about our supposedly continuing to supply that country with combat hardware and arms.

The aims of such articles is obvious—to cast aspersions on the USSR's foreign policy and to sow mistrust toward it on the part of our partners. And these aims are equally obvious in the article published 4 April. Moreover, its very title exposes the author for what he is and conveys his longing for "tension in Soviet-German ties."

In another recent article of his—"Soviets Increase the Number of Anti-U.S. Articles"—B. Gerts, along with other press organs, accuses KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of misinformation and "fanning anti-U.S. hysteria." You really can "tell a thief by his burning hat."

While on the subject of headgear. People in Britain, for example, say of someone caught red-handed telling a lie: "He must eat his hat." It would be interesting to know how many hats Mr. Gerts has.

Hats seem to have become a constant dish in his diet.

Northeast Asia

Gorbachev Discusses Kurils in NHK Interview

OW1204015891 Tokyo NHK General Television
Network in Japanese 2200 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev by NHK President Keiji Shima on 11 April at the presidential reception room in the Kremlin—Shima questions recorded in Japanese; Gorbachev answers in Russian with Japanese subtitles, translated from the Russian]

[Text] Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev granted an exclusive interview to NHK President Keiji Shima on 11

April. In the interview President Gorbachev, citing Sino-Soviet border talks as an example, expressed his desire to resolve the Northern Territories issue for good in the process of deepening cooperative relations further between the two countries across the board. An agreement was reported recently in the Sino-Soviet border talks.

NHK President Shima's interview with President Gorbachev was held at the presidential reception room in the Kremlin for 70 minutes.

In the interview President Gorbachev touched on the border issue, saying that a peace treaty could not be signed unless the border is demarcated. He then expressed his desire to find a final solution to the issue in the midst of further deepening cooperative relations between Japan and the Soviet Union across the board, citing Sino-Soviet border talks as an example.

According to recent information from the Soviet side, an agreement reportedly was reached between China and the Soviet Union at their border talks on the demarcation of the border, including those on the islands in the Ussuri and Amur Rivers. The borders had been a pending issue.

That President Gorbachev cited the Sino-Soviet border talks as an example is believed to hint at the possibility of the Soviet side conceding and changing the borders if Japan examines the unresolved border issue while simultaneously expanding trade and personnel contacts as in Sino-Soviet relations.

[Shima] As long as you promote your perestroika policy throughout the world, I want to ask you first from various angles and in concrete detail what you think of the issue of new borders between Japan and the Soviet Union as one of the new frameworks in the Far East.

[Gorbachev] Well, you have mentioned the border issue. But this is a part of the preparations for adopting a peace treaty. Let us go... [changes thought] We have made and will exert further efforts in this regard. Here we will have to take a look at everything, including... [changes thought] A peace treaty cannot be signed if the border also is not determined. Let us take it all; we are ready to discuss this. [Japanese subtitled version reads: "The border is an issue that should be resolved on the basis of concluding a peace treaty. We must examine all issues while exerting efforts. Therefore, we are ready to discuss it actively."]

As a matter of fact, we have a 7,500-km long border with China. There were some problems and questions. We are looking at these in a spirit of goodwill and in the framework of overall cooperation in all spheres with the PRC. This is how I view it. In other words, a movement toward one another is needed, not preconditions; a movement toward reality. [Japanese subtitled version reads: "The border with China is long and there were various troubles between China and the Soviet Union.

Out two countries discussed problems while having goodwill and cooperating in all spheres. I want to resolve the territorial issue between Japan and the Soviet Union in the same way. In other words, it is important to start talks without laying down preconditions."]

[Shima] Mr. President, as you said just now, a peace treaty cannot be concluded if the territorial issue is left unresolved. It may sound odd for me to say this because I am on the Japanese side, but Japan has been taking that one-sided attitude. This time, however, I believe it will be different. This time, Mr. President, you are our opposite number. It is Mr. Gorbachev. We hope that you will seize this opportunity to build new relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. You will see for yourself when you go to Japan that the cherry blossoms are in bloom. They are very beautiful. I am sure you will see them, too. We hope that you will use all means to build very fruitful Japanese-Soviet relations as beautifully as the cherry blossoms.

[Gorbachev] You know that when solving any issue there are always, or one generally finds, a minimum of two approaches. Some say we should take this path and follow it, cover the course, and overcome obstacles. Generally, you have to climb the mountain to get to the top. [v obshchem, dorogu osilit idushchiy] There is another approach; namely, to do it in a sweep, with a charge, to solve everything with a cavalry charge, with an attack.

I believe that issues of this sort—like our relations—that affect the destinies of people, the relations between our states—and this is not simply a question of the present but of the future as well—demand enormous responsibility and, I repeat, a movement toward one another. During this movement, very many spheres of cooperation will appear between us, in various regions, on certain islands, on the sea coast, and so on and so forth. And many things will fall into place of their own accord. I prefer this course, a movement toward our new relations, and decisively support the idea of making them both dynamic and large-scale so that they will truly correspond to the possibilities of our two states and two peoples. [Japanese subtitled version reads: "Issues like territories between two countries, which affect the destinies of countries, are accompanied by enormous responsibility. Therefore, I believe that we need to meet each other half-way, step-by-step while cooperating. The budding of cooperation already has started in the coastal areas and islands. It is necessary to foster and develop these moves of cooperation. It is to build new relations between the two countries. I intend to make resolute efforts toward that course. It will lead to the two countries' development and open up possibilities for them."]

Bessmertnykh on Gorbachev's Visit to Japan

LD1104130291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0926 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Interview with Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, by TASS correspondent Vasily Golovnin; place and date not given:

"USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Bessmertnykh Interview with TASS Correspondent in Connection with the USSR President's Forthcoming Visit to Japan"]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Apr (TASS)—A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, has given an interview to TASS correspondent Vasily Golovnin in connection with the USSR president's forthcoming visit to Japan.

[Golovnin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, M.S. Gorbachev is making an official visit to Japan from 16 to 19 April. Our country has very extensive relations with Japan, but at the same time these ties are not simple. One might just mention that there is to this day no peace treaty between the USSR and Japan, although almost half a century has now passed since August 1945. In this connection I would like to hear from you what aims are being set up for the upcoming visit, and what we expect from it.

[Bessmertnykh] First of all, our head of state is to go to this country for the first time in the history of Russian-Japanese and Soviet-Japanese relations. The time has come for this visit to be made at summit level for talks with the Japanese leadership to discuss the current state of and prospects for bilateral relations. Japan is one of our closest neighbors, yet relations with it have not, unfortunately, been settled over a prolonged period because of certain circumstances of which you are well aware. We now expect relations to be strengthened as a result of this visit. It is proposed to sign a broad range of bilateral agreements of the most diverse kind—economic, cultural, social, and so on. There will also, of course, be discussion of the core issue, which we are calling the question of completing work on the peace treaty.

The peace treaty is the aim that both sides have set for themselves. Of course, within the framework of the peace treaty we will be striving to deal with the issues of territorial demarcation, since any peace treaty assumes accord on the delineation of the border.

The very fact that direct talks are being held between the leadership of the USSR and Japan, which will make it possible to review all the issues, express worries, and openly discuss everything that has accumulated, is important. It will be useful and timely to communicate with the people of Japan, assess their mood, and show that we are amicably disposed toward them.

[Golovnin] You mentioned the question of territorial demarcation. Japan has up to now made the development of economic and political ties between our countries to a great extent dependent on the solution of this problem. What do you see as the most constructive way to step up the activity of bilateral relations?

[Bessmertnykh] You know, such dependency is not being established directly now. I think that the Japanese leadership is very well aware that the development of relations in one sphere should not be made directly dependent on another. It is true, of course, that the unresolved nature of the peace treaty problem is to a certain extent

holding back our ties. The key to taking relations to the highest level, however, lies in developing strong streams of cooperation in the most diverse areas. We will reach a new level of trust through this cooperation. Trust will make it possible to deal with the most delicate and difficult issues. That is, I think, the logic of it. I might say straight away that no peace treaty will be concluded on this visit; it will take more time. Having launched cooperation, however, we will reach a solution of the most difficult tasks facing us.

[Golovnin] One hears that the Asia-Pacific region is the outcast of Soviet diplomacy, which pays much greater attention to the United States and Europe. Of course, the forthcoming visit to Japan by the USSR president speaks for itself. I would like to hear from you, however, about the overall regional aims that are being set by Soviet diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region under present conditions.

[Bessmertnykh] It is not entirely true that the Asia-Pacific region is a forgotten or semi-forgotten zone of our foreign policy interests. It can be only said that progress in this direction has not yet been as great as, let's say, in Europe. The European tasks were tackled long ago. The situation there was in some ways even more simple. Europe was divided into two camps, and as soon as the demarcation line was removed, common European processes rapidly started to develop, and a new atmosphere began to be created on the continent.

Of course, everything is more complex in the Asia-Pacific region. Fortunately, one may say that there is no single demarcation line there. There is a mass of interests there and a mass of states with their own national interests, interactions, and so on. Many things are more complex and, maybe, will take longer to solve. There is full interest, however, on the part of the Soviet Union in developing cooperation in this region—above all, economic, political, scientific, technical, and political cooperation—and also in tackling the problems of security. I must say that lately we have felt the growing interest of the countries of this region in discussing security problems.

Various economic organizations exist there; we are ready to cooperate with them closely and we are already joining them in their work. There is a change in this respect, which is not very visible to the world; there are interesting proposals on the part of these states. My recent trip to Tokyo and Beijing showed that the countries of this region regard us as an integral part of the Pacific region as a whole. We intend to continue to work very actively there. Maybe the economic future of the whole world lies in this region; it is developing rapidly and has a colossal potential. We—as a country that is entirely included in this region—plan to be a very active participant in all developing processes. Thus, the Far Eastern, Asian, and Pacific direction of our policy will continue to progress actively.

Lukyanov Vows No Kuril Islands To Be Ceded*LD1104154591 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1400 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Text] In its report the SIBINFORM agency quotes a piece from the newspaper SOVETSKIY SAKHALIN. This cites Zhdakayev, a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet as telling the paper after a meeting with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov that not a single Kuril Island will be handed over to Japan. The USSR Supreme Soviet chairman asked for this information to be conveyed to the people of the Kurils to reassure them. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo will be of a business nature. The country's president does not intend to cede the islands.

Eventual Cooperation With Japan Military Seen*LD1104190191 Moscow World Service in English
1210 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Commentary by military observer Valeriy Chebotaryev]

[Text] In his recent interview to the Japanese news agency KYODO, President Gorbachev said that the countries of Asia and the Pacific show ever more willingness to search for ways for mutual security and this factor has already begun affecting the Soviet-Japanese relations. True, looking back at the years of cold war, we can now speak of the reduction of military tensions between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Soviet unilateral reduction of its armed forces in the Far East and the elimination of its nuclear medium-range missiles as well as other steps in Asia have not passed unnoticed in Japan. And it's quite logical that last year the White Book on Defense, regularly published in Japan, excluded the thesis about the Soviet threat for the first time ever.

The deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Major General (Nikolay Bukteyev) appreciates the fact as follows: While this cannot but provoke definite satisfaction, even if we take into account the fact that the authors of the book still preserve practically untouched all of their substantiation to the thesis. I think that in this particular case, the more important thing is not the arguments but the elimination itself of the cold war symbol. Even though it has so far been removed only from the White Book. Significantly, the Soviet Union too has officially declared that it did not regard Japan as its enemy, what is important is not to allow to revive the enemy image in the Soviet-Japanese relations, for that we need to develop confidence-building measures in the military sphere. The relevant proposals were extended to the Japanese side last autumn. I mean mutual acquaintance with the military doctrines, notifications about large-scale military exercises, invitation of observers, exchanges of military delegations and so on.

The spokesman for the general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin, had this to say on what he thinks on the issue: I think that the advanced proposals could become the basis for the

cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan in ensuring security in the region. The Soviet side was the first to propose cooperation with Japan. The leadership of the Defense Ministry and the command of the Far Eastern Military District, for example, could only welcome all the proposals which could be initiated by the Japanese side and could be eventually directed towards cooperation between the armed forces of our two countries in the Pacific.

Official on Expected Gorbachev-No Tae-u Talks*LD1104193291 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT
11 Apr 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Yevgeniy Aleksandrov]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—The brief working meeting of the Soviet and South Korean presidents scheduled for April 19 will certainly impart an additional political impulse to the development of trade, economic and cultural ties between the two countries, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern and Indo-Chinese Department Sergey Razov said in an interview with TASS today.

He noted that the treaty-and-legal basis for the improvement of bilateral relations was laid during President No Tae-u's official visit to the Soviet Union last December.

There is no definite agenda for the forthcoming Soviet-South Korean summit, Razov said. But it should be expected to focus on key problems of bilateral cooperation, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and ways to regulate it, as well as on pressing international issues.

The high-ranking Soviet diplomat stressed that relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea have been recently characterized by dynamic stability. Last year, for instance, their mutual commodity turnover reached 900 million dollars.

The two countries are now working to develop a number of joint projects to extract mineral resources in the Soviet Union and establish a number of joint ventures. Cultural contacts between the two countries have grown much more intensive.

As regards the situation on the Korean Peninsula, Razov said that the Soviet Union adheres to the position that the Korean people should define ways to settle the situation on its own without any outside interference.

The Soviet Union, Razov said, is ready to contribute in any possible way to the creation of favourable external conditions for such settlement.

In closing, Razov expressed confidence that despite its brevity, the meeting of the Soviet and South Korean presidents will prove productive and fruitful and the sides will be able to exchange views on all problems of interests to them.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

U.S. Aid Freeze to Cambodia's Sihanouk Viewed

LD1104200991 Moscow TASS in English 1753 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS international observer Sergey Afonin]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—THE NEW YORK TIMES said on Wednesday that the U.S. Administration had decided to freeze American aid to Prince Sihanouk forces following reports about their collaboration with Pol Pot cutthroats.

This is a new development in the political stance of Washington, which has recently notably enlivened its activity in this direction in the spirit of the draft agreement on the settlement in Cambodia drawn up by the permanent members of the U.S. Security Council.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon said on Tuesday that time was ripe for peace in Cambodia. He spoke upon the conclusion of his meeting with Vietnam's permanent envoy to the United Nations Trinh Huan Lang.

The leaders of the State of Cambodia stressed during their recent talks with U.S. senators their readiness to continue talks on political settlement and the Cambodian people's desire to end bloodshed and establish peace in the country the soonest possible.

Phnom Penh reiterated its determination to work towards the inclusion into any political decision of provisions for specific measures to preclude the return of Pol Pot thugs to power.

As hostilities continue to cause death and devastation in Cambodia, the achievement of the ceasefire and an end to military supplies to the Cambodian sides are now of utmost importance. This would undoubtedly bring closer the time of the final settlement of the conflict.

Although difficulties are unavoidable, it would be most important to hold the scheduled meeting of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia in Jakarta with the participation of the cochairman of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia in a constructive, good-will atmosphere.

Summing up the results of his recent visit to China, where problems of the Cambodian conflict were examined, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said, among other things, that the influx of arms into the region should stop and a moratorium be imposed on supplies of weapons to the region.

This idea was first formulated during a Soviet-American meeting in 1989 and has lost none of its significance since. This attitude is shared, for instance, by Hanoi, which recently proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States should urgently discuss measures to implement this initiative.

Near East & South Asia

Commentary Reviews Kurdish Refugee Situation

LD1204013991 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Arabic 1400 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Andrey Vasilev commentary]

[Excerpts] The U.S. has warned Iraq not to fly any type of fighter aircraft near the Turkish border. The reason for this step is to try to protect all the Kurdish refugees against air raids. The warning also extends to Baghdad's combat operations against the Kurds in this region. Our radio commentator, Andrey Vasilev wrote in this respect:

The most surprising thing is that the Kurds hold Saddam Husayn and George Bush equally responsible for their tragedies. They believe that the misdeed of the U.S. President is that when he started the war against Saddam Husayn, he did not take it to its logical end. [passage omitted]

The leaders of the Kurdish anti-government movement put strong pressure on the U.S. Administration to intervene in the events taking place, but President Bush refuses to do so, with the same determination he showed to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Direct military support for the Kurds is open intervention in the country's affairs, and a violation of the UN mandate. This step will be subject to criticism in and out of the Arab world.

There is, in theory, a chance to discuss the current situation within the UN framework and to adopt a resolution to give the green light to the use of force to protect the Kurds. Effectively, consultations are being held at the United Nations about this issue. It seems, however, that a positive solution to the question is highly unlikely, since such a resolution would be a dangerous precedent to the use of force, even if it is under international cover, in order to solve the internal problems of sovereign states.

Is it possible to find a way out of the situation? What is in store for Iraq in the immediate future?

The situation of the Kurdish revolutionaries in the north is the same as that of the Shiites in the south. They are determined to struggle with resolve and do not intend to lay down their arms, despite crushing defeats. They are talking about the possibility of the Lebanonization of Iraq, if Saddam Husayn's regime does not fall in the near future. This is a very sad thing for the country, whose industrial capacity has effectively been destroyed because of the war. As for Iraq's rivals, they lean more toward the continuation of sanctions, which also make rapid reconstruction of the national economy impossible. In any case, there are difficult times in store for Iraq.

Support For UK Plan for Kurds Viewed

LD1104230491 Moscow World Service in English
2000 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Yuriy Kostin commentary]

[Text] The problem of Kurds has now become one of the most painful issues in a postwar settlement in the gulf. Britain offered its own plan for resolving it. Yuriy Kostin of our staff considers that despite the initially guarded reaction it received from other coalition members, the British plan stands a good chance of being enforced, partly at least. The proposal by the British prime minister, Mr. John Major, to set up a safe haven for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq, did precipitate searches for ways to resolve the issue.

The United Nations passed a resolution to provide a multinational humanitarian aid to the Iraqi Kurds, to be monitored by its military units. The Soviet Union has also agreed to be involved in the action. President Gorbachev's aide, Mr. Vitaliy Ignatenko, told reporters in Moscow that the Soviet Union had expressed solidarity with the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. Many say the UN-approved attempt by many countries to maintain some kind of order in the areas of northern Iraq, now crowded by Kurdish refugees, is nothing short of a partial admission of the effectiveness of the British plan, which had been given clear support by other European community countries. It was also given an enthusiastic welcome in the Middle East countries, including Iran.

Inconclusive reports say the Americans, who refused to comment on Mr. Major's plan, are now close to supporting it. However, U.S. officials hasten to say that the administration's recent warning to the Iraqi Government against any military operation in northern Iraq was not part of the plan for a safe haven for the Iraqi Kurds. The United States can hardly relish the prospect of military involvement in the civil conflict in Iraq, although the U.S. public now seems to be bent more to charge Mr. Bush with ignoring Saddam Husayn's crimes against part of his own nation than reminding him of the tragic experience of the war in Vietnam.

A number of Soviet analysts believe Mr. Major's safe haven plan was prompted by public pressure at home. On the negative side the plan is in breach of international acts and the UN Charter because it infringes on Iraqi sovereignty. This has now become a restraining factor to many states which are prepared to get involved in the UN humanitarian aid, but prefer a more cautious stand on the safe haven for the Kurds in Iraq, let alone monitored by a multinational force.

Explaining his government's position, the British foreign secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, reiterated the coalition had no desire to redraw the Iraqi borders. For his part, the British ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. David Hannay, stressed the establishment of a safe haven for Kurds was a humanitarian idea, not a political one.

Come what may, the enforcement of the plan designed to protect the interests of nearly 2 million Kurds of Iraq, now subject to brutal harassment and intimidation, may well lead to certain changes in the administrative and territorial structure of that country. British officials have already pledged support for a Kurdish autonomy as a long-range priority.

No one knows what amount of difficulties lie ahead, both for the Kurds and those who took the trouble to try to resolve the Kurdish problem. What is clear, meanwhile, is that the current events around northern Iraq are just the beginning of a new political process in the region.

Commentary Views U.S., Soviet Mideast Policy

PM0904143091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 12, 24-31 Mar 91 p 3

[Aleksandr Vasilyev article: "USSR-USA: First Round After the War"]

[Text] US Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Moscow has achieved no results. It was impossible to remove differences in the field of conventional arms which had arisen after the Soviet Union, in a bid to save military hardware from the destruction envisaged by the multilateral agreement signed in Paris, shipped thousands of tanks across the Urals and transferred three divisions into the naval forces category. No results were yielded either by talks between experts on strategic offensive armaments [SOA]. No date has been fixed for the Soviet-US summit at which a treaty on SOA would have to be signed. In short the US Secretary of State left Moscow with practically nothing because, as I see it, Moscow's clearer idea of the motives prompting the Kremlin to behave like this, there is a need to turn to another problem brought into the focus of Soviet-American relations—Middle East settlement.

It will be recalled that prior to his arrival in the Soviet Union James Baker negotiated for 11 days with the leaders of seven Middle East states, the agenda of his talks including four points: the creation of a security system, arms control in the region, the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the economic development of Middle East countries. As a result, he was only able to secure progress in the question of building inter-Arab peace-keeping forces in the Persian Gulf. However Baker was unable to advance in the main direction, i.e., to secure understanding between Israel and the Palestinians.

In the Middle East the United States has encountered problems which can only be resolved by political means. Moreover time has been working against the Americans. The farther it goes, the more their military presence in the region will irk the "Arab street". Washington faced a similar phenomenon nine years ago in Lebanon, and the White House needs to hurry. However, the Americans' active contacts with the Arabs have evoked dissatisfaction in Tel Aviv.

A curious detail: on his way from Riyadh to Cairo Baker phoned from his plane to Moscow and suggested sharing information on the results of his trip around the Middle East, even before his arrival in the Soviet Union, to give the Kremlin time to size up the situation and prepare its considerations. Everything here is unusual: a phone call from a plane on such an important occasion is a rarity in diplomatic practice. The United States' readiness for cooperation with the USSR in the Middle East, confirmed by taking such steps, is also fairly new, given the cooling of relations between the two powers after the emergence of the Soviet-Iraqi plan for a peaceful settlement in the Persian Gulf. This testifies that most likely the White House is already beginning to understand that, single-handed without the Soviet Union's assistance, America will not be able to cope with Middle East settlement even despite the brilliant termination of its Desert Storm operation.

The USSR's position in the Middle East is unique today: not having fired a single shot, Moscow has in general retained its influence in the region. Its non-participation in hostilities has enabled it to keep old friends—Iraq, for one—something that gives the Soviet Union the potential for playing the part of middleman between Baghdad and Washington, scoring points in so doing. The Middle East is the only region of the globe where our country can prove that it has still remained a Great Power, not having spent a single kopek on economic or military aid. This state of affairs will persist until contradictions between the Israelis and the Arabs cease to exist and as long as the USA is considered to be Israel's closest ally.

Of course, Moscow and Washington's interests in the Middle East dovetail in some respects. For example, both superpowers have a stake in maintaining stability in the region and in keeping Muslim fundamentalists as far as possible from state authority. However the Soviet Union doesn't want Pax Americana to prevail there, which is why the Kremlin, for example, wants the security system in the Middle East to include both Iraq and Iran (this is exactly what Mikhail Gorbachev told James Baker during their talks in Moscow)—something that the White House takes exception to for the time being.

In this way, feeling its strength in this key region of the globe, Moscow has, I believe, decided to take a more rigid, pragmatic stand towards the United States, and not only on the question of Middle East settlement. As far as conventional and strategic weapons are concerned, this problem, as I see it, is a matter of home rather than foreign policy for the USSR. No one believes any longer in the threat of global war between East and West. On the other hand, a far greater danger for the Soviet leadership stems from criticism by the military and the Soyuz group, which makes Soviet diplomats be more careful in heeding recommendations from a "man with a gun."

Khowst Fall Called 'Sign' to Najibullah Regime

PM1104151591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel A. Oliynik telephone report: "Alarming Month of Hamal"]

[Excerpts] Kabul, 9 Apr—Hamal is the equivalent of April. In Afghanistan, according to the solar calendar, it is the first month of the year. Afghans greeted their New Year, 1370, with sorrow: After a siege which lasted several days, Khowst—the administrative center of the border district—finally fell under the blows of the mujahidin. [passage omitted]

Indeed, the armed opposition's seizure of Khowst is the first notable mujahidin victory over the Afghan Army in the two years since Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it would be extremely hasty to underestimate it. In my view, the fall of Khowst is a serious sign for the Najibullah regime, having both military and political significance. Opposition leaders, especially Islamic Party of Afghanistan chief Hikmatyar and others, hope that the successful battle for Khowst will rally and strengthen their ranks, greatly depleted as a result of successive defeats and bloody civic strife. They believe this victory may predetermine the course of the entire spring-summer military campaign which, according to their plan, should be a decisive one in the country's struggle for power. Following this logic, it is not difficult to conclude that the mujahidin will soon try to consolidate their success and will launch a large-scale attack in one or other region of the country—around Qandahar, Jalalabad, or Gardeyz....

Now the Afghan government is taking all necessary measures to thwart these plans. Government troops, in conjunction with tribal formations, are reinforcing the defenses around Gardeyz and have repelled the mujahidin attack on Ghown Province. A devastating bombing raid was launched by the Afghan Air Force on combat positions held by Islamic Party of Afghanistan armed formations in Lowgar Province.

....The Afghans greeted the first month of the New Year with fear. Will tomorrow bring to this ancient people a further escalation of military activity, or will the real quest for a political solution to the Afghan problem finally begin?

East Europe

General Staff Deputy on Withdrawal From Poland

PM1104135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by correspondent N. Burbyga; no place or date specified: "Troop Trains Heading East From Poland"]

[Text] The first subunits of Soviet troops stationed in Poland will leave for home 9 April. On the eve of this event our correspondent met with Colonel General A. Kleymenov, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

[Burbyga] Anatoliy Nikolayevich, what kind of grouping of forces do we have in Poland?

[Kleymenov] The grouping numbers around 50,000 servicemen. It comprises several formations and combined units and also a large number of separate units. Armaments include more than 1,000 heavy tracked vehicles, more than 10,000 wheeled vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters. But it must be borne in mind that not only will servicemen and military hardware be leaving, but hospitals, schools, public and consumer institutions, and officers' and warrant officers' families will also be going. The grouping is considerably smaller than the one in the FRG. And this, of course, makes our task easier.

[Burbyga] Who and what is going to leave in the immediate future?

[Kleymenov] Despite the fact that the withdrawal agreement had not yet been signed between our country and Poland, we will nonetheless be withdrawing several subunits in the first half of April. Maintenance and support units will be the first to go, and we will also be taking away ammunition, fuel, clothing, and other gear and supplies.

[Burbyga] What is the deadline for the withdrawal of forces?

[Kleymenov] The Polish leadership has ordered us to complete all the work by the end of the year.

[Burbyga] Is it a realistic deadline?

[Kleymenov] No. January, February, and March have already gone. Only nine months remain. Moreover, the withdrawal of forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia has not yet been completed and the withdrawal from Germany has only just started...

[Burbyga] What awaits those returning home? Have barracks been prepared for the soldiers and temporary accommodation for servicemen's families?

[Kleymenov] Of course, there will be problems. One should have no illusions. We are physically unable to provide housing for everyone: We do not have it. But every effort is being made to ease the resettlement problems. Not for nothing are we withdrawing the forces nearer the summer. And the first to leave, as I said, will be those who will organize housing for their comrades.

[Burbyga] It is known that many servicemen will be discharged as a result of the cuts. Is there a coordinating organ that could help them find work and accommodation?

[Kleymenov] Some of the first to leave Poland are those least affected by the cuts. As for a coordinating organ to help servicemen find work and accommodation, it does not exist in the Army, alas. The law says that local soviets are supposed to deal with all these matters.

General on Stages of Withdrawal

LD1004122891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0940 GMT 10 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 10 Apr (TASS)—"The Soviet Union plans to fully eliminate its Northern Group of Forces in Poland by the end of 1993," Major General Vladimir Zhurbenko, deputy head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff [zamestitel nachalnika glavnogo upravleniya generalnogo shtaba vooruzhennykh], declared today. He gave an interview to the TASS correspondent in connection with the dispatch from Poland of an echelon of personnel and rocket brigade weaponry. "The dispatch of this echelon to the Soviet Union marks the start of the final stage in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland," the General Staff representative noted.

The general said that the withdrawal of the rocket brigade now under way was planned in accordance with the defensive doctrine adopted in the USSR. According to this concept, "by 1995 Soviet troops will not be stationed on the territory of other countries," he pointed out.

Vladimir Zhurbenko recalled that in accordance with the USSR's plans to cut troops in Europe, the withdrawal of units and subunits from Poland began as long as two years ago. He mentioned among the troops withdrawn at that time "a training tank regiment, an assault brigade, all construction units, and some rear support units." But the withdrawal of Soviet troops was then halted. "Until autumn 1990, Poland did not insist on their withdrawal from its territory," the General Staff representative pointed out. Nevertheless, he added, hardly had united Germany given assurance that it would not lay claim to a review of Poland's borders, than "the Polish Government returned to the issue."

In 1991, according to the general, about 10,000 Soviet servicemen will leave Poland, and the area of seven military settlements will be completely freed. The withdrawing troops will include some units and subunits of aviation, communications, and engineering troops.

SFRY's Loncar Cited on Bilateral Relations

PM1104135591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 10 Apr 91 First Edition p 5

[TASS correspondent Yu. Kornilov report on interview with Budimir Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign

affairs, in Belgrade; no date of interview given; carried under the "World Events" rubric: "Our Views Are Closer than Ever"]

[Text] Belgrade—Our contemporary world is characterized by the fact that the principles of mutual understanding and equality, to which we are all committed, define to an increasing degree the course of international relations and their future. Against this background, it is worth noting that Yugoslav-Soviet relations, devoid of ideology, mutual fears, claims, and other burdensome factors, have never been more friendly than today, and have never harbored fewer unsolved problems. If we glance at the history of our ties, it is possible to spot one indispensable rule: These relations always developed positively and successfully whenever they complied with specific principles but, by contrast, became complex whenever these principles were consigned to oblivion for whatever reason. So said Budimir Loncar, SFRY federal secretary for foreign affairs, in a conversation with a TASS correspondent, held at the request of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

Of course, everything has its price, Loncar continued. The world is undergoing a period of dramatic change, all states—each in its own way—are involved in the process of these changes, and it is no surprise that in this process we cannot always be completely in step with one another in everything. It is hard to find two sides in the world whose approaches toward all international questions coincide fully. Nevertheless, the sphere of agreement existing between Yugoslavia and the USSR is truly wide. Today, we are closer than ever before in our appraisal, if not of all, then of the key international problems.

B. Loncar noted that the issue here is about global, multifaceted processes unfolding in an era which began after the end of the "Cold War," and especially after the Paris forum of representatives from member states of the all-European conference. Much can be built on the foundations being laid today—both on an economic and social level, and on the level of agreement and the consideration of mutual political interests. We are talking about such questions as convening a Mediterranean conference based on the very same principles as the all-European process, [a conference] on the postwar settlement in the Near East, and the further enhancement of the United Nations' role. I think that all these question will become a topic for discussion during the visit to Yugoslavia by A. Bessmertnykh, USSR minister for foreign affairs, whom I know well.

In response to a question on his opinion of the outlook for Soviet-Yugoslav relations, B. Loncar noted that, although there are no serious problems between our countries in the political sphere, there is limited room for maneuver in the economic sphere, and, given that the USSR has always been one of our main partners, the situation cannot be called brilliant. He stressed, however, that the state of affairs warrants being viewed from a long-term perspective—after all, it is precisely on such a perspective that the processes of transformation,

through which both our countries are passing, are calculated. Both Yugoslavia and the USSR are in their own sort of transition phase, and great efforts must be made and obstacles overcome before conditions are created for a qualitative leap forward—not only in the sphere of mutual cooperation but also in creating conditions so that our country can occupy a fitting place in the world market. I am sure that right now we are in a critical transition period also in the sphere of bilateral economic cooperation, and that after a certain period of time our countries, having taken a step forward in this sphere, will give a new fillip to the strengthening of our friendship.

Bulgarian Legislative Delegation Visits Moscow

Meets Lukyanov

*LD1104192891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1630 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Text] Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met today with a delegation of Bulgarian legislators led by Academician Todorov, chairman of the republic's National Assembly. The delegation is paying an official visit to our country. The sides expressed preparedness for further developing Soviet-Bulgarian relations on the basis of equality and partnership. The importance of the all-European process as a most important instrument for maintaining stability on the continent was stressed.

Meets Yanayev

*LD1104205791 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Text] Comrade Yanayev, vice president of the USSR, met today with a Bulgarian legislative delegation headed by Academician Todorov. The sides exchanges opinions on the deep sociopolitical processes taking place in both countries, and on ways to overcome arising problems. The present state of and prospects for Soviet-Bulgarian ties in various spheres were analyzed, and the mutual readiness was expressed to renew them on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

West Europe

Commentary on Bessmertnykh's Visit to Greece

*LD1104192491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1330 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] Some of my western colleagues call the trip by the Soviet minister to Athens mundane. They say there was nothing unusual and there were no sensations. I regard such assessments as not reflecting the very nature of this event. It was truly an event—the first visit to Greece in history by the head of the USSR foreign policy department. The document which the foreign ministers of both states signed during the visit is not an ordinary one. This

is a treaty on friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Greece. Of course, taking into account the traditionally friendly nature of relations between our peoples, it looks as if there is nothing extraordinary in it. But let's recall that, nonetheless, Greece is a NATO member.

As far as I know, it is the first time that the issue of friendship is being dealt with in a treaty signed by us with a member-country of the North Atlantic bloc. This fact alone illustrates the cardinal changes that are taking place now on the European continent. Foundations for fundamentally new interstate relations are being laid here, which are based not on a bloc-dominated mentality, but on equal and mutually beneficial cooperation.

I would like to remind you, although in short, of the latest events: the signing of a new Soviet-Romanian treaty; visits by the Turkish president and the Polish prime minister to Moscow; the present stay of Polish President Walesa in Paris; and today's visit by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher to Prague. All these are the bricks for the foundations of what we call a pan-European home. Its dwellers are not shutting themselves off as they used to, and the introduction of visa-free movement between Poland and a whole number of countries in Western Europe is another proof of it. Of course, let us not indulge in euphoria—there are more than enough problems in Europe, including ones of an interstate and inter-ethnic nature.

During the visit by our minister to Athens, for example, the Cyprus problem was discussed. There are many difficulties facing its solution, but there are good prerequisites for a change for the better in this matter. The main thing is to conduct a dialogue and to aim at achieving a mutually acceptable settlement. I think that the results of the visit by the Soviet foreign minister to Greece prove the existence of a wide range of opportunities for cooperation between the European states which have not been used so far. I also think it would be very good if such cooperation were to become a truly usual and mundane matter for everyone.

Spain's Laborda Urges 'Good Sense' From Republics

*PM1104134791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 91
Second Edition p 3*

[V. Volkov and R. Serebryannikov report: "Laboratory of Ideas"]

[Excerpts] Madrid—The meeting between legislators of the 34 countries participating in the CSCE, including the United States and Canada, which has just been concluded, is provoking lively comments in the Spanish press.

According to local political observers, it has opened up the path to a qualitatively new level of cooperation between the states participating in the Helsinki process and the realization of their common responsibility for security and cooperation on the continent. The Soviet

delegation headed by A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, made an important contribution to the work of the CSCE legislators' meeting, according to the Spanish press.

This is how some of the participants are assessing the results of the meeting. [passage omitted]

Juan Jose Laborda Martin, chairman of the Spanish Senate:

The Madrid meeting will make its contribution to the creation of a new order and security and cooperation in Europe, which will also help crown with success the process of transformations started by the Soviet Union. And the overall result of the meeting—the accord reached by the participants in the forum—testifies to a desire to overcome existing difficulties.

We are displaying caution in assessing the internal events taking place in the Soviet Union, as we do not want to interfere in internal affairs; we are interested in cooperation between our countries both at parliament and at government level. Our position proceeds on the basis of the criterion that it is the Soviet Government and the Soviet people that must resolve the problems emerging in the course of the important reform process—without interference from outside. In our opinion, national demands by certain republics should be put forward very carefully from the point of view of the European perspective, and they should not be seen in isolation from political realities. In our opinion, the recognition of the rights of nationalities or republics should take place in accordance with the requirements imposed by political changes and economic reform in the USSR. I believe that certain leaders' desires for partial success may lead to an overall failure. We expect the republics to show good sense and an ability to hold dialogue and reach mutual understanding with the USSR central authorities.

Laptev Receives Portuguese Legislators

*PM1104154291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Apr 91 Union Edition p 4*

[TASS report: "Legislators' Visit"]

[Text] A highly favorable atmosphere has developed in Soviet-Portuguese relations for the stepping up of contacts in all areas. That was the leitmotiv at talks held in Moscow 4-5 April with a delegation from the foreign affairs, Portuguese communities' affairs, and cooperation commissions of the Assembly of the Republic (legislature) of Portugal, headed by its speaker P. Roleta. On 4 April the Portuguese legislators were received by I.D. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the Union. Useful talks took place at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committees on International Affairs and Economic Reform Questions, the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, and the USSR Foreign Ministry.

It was noted during the meetings that the deepening mutual understanding and collaboration between the USSR and Portugal, including interparliamentary cooperation, could be an important component in the building of the new European architecture and promote the development of an atmosphere of confidence and stability on the continent. An exchange of opinions on prospects for the development of Soviet-Portuguese relations revealed the need for fuller utilization of existing potential to bring about their active enrichment and the expansion of cooperation in the most diverse spheres—both traditional and new.

During its visit to the USSR the Portuguese legislative delegation will also visit Leningrad and the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

Latin America & Caribbean

Levchenko on Gen Powell's El Salvador Remarks

PY1004185391 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America
2300 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Leonid Levchenko commentary]

[Text] General Colin Powell, recognized as one of the winners in the recent war against Iraq for the liberation of occupied Kuwait, visited Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras while at the peak of his glory. It is understandable that the general would speak about the war in the Persian Gulf during his meetings with those countries' military and government authorities.

At one point, the U.S. general, recognizing the importance of the negotiation process to achieve peace in Central America and expressing hopes that events like the ones in the Persian Gulf will never again occur, insinuated that a country can resort to arms to defend liberty. It is curious to note that Colin Powell's remarks were made in Honduras just as the United States and Honduras were carrying out their traditional joint military maneuvers. The remark created confusion.

On one hand, it appears that the Central American countries are marching toward a peaceful resolution of conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala. Besides, Central American presidents have called for a demilitarization of the region.

Is it possible that the United States is ignoring this fact and wants to preserve its military presence in the region? All of these things do not seem to agree with declarations in Washington on hopes for a peaceful future in Central America.

Gen. Colin Powell, perhaps perceiving the ambiguity of the situation, deemed it necessary to note in Tegucigalpa that no one should confuse the aspiration for a just peace with weakness. In order to confirm these words, Gen. Powell announced his country's willingness to grant

military aid to the Salvadoran Government if the rebels show intransigence in the negotiations currently underway in Mexico.

I think that such remarks are a veiled form of pressure on Salvadoran rebels because demilitarization in El Salvador is among the problems they have cited in the negotiations. Gen. Colin Powell, whose attention has long been concentrated on the Persian Gulf, was probably not properly informed about the U.S.-Soviet declaration on El Salvador.

Let us recall that that document points out the importance to reach agreements leading to a truce and iterates that a political agreement in El Salvador to guarantee the right and security of all Salvadoran people would also contribute to the process of democratization, development, and disarmament in Central America.

People's Deputies Meet Guatemalan President

LD1104092191 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0130 GMT 11 Apr 91

[By TASS special correspondent Sergey Gorbunov]

[Text] Guatemala City, 11 Apr (TASS)—A meeting has been held at the National Palace in the Guatemalan capital between Jorge Serrano, the president of this Central American republic, and a visiting group of USSR people's deputies, led by A.A. Mokanu, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The president cordially welcomed the Soviet legislators and expressed his gratitude to them for deciding to visit Guatemala. "We highly value the relations which have come into being between our country and the Soviet Union," he said. "The ending of confrontation between East and West creates favorable opportunities for the countries of the 'Third World' and for the development of cooperation between our states."

J. Serrano expressed the wish that the Soviet Union should use the opportunities available to it in the field of promoting a peace settlement in Guatemala.

During the conversation, a mutual interest was expressed in the opening at the earliest opportunity of a Guatemalan diplomatic mission in Moscow and a Soviet mission in Guatemala City. "This will be a significant step toward bringing our countries and governments closer together," the president stressed. He asked the USSR people's deputies to convey greetings to M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.

For his part, A.A. Mokanu pointed out that in the Soviet Union the development of the situation in Central America is being followed attentively. The Soviet public is satisfied with the positive trends in the region and the opportunities which have appeared for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala, he said. In the opinion of the Soviet legislators, the report that the Guatemalan rebels have accepted the peace plan

proposed by the president has opened up good prospects. The USSR people's deputies assured the president of the Soviet Union's readiness in future also to support all initiatives aimed at the establishment of a lasting peace in Guatemala and Central America as a whole.

During the second day of their stay in Guatemala, the Soviet deputies met Ana C. Soberanis Reyes, president of the country's National Congress [name as received], as well as members of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Guatemalan legislature. In an open and friendly atmosphere, a useful exchange of views took place on questions of the work of the legislatures of the two countries. Special attention was paid to the current situation and prospects for a peace settlement in Central America.

The USSR people's deputies invited the Guatemalan legislators to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

The Soviet legislators also had a brief conversation with Guatemalan Foreign Minister Alvaro Arzu.

Development of Ties With Chile Discussed

*LD1104230791 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1353 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Nikishov]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Apr—The active development of Soviet-Chilean relations, first and foremost, in the economic sphere was the aim pursued at a meeting of

business circles of the USSR and Chile, the first in almost 20 years, which took place in Santiago, the capital of Chile. The Soviet Committee for Cooperation and Solidarity with Latin American countries organized this meeting on the Soviet side, with the Chilean side represented by Orlando Saenz. Representatives of several ministries, leaders of state and share-stock enterprises and cooperative were included in the Soviet delegation.

In an interview with a TASS correspondent, Karen Khachaturov, chairman of the committee said a Soviet-Chilean agreement was signed at the meeting which confirmed the restoration of trade and economic relations between the countries. Projects on setting up a trolley bus network with Soviet participation, and carrying out joint fishing were discussed. A principle agreement on the sale of Soviet watches to Chile was reached. The Soviet representatives gained the impression during the talks with the leadership of a range of ministries, large banks, and enterprise cooperations, that the interest expressed by the Chileans was dictated by a desire to find their place on the large Soviet markets. It was decided that a second meeting with Chilean businessmen will be conducted in Moscow from 1 to 5 July this year.

Karen Khachaturov believes that "there are no reasons to idealize the prospects in the development of Soviet-Chilean relations. The democratic process in Chile is still very fragile". A whole generation of this country was cut off from truthful information about the Soviet Union. "This vacuum can and should be filled today with our multifaceted contracts", underlined Karen Khachaturov.

Supreme Soviet

Resolution on State Ministries Law Published

PM1104141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Entry into Effect of the USSR Law "On the List of USSR Ministries and Other Central Organs of State Management of the USSR"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees that:

1. The USSR Law "on the List of USSR Ministries and Other Central Organs of Management of the USSR" be put into effect from the moment it is adopted.
2. The leaders and other officials of ministries and other central organs of state management of the USSR which are being abolished or reorganized continue to fulfill their official duties and bear responsibility for the fulfillment of their functions by the relevant organs for the period of the transfer of business, but for not more than three months.
3. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers decide the question of the use of property in the possession of the ministries and other organs of state management of the USSR which are being abolished or reorganized, including buildings, installations, money and currency, with a consideration for the need to supply the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration with official premises and property.
4. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers perform work in 1991-1992 to organize state corporations, concerns, holdings, economic associations, joint-stock associations (companies), and other structures of the market type on the basis of existing state organs and organizations.

A report be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1991 on the fulfillment of this mission.

5. The USSR President:

submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals for treating the organs of state management of the USSR listed in the above-mentioned law as all-union and union-republican and also for the mechanism for their making of decisions on questions of the joint jurisdiction of the USSR and the republics with a consideration for the principles formulated in the draft of this new Union Law;

over the course of 1991-1992 submit to the USSR Supreme Soviet proposals for the transformation of the relevant USSR ministries into associations and unions of enterprises and other structures of the market type.

6. It be recommended to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers that it form a Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, a Committee for Cinematography, a Committee for the Conservation and Restoration of Historical and Cultural Monuments, a Committee for the Affairs of veterans and

Invalids, a Committee for the Affairs of Families and Women, a Committee for Youth Affairs, and a State Ecology Foundation.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers in connection with the republics' appeals should examine the question of the expediency of creating a Committee for Light Industry and Consumer Goods.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow, Kremlin, 1 April 1991

Press Reports Session Proceedings 8, 9 Apr

PM1104114591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "'Soyuz' Group Demands Convening of Extraordinary Congress"]

[Text] On Monday 8 April the country's parliament discussed many important questions and many interesting speeches were heard. The event of the day may rightly be called the brief report made by Deputy Yu. Blokhin to his colleagues before the start of the lunch interval: "Esteemed Supreme Soviet members! First. The Presidium of the 'Soyuz' deputies group met today with USSR President M.S. Gorbachev on the need to convene an extraordinary congress of USSR people's deputies. In this connection the presidium of the 'Soyuz' deputies group asks the group's members to meet here tomorrow in the building of the USSR Supreme Soviet and discuss this question. Second. In accordance with the decision of the all-union 'Soyuz' association of people's deputies of all levels, the second congress of 'Soyuz' people's deputies of all levels will be held 20-21 April.

Meanwhile there have been additions to the country's Cabinet of Ministers. By an absolute majority of votes the USSR Supreme Soviet has agreed to the president's proposals to appoint I. Denisov USSR minister of health, O. Anfimov USSR minister of the electrical equipment industry and instrument building, and S. Khadzhiev USSR minister of the chemical and petroleum refining industry. Virtually no questions were put to the candidate members of government and the number of "black marks" they received as a result may with complete justification be called minimal.

Actually, it was these appointments that became the only "material expression" of the activity of the country's parliament 8 April. (Unless you count the fact that at the end of the morning sitting the members of the Soviet of Nationalities adopted a draft law on privatization which had not gotten through at the first reading at the previous sitting). Having embarked on an article by article discussion of the draft USSR law "on the general principles of state youth policy in the USSR," the participants in the joint sitting devoted all the time remaining until the lunch break and half the evening session to this question.

When it got to the 10th article it became perfectly obvious that there was simply no longer any point in discussing the 10 articles still remaining. Too many comments and proposals had accumulated. The speeches of those taking part in the debates frequently voiced an idea with which it was hard not to agree: The authors of the draft law—mainly representatives of the parliamentary committee for youth policy—pursuing the most noble aims failed to consider in many cases the realities of the present day. Had their proposals been adopted without reservation the law would have been doomed to inactivity from the outset. For instance, it discusses benefits for young people. A good cause, of course. The only question is where to take the money from. Of it is proposed to introduce a youth social service through legislation. But so far we have no social service in our country at all. It has to be created and for that it is not out of the question that the relevant special union law must be drafted and adopted.

In general, according to the proposal of I. Laptev, who acted as chair at the evening sitting, it was decided to give the authors of the draft law a little more time to do more work on the document. A spokesman for the committee on youth policy stated that by 15 April the deputies may be offered a version which considers all the remarks they have made.

According to the plan for the work of this session day the country's Supreme Soviet should also have adopted a resolution on a question which, to judge by items in a number of publications and also by many speeches in parliament, at any rate before 2 April perturbed a substantial section of society. So far—urgent measures to halt the propaganda of pornography and the cult of violence and brutality. Although it was perfectly obvious that there was no time left to adopt a resolution, the deputies agreed to hear USSR Culture Minister N. Gubenko, who had submitted a draft document and who, it was announced, had interrupted his vacation and flown to Moscow from Yalta specially for the purpose.

Having devoted a substantial part of his speech to historical digressions—recalling in particular that when the draft law was being prepared there was a study of the Orthodox church's experience of the struggle to consolidate morality, the laws of Peter the Great, and also the relevant acts signed by Nikolay II—N. Gubenko told the deputies that the main aim of the resolution is to protect the rising generation. To achieve this aim it is planned to resort in large part not to prohibitory but to regulatory laws. Every adult citizen in our country, the minister stressed, has the right to view and read what he wants. Only the illegal dissemination of immoral output will be punished.

One of the main problems—and N. Gubenko also devoted a considerable part of his speech to examining it—lies in the criteria distinguishing pornography from erotica. It emerges from the draft resolution that a state commission of experts will have the decisive word here. It is also proposed to create a register of movies and

video films and video programs and to draft a provision on the public showing of movies and audiovisual works in the country.

The chair informed those taking part in the sitting that many people anxious to take part in the discussion of the draft resolution had put their names down. Yet the time for work was coming to an end. There was not even enough time for the coreport prepared by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Culture. It was decided to continue the discussion of the draft resolution on urgent measures to halt the propaganda of pornography and the cult of violence and brutality at the next sitting.

The concluding 10 minutes of this day of the session's work were given to Deputy L. Sukhov to make a statement.

The deputy's speech was emotion and full of reproaches against several colleagues in the deputies' corps but it was somewhat confused. Briefly, its thrust was that the USSR Supreme Soviet, counter to the choice of a socialist path for our country's development, confirmed by the people at the referendum, is adopting several legislative acts pushing the country into capitalism.

It was decided to take the deputy's speech into account and not to open a debate on it.

In two weeks' time it will be five years since there occurred not far from the settlement of Pripjat a catastrophe that was to become one of the gravest in the history of mankind. Recalling that sorry date, First Deputy Prime Minister C. Doguzhiyev, who spoke 9 April at the morning joint sitting of the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, stressed that there must not only be talk of how to repay the debt to the dead and the victims, it is also important to analyze all the blunders and omissions manifested during the elimination of the consequences of the accident.

The deputies devoted the entire first half of this session day to an examination of the package of problems connected with the Chernobyl catastrophe. The members of parliament had to analyze the course of the fulfillment of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution adopted a year ago "on the unified program to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] and on the situation connected with that accident" and they had to discuss the adoption of a law on social protection for citizens subjected to the effect of radiation as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

The vice premier reported to the deputies on how the fulfillment of the resolution of the country's supreme legislative organ has proceeded. As a whole it emerged from the speech that the absolute majority of points of the program have been fulfilled. A concept and criteria for the population's safe residence on contaminated territories have been elaborated and are being implemented. In particular they provide for the possibility of

residence on specific conditions on a territory whose contamination level is not in excess of 40 curies.

Touching on the situation at the Chernobyl AES itself, V. Doguzhiyev stressed that the possibility of a spontaneous chain reaction at the fourth power unit has in specialists' opinion been ruled out.

K. Salykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Ecology, acted as the keynote speaker's adversary. As a whole he responded positively to the work the government has done. But his assessments of the results were more critical. Thus, touching on problems of resettlement, the speaker confirmed that the number of settlers has been considerably in excess of the plans. But at the same time tens of thousands of people who should have been resettled without fail have remained where they were. The new settlements lack schools, preschool institutions, and hospitals. The sickness level in the contaminated regions is increasing. In brief, a lot of work lies ahead. In 1991, K. Salykov recalled, the same amount of money was allocated from the state budget to eliminate the consequences of the accident as was previously allocated for the five-year plan to resolve all the country's ecological problems.

Then, after the deputies had been provided with the draft law on the social protection of citizens subjected to the effect of radiation as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES debates began on the entire package of problems connected with the catastrophe.

Deputies Discuss Economy 10 Apr

LD1104163391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1000 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] We have already reported that at the initiative of the scientific and industrial group of the country's Supreme Soviet and the USSR Scientific and Industrial Union, the first serious attempt at coordinating the efforts of people's deputies has been made to find ways out of the economic crisis. We can now provide information on details of this informal meeting that took place in Moscow yesterday.

Representatives of all the groups of deputies of the Supreme Soviet, together with specialists in economics and jurisprudence decided that a professional approach to economic problems is required. The speakers mentioned that consolidation and objective information are needed, and that first, economic sabotage serving political interests should be stopped. Many participants backed the idea to the effect that the scientific and industrial group, and the scientific and industrial union should take upon themselves any integrating and coordinating functions. A proposal was put forward to address all the economic commissions and parliaments of union republics with a suggestion that deputies, helped by skilled scientists and specialists, should develop their own versions of the economic section of the union treaty.

It was decided to hold a meeting with representatives of the economic commissions in Moscow on 20 April.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Audit Chamber

LD1004163391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program
Radio-1 Network in Russian 1200 GMT 10 Apr 91

[Text] Deputies of the Union legislature are today working in committees and commissions. Our correspondent Vladimir Perfilov reports:

[Perfilov] Today the draft laws on USSR state security bodies, the draft USSR aviation code, the draft on the practical application of the USSR president's decree on introducing sales tax, and the draft foundations of civil legislation are being examined.

The Committee on Industry and Energy, the Commission for the Public Consumer Market, and the Commission on Economic Relations of Republics and Autonomous Formations, are today examining draft laws on the USSR Audit Chamber [kontrolnaya palata], the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration, and the draft law on procedures for settlement of economic disputes by the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration.

I would probably not be mistaken if I said that the draft law on the USSR Audit Chamber attracts particular attention. According to the draft, the USSR Audit Chamber will be the supreme body of financial-economic control in the country, and will act under the guidance of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It will implement the supervision of complete tax receipts and the purposeful and economical expenditure of funds. It will supervise the work of the USSR Ministry of Finance, and receive the necessary information from state and commercial banks. On the instruction of the USSR Supreme Soviet it will check on the use of the gold reserve and diamond stocks, taking our country's interests into account. It will supervise the work of the USSR's customs bodies.

However, I repeat, all this is a draft law and so the deputies are at the moment revising individual articles and paragraphs, and making amendments. As always, there are many amendments, and they are having many arguments—constructive ones, but evidently, such is the life of our legislators. That is the end of my report on the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Anticrisis Measures Supported

LD1104111191 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The session of the USSR Supreme Soviet today continued its work in committees and commissions.

Of course, the main concern is about those draft laws on the agenda for the current session, but, as always, life makes changes even to the most serious plans. As you

know, yesterday in the Federation Council the USSR president put forward an anticrisis program that named among its paramount measures financial improvement of the economy. Viktor Grigoryevich Kucherenko, chairman of the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission, among other leaders of Supreme Soviet committees, was present at that session and it was essential that he tell the deputies in detail about this program first of all. All the more so since, in his opinion, it will probably be necessary to prepare an emergency budget for the country for the second half-year which to provide for balancing income and expenditure and now is the time to work on these matters.

[Begin recording] [V.G. Kucherenko, chairman of the commission] Of course, if we put this program into practice, according to the points as written, the effect would tell immediately. I have come to the conclusion that you don't use force here. There is no need to use force anywhere, only accord, only competent reckoning, to heed the specialists, to heed the heads of the banks, the financial bodies, those who understand this matter. Get politics out of these aspects of our state activity. If we don't banish it, we are, of course, reducing the country, we have already reduced the country. But we will be wrecking it to the limit.

[N.S. Feskov, secretary of the commission] I see this idea, that the economy cannot be developed like this any further, through the example of my constituency, where there are many processing enterprises dependent upon the raw-material-producing areas. This is the understanding of the production collectives and I think that this is something that actually inspires confidence, having overcome all these difficulties we will ultimately be able to get out of this deadlock, this crisis.

[A.N. Saunin, deputy chairman of the commission] We can only get out of this state by moving decisively along the road of restructuring the economy into the new market relations. However, the way out now lies in setting up the kind of economic machinery, work collectives must have economic freedom so that they have the opportunity to earn, so that we don't just link the standard of living to price levels—to hell with them, such as they are—but so that conditions are created for the working people's ordinary work, so they can earn treble, four, or five times more and their standard of living can only rise. That is where we must concentrate our efforts: getting the economy working, stabilizing the situation in the country, and dealing with these and other issues. [end recording]

Officials Prepare To Amend Tax Rules

LD1104220291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent V. Stepanyuk, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The [USSR Supreme Soviet] legislative committees and commissions are at present considering not only

the draft laws previously included on the agenda for the current session, but also other pressing problems which just recently were not within their plan of work. Correspondent V. Stepanyuk reports:

[Stepanyuk] This applies for instance to the committee on the all-union consumer market. The Supreme Soviet has instructed it to consider and put forward proposals on how the USSR president's decree on a sales tax should be implemented in conditions of the new prices for goods. It is clear that this issue is an extremely complex one. For this reason the discussion took place with the participation of leaders and specialists of the USSR Ministry of Finance, the USSR Ministry of Trade, the USSR State Committee on Prices, the Consumers' Society, and members of parliamentary committees of a number of Union and autonomous republics. The discussion was of course of a purely preliminary character, but certain draft outlines are already appearing.

Yuri Mikhaylovich, what is the future fate that you see for the 5 percent tax in conditions of goods becoming more expensive, and where the situation has become by no means what was envisaged?

[Marinichev] Yes, the tax has indeed at the present time become much more burdensome. Whereas previously it was 5 percent [word indistinct], it has now become two to three times more expensive, and for the population it has become an imposition on the poor's pay. However, the situation at present with the country's budget is such that it is very difficult for us right now to speak about full abolition of the tax. The deputies are at present seeking ways, in accordance with the second decree of the USSR president, to somehow sharply limit its being levied on the population.

We are now seeking ways for this tax to be levied on production and technological goods, and for it to be levied perhaps on those enterprises produce goods and market them at uncontrolled prices. The price that is determined in these cases may freely absorb this 5 percent. Also perhaps it should be levied on luxury goods and on expensive fur items and jewelry. But regarding what is constantly used by our citizens, it is probably necessary to do some serious work and thinking to see that the population is freed from this levy. [end recording]

Sales Tax Implementation Discussed

LD1104221191

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian at 1730 GMT on 11 April broadcasts a 15-minute "Legislative Diary" program on today's USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Moscow Kremlin hosted by Andrey Nikiforov.

Nikiforov says that the deputies continued their work today in committees and commissions. A meeting of four committees discussed a pressing issue—the implementation of the USSR president's decree on a sales tax.

he says. He adds that the deputies noted that the sales tax has been imposed on consumer goods that have had their prices increased on average 3-5 times, which has also increased the tax. A compensatory sum of 60-65 rubles has been allocated to the people, Nikiforov says. At the same time, he says, the price of an ordinary painting has increased by 200-250 percent. This means, he says, that not more than 30 percent of the rise in prices has been compensated for, which means that a large part of the country—some calculations state half of the population—are below the poverty level.

Nikiforov says that many deputies are in favor of dropping the tax, but some said that it should stay. It should be examined together with the extraordinary state budget. Some spoke in favor of reducing the tax, he says.

Deputy Antonova from the Association of Trade Unions, says that the trade unions were against the tax from the start. A statement addressed the leadership and has been published by the trade unions but so far no response has been received. Nikiforov quotes Antonova as saying that the sales tax is also taken from holiday bookings, transport passes, and canteen prices, in addition to income tax. Antonova said that they will not support the notion proposed by deputy Bochin to the effect that this tax should be retained on free and agreed prices because they make up (?60 percent) of the goods. Regulated prices on foodstuffs have no sale tax.

Orlov, deputy chairman of a statement commission on economic reform, says that if the situation had been normal, there would not have been such a fuss about this tax. He says that it cannot be abolished now but can be re-coordinated; by reducing the list of goods covered by this sales tax and other social measures.

Deputy Balenko says that this tax has a more psychological effect than a practical significance. She says it is strange to talk of a 5 percent tax when prices have risen by between 200 and 500 percent. It should not be abolished at present. It is only one among the main issues that have to be resolved, notably the extraordinary budget, that should be discussed in the nearest future.

Nikiforov says that some committees continued to discuss a draft on a USSR control chamber. Many proposals were submitted so a coordinating commission has been set up. Desyatov, a member of the commission, says it will control the realization of the state budget and report only to the Supreme Soviet. It will control the spendings of Union enterprises but will not interfere in republican issues. He says that the Committee of People's Control is to be abolished but local soviets are permitted to set up such committees if necessary.

Nikiforov says the Agrarian Committee is preparing a draft on an agrarian reform. Deputy Shtepa says the first land reform law had many drawbacks, as does this draft because of the irregularities in allocating land. Private farms have mostly only several hectares of land. Land is most given near towns. Only some have benefits. Shtepa says he does not support the present draft.

Nikiforov says that on 12 April the Supreme Soviet will meet in a joint session. Drafts on the Supreme Arbitration Court and the regulations on economic disputes which are to be examined by this court will be discussed at the session.

KGB Official Requests Revised Border Security

LD1104214991 Moscow Central Television First Program network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent G. Svishchenkov on work of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security on 11 April; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security today examined the concept for the reform of guarding the state border and the USSR's economic zone by border troops.

Addressing the deputies, Colonel General Korenichenko, USSR KGB deputy chairman and chief of the border troops [title as heard], stressed that the radical changes taking place in the country, the development of integration processes in cooperation with contiguous states, and the adoption of a new defensive military doctrine have led to the need to revise views on guarding the border. The task of defending the country's economic interests, of waging of struggle against terrorism and extremism, against the subversive activity of foreign hostile organizations, and of putting a stop to, together with the customs, of attempts to illegally import into and export from the country weapons, drugs, contraband, explosives, and poisons is today moving to the forefront.

However, ensuring the inviolability of the state border remains the border troops' major task.

The discussion was keen and committed.

As a result, the Committee for Defense and Security took cognizance of the concept proposed and recommended to the USSR KGB Chief Directorate of the border troops that further work be done on this document, taking into account the remarks and proposals voiced by the deputies. [Video shows Committee's meeting in progress with many officers in attendance, including Korenichenko; various maps and diagrams on the wall and samples of confiscated weapons]

Political & Social

CPSU Statutes Registered at Justice Ministry

PRAVDA Reports Ceremony

PM1104204991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 91 Second Edition p 1

[A. Petrushov report: "Registration of CPSU"]

[Text] The Certificate of Registration of the Statutes of the CPSU was presented to representatives of the CPSU at the USSR Ministry of Justice yesterday.

This event was preceded by the complex, painstaking work of registering documents which date from 1898, that is to say, when the party existed illegally and people had to pay for looking after any material with their liberty or life. But all the requirements of legislation were met. The documents submitted by the CPSU were drawn up in strict accordance with the Law "On Public Associations" and in line with the rules established by the USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 10 January 1991.

The time was 1600 hours. After introductory remarks USSR Justice Minister S.G. Lushchikov proceeded to the presentation of the registration certificates. The Certificate of Registration of the CPSU Statutes was accepted by CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary V.A. Ivashko. The official CPSU delegation comprised O.S. Shenin and Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; Ye.I. Kalinin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the Leningrad Obkom [Oblast Party Committee]; and K.A. Nikolayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and bulldozer driver at the "Mosstroyemkhanizatsiya" Trust. Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Party Committee] was present. The state document registering the CPSU became an actual fact. The CPSU became the first political party in the country to receive the status of a unionwide party and all the rights enjoyed by a legal entity.

The people assembled in the conference hall were addressed by CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary V.A. Ivashko. He expressed deep satisfaction that the USSR Ministry of Justice had carried out the registration of the CPSU Statutes.

The process of legally enshrining Soviet democracy, Vladimir Antonovich went on to say, is developing steadily despite all the difficulties, and we see a manifestation of this in the document of state registration of the CPSU Statutes.

The Communist Party operates within the framework of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws. Indeed, its statutes begin with that statement. The CPSU will make use of the legal possibilities granted it with the registration of the Statutes to consistently pursue its policy in the interests of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and other strata committed to the socialist option and to achieve the stabilization of the economic and political situation in the country, national accord, and the preservation of the USSR.

We deem it necessary, V.A. Ivashko noted, to assure the USSR Ministry of Justice, as the organ which has registered the CPSU Statutes, that it will be afforded all requisite opportunity in accordance with the law to

supervise the observance of the provisions of our Statutes. Any demands from the ministry will be met—to the extent of its representatives' participating in the work of plenums and other events carried out by the CPSU Central Committee. We have no secrets from the state or the public.

V.A. Ivashko concluded by congratulating the country's Communists on the state registration of the CPSU Statutes.

Statute registration certificates were also presented to representatives of the USSR Environmental Foundation, the Association for the Promotion of Humanitarian Dialogue, the Association of Researchers in the Children's Movement, and the "USSR-Belgium" Society.

Ivashko on Registration

PM1204101291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Apr 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Report by O. Voznesenskiy and I. Podsvirov under the rubric "At the CPSU Central Committee Press Center": "Communists Have No Secrets From the State"]

[Text] A news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, devoted to the registration of the CPSU Statutes, was held at the CPSU Central Committee Press Center (the Oktyabrskaya Hotel) 11 April. Participating in it were V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; O.S. Shenin and Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee; Ye.I. Kalinina, secretary of Leningrad Oblast party committee, and K.A. Nikolayev, bulldozer driver for the "Mosstroyemkhanizatsiya" Trust, members of the CPSU Central Committee; and T.B. Kirgizbayeva, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and team leader on the "Malik" State Farm in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.

The news conference was opened by A.Ya. Degtyarev, head of the CPSU Central Committee Ideological Department. In his introductory speech V.A. Ivashko provided information connected with this important event in the life of the CPSU.

Both at the time of registration and during the news conference he said that the CPSU has taken up a position of legal equality with other parties and intends to support the state's efforts to preserve this equality. Incidentally, when Article 6 was changed, the Law on Public Associations did not exist and a section of Communists got the impression that the CPSU was almost being separated from the state. What is more, our opponents are doing everything to really separate the CPSU from the state.

But the truth is that the Law on Public Associations establishes a far more rigid link between parties and the state, compared with the constitution. Only now the initiative comes from the state. There is something here for champions of rally democracy to think about. Any

registered party is protected by the law. And the stronger democracy is, the stronger this protection is.

Replying to questions, the deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that the registration of the CPSU Statutes is a significant step on the path of the further renewal of the party which initiated perestroika. To characterize the CPSU in its present state, it has become more democratic, and different trends exist within it—which makes it possible to express more fully the views of the majority of Communists and the viewpoints of particular groups. But there are fundamental principles enshrined in the draft new CPSU Program which remain unshakable.

We treat with understanding, it was stated at the news conference, the fact that the USSR Ministry of Justice scrutinized the CPSU's historic documents setting forth its aims and tasks. Their legal assessment from positions of continuity is a point of principle for the party and for Soviet power.

A document recording the number of party committees at various levels and of primary CPSU organizations in each union republic was submitted to the ministry. In other words, the party's entire structure was indicated.

The CPSU is the only party to have a centralized record of its members. We would be able to provide information on all 16.5 million Communists. But lists containing the names of 7,144 people have been received from the provinces for confirmation. All the Communist parties and most of the republic, kray, and oblast party organizations are represented here. The lists submitted to the CPSU Central Committee contain the personal signature of Communists.

Journalists inquired whether the CPSU organizations in the union republics will be registered. The CPSU has been registered on the basis of the USSR law as an all-Union association, having unified Statutes and recognizing the jurisdiction of union state organs throughout the country's territory. For Communists there is no problem of registering the statutes of the union republic Communist parties with the appropriate organs of state power locally. This depends on their wishes, for the union republic Communist parties are independent.

Reflecting on the ambivalent nature of the problem of leaving the CPSU's ranks and of the return to them of people who left earlier, V.A. Ivashko and the other meeting participants drew attention to the fact that the process of renewing internal party life is entirely natural. This should not be dramatized. As early as last year there were predictions of the CPSU's imminent disintegration. And corresponding actions were being taken by the formerly well-known "Democratic Platform." But the "Democratic Platform" has gone, and the CPSU remains.

During the news conference very pointed questions were frequently heard from the floor. Exhaustive and perfectly frank answers were given to them. The chief thing, the conference participants pointed out, is to achieve consolidation on a principled basis and to concentrate the efforts of society and the party on specific matters which would contribute to the speediest surmounting of the economic and political crisis.

With regard to the creation of the "Communists for Democracy" faction of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.S. Shenin said this: "The name 'Communists for Democracy' is roughly the same as saying that 'the economy must be economical.'"

Not denying the CPSU's participation in commercial activity, the organizers of the meeting with journalists pointed out that, according to the law, the party will report back on its income, but this does not mean that "all will be welcome guests of our accounts office."

In short, the discussion of the CPSU's registration took the form of a constructive dialogue on ways to democratically reform the party and the whole of society.

Ivashko Denies Gorbachev Resigning

*LD1104170591 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1636 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondents Sergey Novozhilov and Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow, 11 Apr (TASS)—Vladimir Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has denied rumors that Mikhail Gorbachev has resigned as leader of the CPSU. Ivashko was speaking at a news conference in Moscow today in connection with the registration of the CPSU as an all-Union party, which took place at the USSR Ministry of Justice.

Vladimir Ivashko stressed that at the present time, the joint tenure of the posts of USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee is in keeping with the interests of the state and the party. He told journalists that a CPSU Central Committee plenum is to be held at the end of April or the beginning of May, the agenda for which is to include "the current situation" and "the work of Communists in local soviets."

Vladimir Ivashko did not rule out the possibility of other matters also being discussed at the plenum.

Gorbachev CPSU Role, Yeltsin Conflict Viewed

*PM1104144691 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Apr 91 Union Edition p 3*

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Aleksey Kiva: "The President and Others: Where Does the Path to Consensus Lie?"]

[Text] It is now not only the left radicals, but also representatives of right-wing forces (see how the opposite poles converge!) who are demanding the president's resignation. Gorbachev, they say, is a spent force; we need someone fresh.

Well, this approach is entitled to exist. Every one of us has a certain stock of intellectual and spiritual strength, potential for energetic action, feeling for innovation, and so forth, and all this gradually drains away. Replacing the leader and his team is a perfectly normal phenomenon. To be frank, sometimes, when you look at Gorbachev's tired face, his newly acquired wrinkles, his hair getting grayer and grayer, you feel human sympathy for him: What an incredible burden he has taken on! To be captain of our perestroika ship for six years... Yet how many spiteful things are now being written about Gorbachev! And the smaller the author, the bigger his spite and simple stupidity. Mediocrity is inclined to measure others by its own standards. And it is always vindictive.

Has the leader exhausted his potential as a reformer? Yes, probably. But only, I think, in the persona of general secretary. Whereas as a reformer president... (But this position of principle should not be confused with the practical matter of abandoning the combination of these two posts.)

The general secretary serves, first and foremost, his party and its structures. The president should serve the citizens, society, the state. The general secretary cannot but be ideologically—and socially—committed. The president should not, is not entitled to be so. The president is above parties, classes, groups, and so forth. The general secretary is the personification of a party, albeit the most powerful. The president should be the personification of society as a whole. In pursuing his party's policy the general secretary, without intending it, will ruin the Union, by demanding that everyone align themselves with socialism and the soviet power structure. After all, it was this policy that exacerbated relations between the center and a number of republics, which have their own views of the political and state structure. In theory, the general secretary was bound to encourage the creation of social salvation committees in the Baltic republics in order to restore power to the communists, while the president should have committed their organizers for trial for unconstitutional activity and attempting a coup d'état.

Gorbachev thus finds himself in the grip of an insoluble conflict. To deny this is demagoguery. And the more conservative and aggressive the CPSU's right wing becomes, the narrower Gorbachev's opportunities for reform. Hence we are on the verge of seeing the tragedy of Gorbachev as an outstanding politician who started perestroika with unprecedented boldness and scope, but who ground to a halt in the face of the most difficult step.

A real multiparty system is being established in the country, forces that oppose the CPSU are in power in a whole string of republics, oblasts, cities, and so forth, and

in many regions the striving for sovereignty has intensified. How can this political diversity be brought together under the common denominator of the CPSU's doctrine and political practice?! The Bolsheviks' party was created in order to build a classless, prosperous society in our country according to the Marxist pattern, over a number of decades. The country is in ruins, but the CPSU has not abandoned its utopian goal. It is hardly surprising that communist rhetoric, which not even the president is free from, irritates many people, and provokes some to furious outbursts: "Do you take us for fools?!" This erodes the president's authority.

And that is one explanation why many brilliant representatives of the creative intelligentsia who only yesterday were defending Gorbachev against the right have turned their backs on him and gone over entirely to Yeltsin's side. I am not convinced that they have adequately grasped Gorbachev's position, or that they acted correctly. In general I feel a certain distrust toward that section of the radical intelligentsia that is inclined to apply an ideal moral standard to public life. The Russian intelligentsia's idealism and maximalism, the nihilism and critical thrust of their thinking, are well-known phenomena. But on this occasion I am making a different point. I am talking about the roots of the crisis of perestroika and power. And naturally, this does not only concern the president, but primarily the ruling party, which, in the course of perestroika, is forced to do what is unnatural to it. It is no accident that in many East European countries the communist parties refused to participate in this, standing aloof and refusing to resort to terror with the help of military force.

People may say to me: "Why complicate everything? Why go on gambling on a man who has already had his say, and in whom we cannot have confidence at the present stage? It hardly matters what the reason is—whether he is forced to maneuver under strong pressure from the right, or whether he cannot go against himself, against his own past in the apparatus, against his illusions. And, perhaps, against the desire to hold on to power a bit longer, rather than finding himself in the position of A. Dubcek after our invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Would it not be more sensible to stop associating Gorbachev's name with the country's progress along the path to common sense? And to put all our efforts into supporting an alternative figure."

My answer is extremely simple: "Just try it! Try to find a large-scale personality capable of accelerating the reform and, of course, acceptable to those forces that make the political weather here nowadays. Only don't come out with banalities, such as that no one is irreplaceable, that nature abhors a vacuum. It is a historical fact that nowhere have there ever been two major reformers in succession. In no country. And in general it has seldom happened in our history that a progressive leader, even if he subsequently moved to the right, has been replaced by a more progressive leader. Precisely the opposite has happened."

But all the talk about wanting to see Gorbachev, in this very grave period in our many centuries of history, as a president reflecting the interests of all social strata and political forces and acting as a symbol of the policy of civil consensus, rather than as a general secretary concerned to preserve the power of the party apparatus and the top bureaucracy, will be so much hot air if we confine ourselves merely to wishing. A president is always a compromise figure. So at least two or three things are necessary. First, willingness on the part of Gorbachev himself to be a real president, to be—if I can put it in this high-flown way—the savior of the nation, in conditions in which civil war cannot be ruled out. Second, an acceptable basis for historical compromise is needed. Third, willingness to compromise, for the sake of avoiding civil war and advancing the process of perestroika, is required.

But that is not all, either. The president must be helped to stabilize the situation in the country, which is close to total chaos, first and foremost in the economic sphere, and to prevent the uncontrollable disintegration of the Union. And not to create a hysterical atmosphere in society, not to turn our citizens against anticrisis measures, which, of course, may be very harsh and also, alas, may be erroneous. And even more, not to gloat over the disintegration of our state. Wanting disaster for your own country is pathological.

It seems to me that Gorbachev is ready for his new role. I am judging by what he said recently about centrism, about the need for the president to reflect the interests of all strata of society. That the interests of society and the state are higher than the interests of individual parties or classes. How firm this present position of his may be and how far it is liable to shift under pressure from various forces is another matter. It seems to me that there have been certain shifts in his understanding of the socialist choice, of socialism.

As for reformist and moderate forces in the CPSU, I believe that for the most part they follow Gorbachev and support his course. With the exception, say, of people from Nina Andreyeva's "Yedintsvo" ["Unity"] and some of the Russian Communist Party's leaders and activists, whose position does not fall within the bounds of common sense. In fact, an information revolution is in full swing in the world and a radically new civilization is developing, while we, "thanks" to our "all-conquering theory," have preserved ourselves in aspic at the level of antediluvian production forces, with a huge proportion of manual labor. And people belonging to the CPSU are pushing us back toward slave labor, totalitarianism, and isolation in the world. That is, toward the stone age. Toward complete collapse. How are we to understand that?

The very large class of progressively and patriotically minded officers will doubtless come out on the side of common sense and sound economic and social relations. They cannot fail to grasp that outside the market, outside

modern civilization, armaments will become disastrously obsolete, even if we are all reduced to bread and water, and the army will decay to its roots. And I cannot imagine that the democrats will come out against healthy patriotism and leave it to the mercy of the forces that are dragging society backwards. The body of forward-looking officers has little in common with reactionary partocrats.

It is often said: Is there any point in taking any notice of the "social dinosaurs," the Stalinist misanthropists? The fact is that a chronically sick society has nurtured not only a distorted social and spiritual sense. It has also fostered hordes of alcoholics, drunkards, loafers, bums, and half-bums, people who are not used to working intensively, but are used to receiving guaranteed starvation rations. People who have developed the mentality of distribution based on leveling. People who are extremely envious and ready even today to respond to the Bolsheviks' old slogan, "Steal what was stolen!" They are the people whom communofascism is counting on. That is not my word, it belongs to supporters of socialism in the West. It is what they call Stalinist socialism.

When a painstaking German journalist from the weekly DER SPIEGEL asked S. Shatalin, whom I deeply respect, about the mechanisms for the operation of the "500 Days" program and inconsistencies came to light, I was beside myself. Tens of millions of people losing their jobs as a result of the ending of subsidies to unprofitable enterprises—you can hardly imagine a better gift to Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov. And if the communist fundamentalists take their revanche after all, then in my opinion it will not only be the president who is to blame, but also the left, the radicals, and the ultraradicals. This would not, of course, be the revanche of the neo-Bolsheviks alone, but of other forces in conjunction with them. The "third force"—that is where the real threat to us lies. Both the forces that follow Gorbachev and those that support Yeltsin could find themselves cast onto the sidelines of political life. Both these main forces, in their confrontation, have for a long time been draining each other's strength, exacerbating the crisis, and bringing chaos closer. They are repeating precisely what happened in Germany just before fascism came to power, or in Iran before the establishment of the dictatorship of Shiite fundamentalists.

The democrats, frequently adopting a position with regard to the Union that is incomprehensible to the broad masses, are actively promoting the formation of the "third force" in the shape of supporters of an imperial Union and national communists. If a powerful bloc of centrist and left-centrist forces could be created around the president, then in relation to right-wing and left-wing extremism that would be a "third force." In a historically positive sense. You cannot create such a bloc around a general secretary who carries out the duties of president in parallel.

What do I think could form the basis of a policy of national consensus? First, a left-centrist policy oriented

toward the unhurried implementation of profound reforms. Why unhurried? Because the stumbling block on the path of progress is not only the old structures, inertia, and the logic of our survival in conditions where a gap has developed between the old, dying social—including economic—model and the new one, whose formation is proceeding slowly, painfully, and with difficulty. The main obstacle to our progress is people themselves. You could, of course, wax ironical about the fact that totalitarianism managed to breed a special race of people—"homo sovieticus"—but the fact remains: Our mentality, our psychology, all our habits of life are stubbornly opposed to change. Because they bear the stamp of an antimarket, antidemocratic orientation. And to change that will take the lifetime of at least one generation. Thus when I use the word "unhurried" I do not mean marking time, or having no strategy for profound changes.

Second, whatever ultimate goal the various political forces may set themselves, present generations of living people will—I am profoundly convinced—accept only a model—of some kind or another—that has a strong emphasis on social justice. For instance, the "democratic socialism" model, examples of which already exist in the world; they are notable for their high degree of attractiveness to the broadest population strata. I am talking about socialism of the social democratic type, as in Sweden, for instance. What does a working person whose mind is not distorted by bolshevism want? To pore over "Das Kapital" or "Malaya Zemlya" [Brezhnev's memoirs]? To brandish a stick and hunt the "class enemy"? To watch his neighbors through the keyhole? To inspect the pockets of a successful colleague? To knock on the door of someone in the KGB? What he needs is: a decent standard of living; good-quality social services (education, medical aid, and so forth); a high degree of social protection; a humane attitude toward him on the part of society. And that is socialism. In essence I do not much care who owns the means of production or what Marx or Lenin had to say on the subject.

As I understand it, the president advocates a socialism that would incorporate all the best things that world civilization has developed.

Third, the ideologization of our life, and primarily of economic relations, must be abandoned. At the level of the president, and that means at the level of our state policy. The force uniting people should be the philosophy of tolerance toward those who think differently and want different things, civil peace, consensus, social progress, humanism, and commitment to the principles of social justice and democracy.

Fourth, it is necessary strictly to put into practice, on the one hand, the idea of preserving the renewed Union and respecting the sovereignty of its components, and on the other, to be guided by the principle, established by Lenin, of the nations' right to self-determination. But without haste or rashness, and, naturally, within the framework of the rule of law.

One last point. The new foreign policy course formulated during the perestroika years has proved fully vindicated, and cannot be called into question. Any backtracking in foreign policy will inevitably lead to backtracking in domestic policy too.

In speaking about civil peace and historical compromise, it goes without saying that we cannot ignore the question of relations between President M. Gorbachev and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Chairman B. Yeltsin. Although, to be frank, many people are sick and tired of this problem. Including me. But I still have not stopped hoping for a rapprochement between these two leaders' positions.

I am convinced that objectively they need each other. And not only they themselves, but the forces that are behind them. Defeat for one will ultimately lead to defeat for the other. And to the defeat of perestroika and of democratic forces.

Let us examine some possibilities.

First possibility. One fine day the president gets tired of people calling for his resignation, his nerves give way, and he complies with this demand. The vice president automatically becomes president. Temporarily. Perhaps "temporarily-permanently." The new president, at such a time of acute crisis, would be obliged to take all possible steps to stabilize the situation, and only then to think about reforms. What are "all possible steps"? Impose martial law to put an end to the dyarchy? In short, there is a 90-percent chance that the perestroika process would be halted. The country would find itself set back even further.

Second possibility. Boris Nikolayevich, obsessed with the idea of preventing the revanche, as certain left-wing circles put it, of "communist reaction," forces the pace, Polish-fashion, having in mind, as he said recently, that "either democracy will be stifled, or we will survive and win this year without fail." The strikes snowball. Life in the country is paralyzed. Cold. Hunger. Savage outbreaks of banditry. Millions of people taking to the streets with banners: "We are sick of anarchic democracy. We are hungry. We are living in poverty. It is time to impose order!" The army intervenes...

Third possibility. For various reasons that it is hard to predict beforehand, those whom we call democrats do indeed come to power. But by no means all of them can be called democrats in the true sense of the word. We already have examples of democrats, after taking the helm of power, acting far from democratically. That is on the one hand. On the other—the situation of ruin itself demands a strong, authoritarian power. And here one type of totalitarianism could easily give way to another. But in the people's life nothing would change rapidly for the better. After all, the economy is largely in a state of ruin and market relations will not produce tangible results in a hurry.

However, there is another possibility. "The strongest man wins," and keeps the situation in the country under control. But then it would be very difficult for him to maintain his former positions. And a martyr's halo would get in the way, too.

So is it perhaps better after all to seek compromise solutions of some kind? For the sake of using both leaders' strong points in the interests of perestroika. The strength of one lies in the power apparatus and in the international arena, and the other's strength lies in his popularity among the people, in particular, as people sometimes say, among ordinary people. Or are these two outstanding leaders so irrational in their approaches to one another that passions will prevail over everything?

What, in fact, divides the two leaders? Not as regards details and trivia, but in essentials. First, the scale, the pace, the very philosophy of the transition to market relations, and, second, the ultimate goal of our perestroika. The first is, I suppose, understood, the second needs clarification. M. Gorbachev remains true to the socialist choice and sees all our transformations within the mainstream of socialism, while B. Yeltsin thinks we have had our fill of socialism already. Or rather, not our fill; we are half-starved, poor, pathetic, lacking everything, spiritually castrated. And all because of Marxist socialism (which is equally impossible everywhere), because of the communist utopia. And also we are the target of endless humiliations and bureaucratic tyranny, as if we were third-class citizens. Here I am on Boris Nikolayevich's side.

But at the same time I entirely support Mikhail Sergeyevich when he says: You cannot pretend that socialism, as a specific social organization of society and system of values, does not and cannot exist. This is bolshevism again, but from the opposite angle. We are a surprising people, we people of Russia. Russia's Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Georgians, Armenians, Jews, and so forth, and also many Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, and others who shared our revolutionary fate. At one time the radical Russian intelligentsia, for the most part, was opposed to capitalism, describing its world as one of exploitation and violence, hypocrisy and deceit, petty bourgeois comfort and mundane happiness. All the aspirations of the intellectuals of that time were associated with a new system, which had never before existed, but appeared splendid, where everything would be like in the Biblical paradise, if not better. They attached no value not only to the gains of Russian enterprise or our landowners who fed half of Europe. They also rejected out of hand the new social relations that had acquired democratic content after the February revolution. That was not enough for them. Maximalism, fed by orthodoxy and Russia's boundless spaces, demanded everything, immediately. And we got it—first from "war communism," and later from the "father of the peoples" [Stalin].

But now, more than 70 years later, the situation is making a 180-degree turn. The radical intelligentsia is

prepared to rush headlong into the maelstrom of market forces, once again, as in 1917, without calculating everything beforehand. Without warning the people that the market economy does not like the weak. This is not the dream of our rose-tinted childhood, it is an objective necessity. The lesser evil, if you like, because the planned economy will be our mass grave.

What am I actually afraid of? That our "artificially bred" society, with its collectivist, leveling mentality and psychology, unprepared inwardly for radical changes, coming up against the harsh realities of the market economy in the early stages of its development, will say: "We've had enough of capitalism. Give us back the gains of October!" In other words, take us back to the camps, to the barracks, only give us guaranteed rations and the chance to work lazily. But all the same, I do not think this will happen.

So what divides the two leaders, if you set aside rivalry, ambition, and the personal relationship factor? Mainly, it seems to me, an argument over pie in the sky. True, there is also the fundamental question of the Union and the ways of forming its structures. But frankly, I do not think Yeltsin seriously believes that some kind of amorphous formation could take the place of the present USSR. All this is from the realm of illusion, or rather political games. If Russia must not be "torn apart," how can you tear the Union apart? The Union should be strong within its own sphere of competence, and the republics in theirs. In a period of transition from one type of society to another—and a period that is further weighed down by a very grave crisis—wishy-washy power will inevitably end in murderous chaos, or more likely in a cruel dictatorship, which, as I have said, the citizens themselves will demand. Those who want the Union to disintegrate are objectively helping to strengthen trends toward a return to pre-perestroika times. Our country is historically fated to be great and multinational. It is a pity that many people fail to realize that.

This is what the argument over pie in the sky is about. The logic of development of a country that has been stewing for three-quarters of a century in the cauldron of totalitarianism, will lead, in the context of market relations and a multiparty system, neither to "Gorbachevist socialism" with a communist perspective, nor to "Yeltsinist nonsocialism." Some kind of unique social structure will arise. That is on the one hand. And on the other—it is necessary right now to tackle the most urgent tasks on the basis of common sense and world experience, discarding the various "isms," and this in itself will dictate (and is already dictating) very similar paths and methods, and also, probably, tempos. We will not hurry into the market system, nor will we return to the former economic model, and it is no use breaking lances over nothing. We will be moving toward our goal for several decades. Taking the longer historical view, the results will certainly be similar—whether through the implementation of the "500 Days" program or the "shock therapy" option, or through the route of the "Basic

Guidelines..." It is all the more necessary therefore to summon our patience and act within the framework of a rule-of-law state, discarding neo-Bolshevism of both the left-wing and the right-wing variety. Whoever comes to power now, he is not going to cure our half-ruined economy or feed people to satiety. That titanic task can only be resolved by all of us together. Through intensive efforts, and probably not soon.

It seems to me that the president, setting aside emotions, should be pleased with the results of the work of the extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. I think these results came as a surprise to many people, but they revealed a shift to the left, in the direction of radicalism, in the correlation of forces in society. Who can realistically challenge the vast majority of Russia's population, who made their choice in favor of the democrats and Yeltsin? You would have to be suicidal. And therefore, in my view, the president should stop giving way and we should stop talking about pressure from the right, from the military-industrial complex, the Stalinist-Brezhnevist party apparatus, the "red landowners," and so forth. I repeat: There is no force in society that, without running the risk of a crushing defeat, could venture to go against the aspirations of the peoples of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and so forth.

And if Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as the interests of progress in the reform of society demand, stop weakening each other and, on the contrary, pool their efforts, then you can believe that perestroika will really be irreversible.

Burlatskiy Interviews Shevardnadze

91UF0624A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 14, 10 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze specially for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA by Fedor Burlatskiy, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor in chief; date and place not given: "His Resignation Above Life..."]

[Text] **Nobody has the power to isolate us except ourselves. Self-isolation is the main danger, warns the former minister.**

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, allow me to begin with a question which will probably be difficult and even painful for you but which nonetheless is important to our country. Your resignation was like a bolt out of the blue. How do you explain it?

[Shevardnadze] This question is still the most difficult one for me. It seemed to me that I answered it in my resignation speech. Nonetheless people continue to ask, apparently assuming that I did not tell everything....

At that same congress my resignation was linked to some emotional outburst or stress. But in fact it was the result of serious reflection and a scrupulous analysis of the situation that had developed in society. A politician

must look far into the future, evaluate the situation, and, if it is unfavorable, try to change it for the better. And if he cannot do this he is obliged to step aside. In any case, that is the way it was with me.

Some of those who spoke after I did expressed doubts about my words about the imminent dictatorship. But today the president himself, when speaking to the miners, says that "out of chaos always arises the strictest dictatorial power." That is exactly what I warned about on 20 December 1990. And all subsequent events have confirmed that my alarm was justified.

What was I proceeding from at the time?

The policy of new thinking had been widely publicized in the outside world. But inside the country the previous stereotypes of behavior and awareness prevailed as before. The reforms are being extinguished by covert and now also overt resistance. The image of the domestic and foreign enemy is being revived. The debate about the choice of a historical path and the value system is being diverted into the channel of direct political confrontation and struggle for power. In an atmosphere of disorder and confusion conflicts are started and power actions are taken—frequently unbeknownst to the legitimate power.

Attacks on foreign policy are certainly no reason to resign. For me they are a symptom of the consolidation of reactionary forces striving to reject common human values, replacing them with postulates of the class struggle.

Having had a sense of the approaching danger for a long time, I could not help but think that unless extreme measures were taken we would not be able to save our newborn democracy and all the achievements of perestroika. And if they were lost, what kind of policy of new thinking could there be? And I would not work for any other policy.

I found it unbearable to think that if I did not take this step I would be forced to participate in something absolutely alien to my convictions. And I also wanted to warn people and force them to think: Where are we going and what are we doing? Will we remain true to the ideals of perestroika or do we want to return to the old policies.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, any politician, especially one of your high position, is always faced with a choice when there is a turn of events with which he does not agree: To stay or leave? Should he leave in order to activate the forces and directions in which he believes or should he stay and slow down the movement toward reaction? Now that a couple of months have passed, do you still hold the same conviction? Was your choice ultimately correct?

[Shevardnadze] I have probably made a fairly large number of mistakes in my life. In recent years, when thinking over my experiences, I have come to the conclusion that many of my mistakes could have been avoided if I had adhered to my principles more strictly.

For I have perhaps had more experience than some of my colleagues and a better knowledge of the real state of affairs in the republics and the real attitudes and feelings, including national ones. I know from experience that many stereotypes and distorted ideas about the nature of interethnic relations are in opposition to ideas that are strongly attractive to a large number of people, and politics must take this into account. In my work in my former post I strove for this, but in my new capacity, taken in by the immensity of the new cause, I was not, one might say, staunch in defending some of my views.

This is not an attempt to justify myself and blame someone else. I am responsible for everything, regardless of whether or not one decision or another fell within the sphere of my competence. If you will, my resignation was predetermined by this. I do not wish to say that I made nothing but mistakes; I probably did something useful in the country's domestic life as well. But I think my decision to resign was the right one: I do not regret it. Moreover, I can see that it was not in vain. For the events in January could have turned out differently. And although the activation of healthy, democratic forces and their unification which we see now is an objective process, I think the step I took may have contributed to this in some way.

[Burlatskiy] If you will allow me, this is not a very tactful question. Since I too am a person who is fairly experienced in politics, I have a certain intuition. I had the feeling that Mikhail Sergeyevich, of course, did not suggest that you resign but hinted, say, something like this: Eduard Amvrosiyevich, you have done so much in the area of foreign policy that perhaps you should now move on to a broader field of activity and make your contribution to domestic life. Was there no incentive like that?

[Shevardnadze] I recall that he spoke of the post of vice president.

[Burlatskiy] That is precisely what I have in mind.

[Shevardnadze] Perhaps this as well as several other ideas were discussed, but in passing, as it were. In any case, there was no special persistence on the part of the president and, for my part, I had no desire to take a different job. For I think Mikhail Sergeyevich was completely sincere when he said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was operating normally, that its collective had done a great deal, and that he was satisfied with the situation in that area. I would not want to think that these were empty words, some kind of "internal diplomacy." My comrades, my colleagues, and I worked—shall we say—self-sacrificingly. And we did have certain results. So that was not the reason.

I began to reflect on the choice I had before me after the events in Tbilisi. The legislative commission had proved that the application of military force against the people was inadmissible in a society that had proclaimed a course toward democratization and glasnost. This conclusion fully agrees with my assessment. Yet they tried to

oppose the conclusion of the legislative commission with another viewpoint, which essentially justified force, and to place the blame on the victim of the punitive action. In this I saw a remnant of our former practice, an attempt to revise and abolish the norms established by perestroika.

Order is necessary in any state, the more so in one such as ours which is in a deep crisis. But I am categorically against using the Army for punitive purposes. Because I lived through the year 1956 when unarmed demonstrators in Tbilisi were killed by Army weapons. And in 1962 there was Novocherkassk... Finally, I remember April 1978 when Army units were prepared to move against a peaceful demonstration, and disaster was avoided only at the price of great political efforts.

Let us impose order by means and methods that are in keeping with democracy. Let us strengthen the forces of law and order and improve the legal regulation of their application. But we should never throw the Army against our own citizens. We must relieve it of this function.

[Burlatskiy] I made that suggestion in the Supreme Soviet when they were discussing the question of financing the Army, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and I suggested turning some of the money from the KGB and the Army over to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. We could train our officers who are now returning from Eastern Europe. We could train them and give them technical equipment and everything they need. The work we are observing in Western countries could be extended a bit to this level. It would be normal work, not involving firing on the population and certainly not using tanks.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, unfortunately, we have these events before our eyes: Vilnius, Riga, and then 28 March—the demonstration in Moscow and the barricades around the Kremlin. On that day I walked through the streets and was shaken. You are right—we must reinforce the militia. But was that really the only mistake we made? Look at how much agitation there is surrounding the Union treaty! But if three or four years ago we had offered the treaty that has now been made public, I am sure the people would have voted in favor of it without any problems. We were too late, we were timid. The same thing is true of the transition to the market economy.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, today there is a significant split in opinions about our foreign policy. Between the Foreign Ministry and the president, on the one hand, and the Army, on the other. In general one can understand this. It is a kind of institutional pluralism. The Army is concerned about security and defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more oriented toward the creation of a generally favorable international situation for the Soviet Union and for economic and humanitarian cooperation. But the split is growing into a

serious clash of positions. Especially regarding such issues as the fate of Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany...

[Shevardnadze] Let us begin with Eastern Europe. Was there ever any real alternative to the events of the autumn of 1989 and the winter of 1990? After all, these were essentially revolutions, widespread popular uprisings against the existing regimes.

There was an alternative. But was it reasonable? We were urged fairly actively to apply force, that is, to restore the doctrine according to which a crisis of power in one country of the "socialist community" must be overcome by armed intervention by the other countries. In other words, it was suggested that we act according to the scenarios of 1953, 1956, and 1968. Could we have done that, sacrificing our own principles concerning the right to freedom of choice, nonintervention, and the common European home?

According to the logic of our critics, it turns out that we were obligated to act. Even risking the policy of perestroika?—I asked, and I heard this answer: Were it not for perestroika nothing like this would have happened in the socialist camp.

Wrong! The ferment in the countries of Eastern Europe began long before perestroika. Take Poland, for example, at the beginning of the eighties. The military could not and did not stop the movement.

Unfortunately, with rare exceptions our partners at the time, the Eastern European leaders, had little understanding of what was going on. Discussions about our being in a state of ignorance are narrow-minded. I myself was a witness to how, during high-level meetings, there was a lack of understanding and strain in the interpretation and vision of the paths of development.

Of course, certain recommendations were made to our allies in extremely delicate form. Referring to my own experience, we let it be understood that if changes were not made, they would encounter serious problems. Alas...

It was impossible to stop this process other than by force, but force in that situation did not provide hopeful prospects. The very idea of it as a factor in keeping the states some people call buffer states on a short leash is insulting to both to us and to their people.

[Burlatskiy] Yes, sooner or later these states had to declare that they wanted to be independent and declare their desire to live in a different way.

[Shevardnadze] Undoubtedly. But in our country many people were very unhappy about the unification of Germany.

I will not deny that as early as 1986 I personally came to the conclusion that this problem would soon arise. Even then I said that Germany would be the main and decisive issue for Europe in the near future. Under the conditions

of a half century of a great people living divided—there was the national question. It was the question of the unity of a nation that did not want to be divided by the walls of ideology, arms, and concrete. And we had to think of how by political means—I repeat, by political means—to prevent possible losses and the danger of letting the process get out of control.

What did our opponents suggest? We had to intervene in some way, to think of something. What? Place interception and covering divisions on the borders, as some said? Start the tank engines? But that is the brink of war. Yes, yes, do not be surprised—World War III. With the concentrations of arms and armed forces that existed in central Europe, any power struggle involving troops was fraught with that risk.

[Burlatskiy] That is a very serious statement, which I am hearing for the first time.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, I have not made statements like this up until now. But, believe me, it is the result of the most serious analysis backed up by extremely solid data.

Continuing to think about where the solution could lie, I came to the conclusion that since we had come to the countries of Eastern Europe as liberators, we had to act in keeping with this high mission and honor. We had to arrange relations with these countries in a different way. Unfortunately, the great-power approach and imperialist psychology took the upper hand.

[Burlatskiy] You know, that even under Khrushchev they discussed the question of changing the nature of our relations with these countries. And this process began with Khrushchev's visit to Yugoslavia. Then came the 1956 events in Hungary... This, incidentally, dealt a colossal blow to the democratic reforms in our country. Then there were the tragic events of 1968.

This is our opinion... But there is another one as well. During the discussions in the Supreme Soviet I heard many deputies complain about the fact that we had lost Europe, and the East European countries were going over to the side of NATO, the FRG, and the United States, and we are left isolated...

[Shevardnadze] I do not share the opinion of those who think the countries of Western Europe and the United States want to isolate us. Nobody is capable of isolating us except us ourselves. Self-isolation—that is the main danger. It can occur as a result of a particular policy or as a result of uncontrolled development of events within the country. And when the West tries to create a protective barrier against chaos advancing from the East, the solution lies in the sphere of our domestic problems. If we succeed in getting rid of our ethnic, economic, and political problems and continue to build a rule-of-law, democratic state we will continue to participate in the general European process and, together with Europe, we will form a unified economic, legal, humanitarian, cultural, and ecological space. The basis has been laid. This is a unique chance.

[Burlatskiy] A couple of days ago there was a heated discussion of the question of including on the agenda the Law on Exit and Entry, and our subcommittee is preparing it. For more than a year I have been unable to do this. The opposition is colossal. Although behind the law stand the interests of a people who want to be an organic part of Europe and the entire civilized world.

[Shevardnadze] I share your opinion completely. This law was initiated and prepared by us, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As minister it was somehow awkward for me to come out against those leaders who were standing in the way of its adoption. And I thought at the time, as I still do, that the adoption of the law could not be postponed. The opponents' main argument has to do with the outflow of brains and working hands. But people are already leaving, and in large numbers. So should we seize them and refuse to let go of them the way we used to? We did not get very far doing that. By holding our citizens behind locked doors we have declared each emigrant to be a potential traitor and enemy of the homeland. But, excuse me, they are not enemies of the homeland but of the regime, its system, and its attitude toward its own citizens. Get rid of the reasons why people want to leave and there will be no outflow of brains.

If we want to be a civilized country we must have the same laws and policies that the rest of the civilized world has.

[Burlatskiy] Your resignation speech at the congress contained a very interesting analytical thought about distinguishing between reactionary and conservative forces. This caused many to ask: Who is who? I would like you to discuss this in greater detail, even specifically if you can.

[Shevardnadze] I see no tragedy in the fact that we have conservatives. In any civilized society there are revolutionaries, innovators, democrats, and conservatives. And we cannot condemn the conservatives because they believe in certain ideas.

[Burlatskiy] People, the majority of the society, are always afraid of change. Not really sure that things will be better, they are afraid to lose what they have.

[Shevardnadze] We must speed up the creation of structures for the democratic movement on a scientifically substantiated, serious, and strong platform.

As for reactionaries, we have them too. I will not give their names at this time. People can see for themselves—all they have to do is turn on the television. But you should look for them in the other camp as well. People with extremist ideas are also joining the democratic movement. They are potential dictators who are ready to establish a totalitarian system.

[Burlatskiy] I look at what is happening in the Russian parliament. In spite of all the chaos, parties are being

formed and there are the beginnings of a multiparty system. How do you view this process?

[Shevardnadze] Once we have recognized the constitutional path and political pluralism, we should not be bothered by the formation of new parties. It is not important how many of them there are now. What is important is what they achieve, what goals they set for themselves. And another thing: how viable they are. If the democratic movement does not have the corresponding structures, one can hardly expect it to end up on top. The situation in society is extremely complex. In such a situation, of course, the people with a chance of success are those who have strong structures—organizational, political, and propagandistic.

I am not bothered at all by the fact that the democrats are able to form a party. This is normal. In any civilized society there is a ruling party and there are opposition parties. The opposition is called upon to offer an alternative and thus balance out the sociopolitical process. But when a society does not have elementary order, a quite unfamiliar figure can appear in the arena and, promising "strict order," can attract many followers. There have been so many cases like this in history!

[Burlatskiy] I am especially frightened by reliance on the mob. Some things remind me of the beginning of the thirties in Germany—the same crisis, the spiritual collapse and vacuum, the lack of any positive programs of the ruling forces. And at that time there was the mob. And at that time there was the leader. And at that time there was the dictatorship.

[Shevardnadze] We need capable, active people with a progressive orientation. There are many of them in society. I know that the youth are in favor of forming normal democratic institutions. I mean normal institutions and not ones that have admixtures of adventurism but ones that are led by thinking people. Intellectuals, if you will. I know there is support for them among the working class.

It seems to me that our main task today is to consolidate all healthy forces. Several times recently I have expressed the idea that both among the conservatives and among the democrats there are people who understand the full measure of their responsibility to the country and to the people.

[Burlatskiy] There is a certain contradiction here. On the one hand we should form an alternative democratic movement which should be self-determining. And on the other it should build a bridge even to the conservatives...

[Shevardnadze] Exactly. And there is no contradiction here. True democrats will cooperate with normal conservatives if they are united by a common goal—saving the country. The people are tired, and we must find the courage and decisiveness to step across all barriers. Gorbachev and Yeltsin must also think seriously about this. Before it is too late.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, you have touched a sore spot. We have spoken out in favor of creating a left centrist bloc and have been agitating to have Mikhail Sergeyevich, Boris Nikolayevich, and the leaders of all the republics sit down at a roundtable, and I mean a round table and not a rectangular one, and resolve the question of questions. Today it is necessary to solve crucial problems related to avoiding famine. Tomorrow we will be ready for something else, but today let us solve this together without setting maximalist tasks. For the past half year we have been hoping for this, for agreement. Now many people are saying that it is already too late.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, we are quite late. But what can we do? Continue the confrontation? That would mean the destruction of everything. Of course, the psychological barrier exists and it is difficult to forget the rather unpleasant words our opponent has uttered about us. Everyone has his pride. But still, guided by the interests of the people, we must resume dialogue. Regardless of how burdensome and difficult it may be.

Perhaps this is not the right analogy, but still I will say that when we were just beginning to work with Reagan he called us the evil empire. And that is how he began discussions with us: the evil empire. Schultz and I waited and thought: Let them sit and talk, the more the better. And they sat and talked until late at night. I know that they were very heated and sometimes unpleasant discussions. But it was dialogue.

[Burlatskiy] They locked elbows and felt like human beings.

[Shevardnadze] So why can our two leaders and other leaders not find a common language? Gorbachev and Yeltsin should provide an example for the whole country and the leaders of other republics.

[Burlatskiy] Ultimately this is their historical and moral duty to the people. It is thought that Yeltsin and Gorbachev parted ways because of their programs and political positions. One was in favor of the "500 days" and the other—the "Basic Directions." And I personally find this especially unbelievable. Experience has shown that these are quite compatible ideas. It is necessary to proceed through concrete decisions and not abstract debates which are reminiscent of meetings of scholarly councils.

[Shevardnadze] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has considerable support not only in Russia. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has experience, knowledge, and authority both in the world and in our country. And the country is literally burning up.

The two leaders must discuss this seriously. They can appeal together to the all-Union audience. Now we need concrete, constructive actions. If we look for the guilty parties—say Gorbachev has failed to say something or Yeltsin has failed to do something—there will be no end to it.

[Burlatskiy] They say, Eduard Amvrosiyevich, that someone is already playing his own game here and even trying to bring these two opposing forces into conflict. Somebody is sitting and planning—shall I take over Gorbachev's post or Yeltsin's? Do you not have this feeling?

[Shevardnadze] You know, Fedor Mikhaylovich, that is predictable too. When there is such a complicated and contradictory situation in society, a third force always enters the arena.

[Burlatskiy] That is what Brezhnev did at one time... In your view, what position does national democracy occupy in the alignment of political forces? Now, especially after the referendum, the most diverse conclusions are being drawn regarding this. Some say that the idea of unity, the idea of a restored Union won. Others talk about a federation. Still others hint about a confederation. Six republics took a special position.

[Shevardnadze] I respect any democratic movement. But we should probably not forget that all of them are young. There is strong social ferment in certain republics. And against the background of democratic changes, violations of human rights are becoming widespread, whether the victims are of indigenous or nonindigenous nationalities. It takes time for people to figure out where the real democracy lies, where the real interests of the peoples and nationalities are, and where there is careerism, chauvinism, and nationalism. But during this time there can be catastrophic changes in the way people live. And what do we do then?

So they held a referendum... That was risky business. After certain republics declared that they would not participate in the referendum, the situation got worse. It is very important for the time necessary for self-determination to be calm and not filled with disturbances. This is very important if we are to speak about real self-determination. After all, we have always recognized self-determination, beginning with Lenin. But there was no legal mechanism, no legal procedure that made it possible to exercise this right.

Now we have come to an awareness of the fact that this requires the corresponding institutions, methods, and procedures.

I think the largest republics will sign the Union treaty. As for the others, let us think about them. Since we have the right to self-determination and separation and we are creating a mechanism for exercising these rights, perhaps there should be some special status for these republics during the transition period.

[Burlatskiy] I am reminded of the old Russia. In Finland there was the legislature, in Poland the Sejm, and in Bukhara there was the Bukharan emir. Nobody demanded standardized political forms and everyone dealt with the customs, aspirations, and traditions of the peoples.

We have still not overcome our desire for some kind of general, universal form. Soviets? The soviets must be identical everywhere! The regime? It must be the same regime everywhere. Of course, the demands of a modern civilization are one thing. But we are afraid of flexible forms. It would have been possible for certain states which were determined to withdraw to retain a form of economic association like the Common Market. But we have this attitude: If they leave we will break off all economic ties.

[Shevardnadze] It seems to me, Fedor Mikhaylovich, that we must search for bold, unusual solutions. Say a republic does not wish to sign the standardized Union treaty. But it is prepared to sign a treaty with Russia and other republics. I think the Russians are doing the right thing by taking the initiative here. Such a process should be supported.

But that is still not all. If a republic does not sign the Union treaty, then we should sign another agreement with it that corresponds to the real situation. In any republic people now understand that it is impossible to live without certain obligations to the center and certain obligations from the center to it.

[Burlatskiy] More than 90 percent of the economy of the Baltics involves other republics.

[Shevardnadze] I believe the country's highest leaders should deal with how relations between the center and these republics are regulated. These republics, like all the others, must feel that they really have equal rights. I, for example, cannot forgive myself, or others either, for the way negotiations were conducted with the Lithuanians headed by Prunskiene. In my opinion, they had a character of strict subordination: There is the center and then there is the "periphery." With this setup it is difficult to find a common language.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, here is what makes me a little bitter... At the basis of self-determination lies the ethnic principle and not the population principle as is the case in Western countries. That is, the people in the legal sense are all the nations. The people in the ethnic sense are the indigenous nation. As soon as we enter completely, with both feet, on the path of superiority and priority of the indigenous nation living in this region, a confrontation will begin. How can one, on the one hand, preserve national statehood as it has historically developed—in the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia, and so forth—and, on the other hand, not end up in the grip of ethnocracy? This is very dangerous, as we can already see. Entire nations are cast out. The Armenians from Azerbaijan, the Azeris from Armenia, the Russians from many regions, and so forth. The ethnic principle...

[Shevardnadze] But do you see a possibility of abolishing it by decree? It is unfeasible under modern conditions. Certain peoples have literally suffered for the idea of national statehood. For centuries they have battled and spilled blood for it. I am afraid that the dogmatic interpretation of the idea of nations coming together and

merging and the stupid practice of its realization have established this idea even more firmly in people's minds and hearts.

It cannot be abolished by any decree. The solution lies in the formation of truly legal foundations: civilized statehood, the establishment of the primacy of the law, and the use of international experience. It was not by chance that I mentioned human rights. In terms of them it is possible to judge what kind of system you are dealing with—civilized or uncivilized. Such is the generally recognized principle which has become the crowning accomplishment of the 20th century.

How do we make sure that a person's rights are respected everywhere, regardless of his origins or his "roots"? That interethnic conflicts do not place the parties drawn into them on the verge of destruction? There is no other path to this. Except dialogue. And anyone who does not want dialogue simply does not want peace for his own and for other peoples.

Unfortunately, dialogue is always impeded by prejudices, stereotypes, and "images of the enemy." Their elimination depends exclusively on the will of the parties involved.

I am reminded of a meeting with Angolan opposition leader Savimbi. The propaganda did not flatter him, to put it mildly, and it was not without misgivings that I agreed to speak with him. He turned out to be an extremely educated person, a physician, and an intellectual.

We had a good conversation at that time and agreed on many things.

I think our republics should arm themselves with the experience accumulated in searching for harmony in international affairs. They are very much in need of it. And we could help them—both by ourselves and by bringing in recognized foreign figures.

[Burlatskiy] Eduard Amvrosiyevich, in concluding our interesting conversation I would like to ask you a personal question. Where do you see your place in these complicated processes in the life of our society? Because your reputation was not formed in a day, it has developed over the six years of perestroika. People have followed your activity in Georgia as well.

[Shevardnadze] I have never laid claim to a key role and I certainly do not do so now. But I wish to use my strength, experience, and knowledge to save perestroika and democracy and to reinforce our democratic achievements. It was not without reason that I put forth the idea of creating this association [Foreign Policy Association]. According to its charter, it is an independent, nongovernmental organization. Its goal is to assist the positive process and to save and protect the new thinking and its principles...

[Burlatskiy] That is in the international arena. Your association is pointed there. But your ideas and feelings

are linked to perestroika within. Do you have any intentions or plans regarding this?

[Shevardnadze] Of course. We would like to work with the republics very actively and in specific ways. It cannot be ruled out that analogous associations will be formed in the republics as well. We can help those that have no experience in cooperating in the international arena—in the spheres of economics, politics, ecology, and so forth.

In the second place, I would like to engage seriously in a study of international experience in resolving conflicts. We do not wish to impose anything on anybody. We will share our knowledge and experience and, if necessary, we will become intermediaries. Why not make this our practice?

[Burlatskiy] That is generally accepted.

[Shevardnadze] I have performed this mission frequently in international affairs. And I was always convinced of its usefulness. Those are our plans. I have no other personal aspirations or ambitions.

If I had been guided by such considerations I would not have left the post of minister. And now interesting and energetic people are gathering round—assistants, advisers, experts. It is gratifying that the association will include my colleagues, foreign affairs ministers and ambassadors from other countries, business people, and journalists. Young people and future politicians are also making their appearance. About 10-15 days ago I had a surprising meeting with them. They were completely new and original people, talented people. This is the new generation which has yet to make its voice heard.

[Burlatskiy] And the last thing. Eduard Amvrosiyevich, will we get through this crisis? Can we begin to find the normal, constructive work our country needs so much?

[Shevardnadze] We will get through it if we forget about all the offenses, intrigues, and contradictions that existed before and exist now. If we are able to join together for the sake of saving the most sacred thing we have.

Law on Ministries, Other Organs Published

PM1104133391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Law signed by USSR President M. Gorbachev in Moscow on 1 April: "USSR Law on the List of Ministries and Other Central Organs of State Management of the USSR"]

[Text] This law, in accordance with the USSR, defines the list of ministries and other central organs of state management of the USSR.

Article 1. Ministries of the USSR

The following are ministries of the USSR:

The Ministry of the Aviation Industry,

The Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building,

The Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry,

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations,

The Ministry of Internal Affairs,

The Ministry of Geology,

The Ministry of Civil Aviation,

The Ministry of Health,

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

The Ministry of Information and the Press,

The Ministry of Culture,

The Ministry of Metallurgy,

The Ministry of the Maritime Fleet,

The Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry,

The Ministry of the Defense Industry,

The Ministry of Defense,

The Ministry of General Machine Building,

The Ministry of Material Resources,

The Ministry of the Use of Nature and Environmental Protection,

The Ministry of Railroads,

The Ministry of the Radio Industry,

The Ministry of the Fish Industry,

The Ministry of Communications,

The Ministry of Agriculture and Food,

The Ministry of Special Construction and Installation Work,

The Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry,

The Ministry of Trade,

The Ministry of Transport Construction,

The Ministry of Labor and Social Questions,

The Ministry of the Coal Industry,

The Ministry of Finances,

The Ministry of Economics and Forecasting,

The Ministry of the Electronics Industry,

The Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Building,

The Ministry of Power and Electrification,

The Ministry of Justice,

The Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Processing Industry.

Article 2. Other Central Organs of State Management of the USSR

The following are central organs of state management of the USSR, which are headed by USSR Ministers:

The Committee for State Security,

The State Committee for Purchases of Food Resources,

The State Committee for Timber,

The State Committee for Machine Building,

The State Committee for Public Education,

The State Committee for Science and Technology,

The State Committee for National Issues,

The State Committee for Statistics,

The State Committee for Construction and Investments,

The State Committee for Chemistry and Biotechnologies.

Article 3. Commissions of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers

The following operate in the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to manage groups of sectors or national economic complexes:

The State Military-Industrial Commission,
The State Fuel and Energy Commission,
The State Commission for Emergency Situations.

Article 4. Interrepublican Organs of State Management of the USSR

The implementation of currency policy in the USSR is carried out by the Union-republican currency committee.

The elaboration, in coordination with the republics, and consistent implementation of a package of interconnected measures for the transition to a market economy are ensured by the State Council for Economic Reform.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev
Moscow, Kremlin, 1 April 1991

Ryzhkov Denies UK Paper Interview Claims

PM1104153191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 91 p 1

[N. Kadulin report: "Evening Phone Call to N. Ryzhkov"]

[Text] Last Sunday, Britain's SUNDAY TELEGRAPH published an interview with Nikolay Ryzhkov, former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by former TASS legislative correspondent Andrey Orlov. According to a report by our London correspondent A. Kupriyanov, Ryzhkov—if the newspaper is to be believed—called M.S. Gorbachev a "traitor" and B.N. Yeltsin a "pseudodemocrat" who has not even read the "500 Days" Program and whose accession to supreme power could have consequences for the country that are hard to predict. The interview gives the impression that Nikolay Ivanovich does not hold a very high opinion of V.S. Pavlov's first steps either.

We rang Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov at his dacha.

"In fact," he replied, "Orlov's request for a meeting was conveyed to me via some aides while I was recuperating in a sanatorium. He said that he had gathered some material for a book or brochure on the economic reform, and I agreed to help him figure out what it was about. Of course, I did not suggest at that time that he should take the most trenchant political extracts from our conversation, let alone that he should exaggerate them, to put it mildly.

"Now for Gorbachev and his advisers. I did not use the word 'traitor.' But I can tell you this.

"I discussed the question of reforming the Council of Ministers as the country's supreme political organ with

him a long time ago. However, I was astounded that it was carried out so suddenly. At 0930 on the morning of 17 November, M.S. Gorbachev rang me in my office from his car and informed me that half an hour later he would be proposing the reform of the Council of Ministers at the Supreme Soviet. In my opinion, this should have been carried out after the signing of the Union treaty, that is, after it had become clear which functions the center would be assuming and what would come within the remit of the republics. As he and I had agreed earlier.

"As for the president's advisers, when perestroika began, as you know, Gorbachev had a group of comrades around him. Now they no longer work with him. All these people, and I am one of them, had different viewpoints. We debated issues and Mikhail Sergeyevich liked that. I know hardly any of the people who are with him today. It is for Gorbachev to judge whether things are better or worse for him now.

"Now for my criticism of Comrade Yeltsin. My attitude toward him was and remains extremely negative. I am sure that he is no democrat but merely poses as one. And I still believe that the '500 Days' Program, which runs to two volumes, cannot be studied and adopted in two days. This is no joke.

"Finally, about Comrade Pavlov. Criticizing my former colleagues is not my style. But nevertheless, the 'Western bankers' intrigues' that Valentin Sergeyevich spoke of in connection with the well known banknote exchange was a joke. After all, I was in the know until quite recently."

"Nikolay Ivanovich, do you still have dealings with Gorbachev now?"

"No. The people with whom I am in contact now are mainly former colleagues and deputies."

"What are you planning to do nowadays?"

"My four-months of treatment and recuperation are over. You may presume therefore that I am fit again. Time will show what will happen next."

"Thank you."

Poll Shows Half of Country Rejects Communism

PM1104134991 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 12, Mar 91 (Signed to Press 19 Mar)
p 13

["Public Opinion" article by Vera Nikitina and Vadim Sazonov: "Communism: For and Against"]

[Text] It seems to approximately half the country's population that the ideas of Communism have exhausted themselves in our country. This is evidenced by the results of a mass poll conducted in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], the

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Estonia by the All-Union Center for Studying Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Questions.

Communism has been abandoned by 60 percent of men and 44 percent of women (70 percent of those under 20 who were polled and 40 percent of those over 60).

Every third holder of an institute diploma is a supporter of Communism, but among those with no higher education the figure is one in five. Can it be that the lower the level of education, the simpler it is for people to part with Communist beliefs?

Among CPSU members, the number of supporters and opponents of communism has almost equaled out (38 and 40 percent). In comparison, three out of every five members of the new informal movements and organizations reject a communist future.

The largest number of people abandoning Communism is in Estonia—three-fifths of the population, and in Kazakhstan the figure is 55 percent; in the RSFSR and the Ukraine no more than half the population opposes Communism.

The most Communist city is certainly not Moscow, where 27 percent of the inhabitants retain their faith in the recent idol. Small cities, which, incidentally, have outstripped the countryside with almost twice as many communist supporters (37 percent as against 19), can more justifiably claim this title.

Overall, Communism now has twice as many adversaries in the country as it has firm followers. But between the supporters and the opponents of communism a significant section of the population is biding its time, unable to ally itself with either one side or the other. At any moment it may choose a clear position and place itself under the banners of the former ideals. Then the forces will be approximately equal and will consolidate in the proportion 50:50.

Poll Shows 56 Percent Lack Trust in Leaders

PM1104134191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 91 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "For the Union Leadership's Attention"]

[Text] The participants in a poll conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion on Socioeconomic Questions were asked a question about trust in the USSR leadership.

More than one-half of those polled (56 percent) do not trust the Union leadership. One in four (25 percent) answered that they "largely trust" it. Some 6 percent of respondents have complete trust in the country's leadership. And 12 percent of those polled were undecided.

Commentator Views Current Political Processes

LD1104152491 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS news analyst Sergey Kolesnikov]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Passions have not yet cooled after heated debates at the Congress of Russian People's Deputies, the wave of strikes keeps battering the country and confrontational sentiments prevail in society. But this salient feature of current political processes in the Soviet Union does not dwarf the quest for accord and consolidation, which becomes increasingly vocal in the great diversity of views.

The difference in positions of those, who keep harping on trite formulas of the purely ideological nature and demand the dissolution of almost all social and state structures, beginning from the resignation of the president, and those who do not spare efforts for the benefit of the peoples of Russia and the entire Union, who look for ways out of the crisis relying on common sense and responsibility, is shaping more and more clearly.

A clear programme to pull the country out of the crisis, which was presented by the president to the Federation Council, contains a range of political and economic measures. These measures may serve as a foundation for a broad consensus of the wholesome forces of society, who are interested in the country's peaceful and effective advancement to democracy and stability.

A detailed analysis of the anti-crisis programme's economic part is still to be made. This programme will be sent for additional study, mindful of the results of its discussion by the Federation Council.

However, meticulous observers could not fail to notice that several specific measures and, primarily, the vector of movement underlying the programme of the Cabinet of Ministers and the concept of economic development that was elaborated by the Russian authorities coincide in many important aspects.

This coincidence is not surprising. Although democratic criticism of the Union government's policy of scathing [as received], nobody can dispute the obvious fact that the majority of proposals in the Russian programme to stabilise the economy and switch to market relations logically stem from the guidelines for stabilising the national economy and switching to market relations, which were adopted last October and were repeatedly anathemised in the "independent press".

The most competent analysts in the radical press have already become aware of this relationship. In evaluating Valentin Pavlov's activity in the office of the prime minister, a news analyst in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (independent newspaper) ironically censured the professional economist only for drawing "the hatred of intellectuals and old women" as largely a purely emotional factor.

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper admits that "market reforms begin to be threatened not so much by machinations of the "nomenklatura" as the workers' movement, which is gaining momentum spontaneously, and the radicalisation of the population's sentiments due to the increase in prices.

All this compels the government as well as those who only recently invested a great deal of effort in inciting the masses to begin calling people for calmness and prudence.

Consensus on the basis of the priority of national, state interests is possible also around the political programme submitted by the president. This programme calls for restoring law and order, the bottom to top subordination of executive power and holding officials and executive bodies accountable for their assigned work. These demands are consonant with the calls made recently from the rostrum of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies.

True, the question remains as to how and with the help of what political, legal and other mechanisms to implement these measures. Presumably, under present circumstances and given the existing level of legal culture, the most rigid ban on strikes and rallies and the enforcement of any extreme measures will not have such an effect as a moratorium on any actions destabilising civil peace, which is imposed voluntarily by the public.

Is society prepared to assume moral responsibility on its own will? If it is not prepared for this move, one is inclined to call in question the possibility and fruitfulness of realising the idea for a round-table conference, which is being put forward by alternative political forces. The call for common sense underlies the policy that is vitally needed by the people today. This policy is proposed to the country by the head of the Soviet state.

Union, Autonomous Republic Status Rejected

91UN1249A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Appeal to USSR president and presidents and Supreme Soviet chairmen of sovereign republics, signed by representatives of scientific and creative intelligentsia of the Yakutskaya-Sakha Soviet Socialist Republic; date not given: "There Are No 'Large' and 'Small' Republics"]

[Text] Our country is going through a difficult period in its history. The political, economic, and spiritual crisis of the unitary-totalitarian system is accompanied by unpredictable consequences from which all of the people of the multinational country are suffering. Serious difficulties are being experienced by the national-state system, whose radical improvement became a long-awaited and hoped-for process.

At the present time a concerned discussion about the Union treaty is going on, and fateful questions concerning the existence of each republic, each people, and

each person are being decided. The day is not far off when the republics will sign the treaty. At the same time, the situation is such today that difficulties have arisen for republics that are part of the structure of other republics in implementing self-determination, although on 26 April 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law "On Demarcating the Powers between the Union and Subjects of the Federation," in which autonomous republics are recognized as independent and equal subjects of the Union federation. The draft of the Union treaty, continuing this line, establishes that each republic—treaty participant—is a sovereign state.

The Yakutskaya ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], established in 1922, is part of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] structure. In September 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted a declaration on its own sovereignty, and on 26 February 1991 the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] adopted the Law "On the State Status of the Republic," according to which the republic is recognized as a sovereign state within the structure of the RSFSR and the USSR, establishing its relationship with them independently and on a treaty basis. Similar decisions were made by other republics. Thus, a fundamentally new situation has been created in the future development of the national-state arrangement of the country; the republics have proclaimed their new state status, which asserts the equal rights of the people who live in national-state formations.

In the situation that has evolved, in negotiations in the Council of the Federation on consideration of the draft Union treaty the leadership of our republic is striving for a direct signing of the treaty, which would lead to a reinforcement of the republic's status as a full and equal participant in the treaty as a sovereign state. However, in the course of preparations for signing the Union treaty, as is evident from the nature of the discussions with the participation of authorized representatives of the sovereign republics, the opinion is being expressed and defended regarding the preservation of the division in the structure of the Union of "large" and "small" republics and "large" and "small" nations, and the preservation of the demarcation of republics as "Union" and "autonomous." We think that under the circumstance of implementing the new thinking on questions of the national-state structure and renewal of the Union as a federation of sovereign republics, such a position cannot be considered constructive or promoting a real renewal of the Union as a law-governed state.

It must be said that a direct signing of the Union treaty does not denote automatic withdrawal of the republic from the RSFSR structure and infringement on the interests of the RSFSR and of the other sovereign republics. We proceed from the need for a correct understanding of the equal rights of peoples, and we think that relations between republics, one of which is part of another, should be regulated by treaties and agreements between them. Thus, direct signing of the

Union treaty supposes a new development of relations and a strengthening of vertical and horizontal treaty ties between the republics on a new sovereign basis. It is precisely for this reason that we counted on and count on the energetic support of the USSR president and the leadership of the sovereign republics which in the past were the object of an imperial policy of the departments and ministries, just like the former Yakutskaya ASSR.

Counting on your support, we ask that two factors be considered:

1. The Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR is a large national-state organization with enormous natural and economic potential. In territory it occupies a fifth of the Russian Federation and a seventh of the USSR, and in the north it has a state border of great length. It surpasses some of the Union republics in the volume of real aggregate social product and national income that it produces.

The economy of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR is oriented mainly on the production of products for hard currency and export, and the sale of part of them amounts to billions of dollars in hard currency receipts for the USSR.

The republic takes an active part in the all-Union distribution of labor. It supplies the national economy of the country with 99 percent of the natural diamonds, 15 percent of the gold, 30 percent of the tin, 100 percent of the antimony, 15 percent of the valuable trade furs, 16.0 million tons of coking coal, and other types of products. In the republic's industry, the share of industrial all-Union significance is more than 85 percent.

According to the draft Union treaty, it is proposed that the formation and utilization of the gold reserve and the diamond and hard currency funds become the joint authority of the Union and the sovereign republics. We think that the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, being virtually the only supplier of natural diamonds and one of the principal gold extracting regions, should become an equal participant in these funds.

2. As history shows, the national-state structure of the country did not remain immutable and static for more than 70 years. The Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen republics were originally created as autonomous formations within the RSFSR, and afterwards were reorganized into Union republics. This was a natural process in the political, economic, and spiritual development of the republics, and it did not lead to the disintegration of the Russian Federation. It is not accidental that the draft Union treaty affirms the principle of openness for joining the USSR, and the draft federative treaty for national-state subjects of the federation provides for an independent determination of one's state-legal status.

We believe that the Union treaty should be signed by all Union republics. We hope that our Appeal will be supported by the USSR president and the leaders of the republics. At the same time, the entry of all of the

republics in a system of subjects of the Union does not infringe on the interests of other republics, including the RSFSR.

[Signed] V. Antonov, people's artist of the RSFSR and the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR and laureate of the State Prize of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR imeni P.A. Oyunskiy; L. Babenko, people's physician of the USSR; N. Yefimov, laureate of the Lenin Prize for Science and Technology; V. Ivanov, honored worker of science of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, professor, and people's deputy of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR; A. Ilina-Dmitriyeva, USSR people's artist and laureate of the RSFSR State Prize; G. Krivoshepko, RSFSR honored worker of art, people's artist of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, and director; G. Krymskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professor; V. Larionov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professor, and USSR people's deputy; A. Mordinov, RSFSR honored worker of science, professor; N. Samsonov, honored worker of science of the RSFSR and the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, professor; N. Mordinov, people's writer of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, member of the Writers Union; N. Solomonov, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, professor; V. Fedorov, member of the USSR Writers Union; M. Fedorov, honored worker of science of the Yakutskaya-Sakha SSR, professor.

Gorbachev Greets Soviet Charity Fund

PM1104084091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Apr 91 Union Edition p 1

[Message from M. Gorbachev to mark "Charity Week":
"To the Soviet Fund for Charity and Health"]

[Text] I greet the participants in "Charity Week," which begins today. I would like to see this noble cause as not just another campaign, but a symbol of society's growing attention toward the moral aspect of our existence and the new self-awareness of citizens and society as a whole.

The charity movement not only helps the suffering and needy, but also awakens people's souls to activity, offering them the opportunity to see the results of their efforts directly and in the most noble sphere. Which is more important and more humane—support for the weakest section of society, or the moral awakening of the individual? I am sure that for the normal life of a country and people, both are highly necessary. Without a combination of these factors, social rebirth simply cannot take place.

May this endeavor of charity, which illuminates hearts and souls and uncovers human generosity, be crowned with every possible success.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev.

CPSU CC Member on Price Reform, Economic Problems

AU1104161491 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG
in German 7 Apr 91 p 24

[Jochen Kummer report: "If You Want to Know How a Central Committee Member Lives, Go Shopping With Me"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—We met again in Moscow after eight months. "I thought you, too, are no longer in office," I told Aleksandr Yakimovich Degtyarev of the Ideology Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

"Why?" he asked.

"Because many of Gorbachev's associates of the first hour have resigned or were pushed out by reactionary Communists," I answered.

Smiling, he said: "It is a coincidence that you are meeting me on my first day in a new position: I have advanced from deputy head to head of the Ideology Department."

Degtyarev, 44, is now counted among the young guard of party leader Gorbachev. The department head and Central Committee member has 200 subordinates. They are to outline the major ideological basis of the party for Gorbachev.

Degtyarev and I are sitting in his office number 701, like last year: in the party headquarters in the Old Square, number 20, behind the GUM department store in Red Square. He briefs me about his tasks: "There are three main elements: settling situations where disturbances have occurred; preserving and strengthening the entire union—here we do not know the number of republics involved; and the fastest possible settlement of the economic situation."

"Does President Gorbachev still have the power in this hands?" I want to know.

"If one uses the strictest yardstick, yes," he says. "But one can say that the harsh confrontations with the individual republics have made the situation get out of control sometimes."

We talk about the bloodshed in the Baltic states in January and about the escalation in the capital city of Moscow. "Politically and emotionally, the events have caused great damage to Gorbachev's cause," he admits. "But the more profound direction of perestroika has remained."

Degtyarev, a former lecturer for Russian history of the Middle Ages, speaks of "complications." He uses the term "scissors" in order to explain some of the reasons for the complications. On the one side he sees the smooth "speed of the political events." The "resolution on glasnost has been fulfilled completely," he says. "And so has the law on the press."

I object: "But President Gorbachev has proposed to reintroduce some sort of censorship, which, however, was rejected by the Supreme Soviet."

"No, no," Degtyarev counters. "This was only half of the sentence. The idea was to alleviate the harsh contradictions that have developed in the press. But no matter what, the press law is valid. And the resolution on glasnost has been fulfilled."

However, I did not miss the fact in the Soviet Union that Gorbachev has taken radio and television under stricter care of the party under functionary Leonid Kravchenko. The oppositional group "Democratic Russia" is not getting its due.

Degtyarev also thinks that the changes in the political structures have been fulfilled. "They are even overfulfilled," he claims. Among other things, Gorbachev has introduced the presidential system in the Soviet Union.

Never before since the Bolshevik revolution has the law given a ruler as much power as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Russia's legislature president, Gorbachev's challenger Boris Yeltsin, will hardly agree with the words of the "overfulfilled" changed political structures. He is striving for the office of Russian President, who is to be elected directly by the people on 12 June 1991. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was not elected Soviet president directly by the people.

"What has been achieved in the political area, has not been achieved in the economic area," Degtyarev admits. "We have lost two years. The market with the new price system should actually be working already. However, because it does not do that, the political and economic development looks like a pair of scissors."

Since the end of last year, the shelves in the Moscow shops have been practically empty. "Where is the meat?" I ask.

"On the black market," Degtyarev answers.

"Why does the city of Moscow introduce new vouchers?" I ask.

"This is the result of the escalation of the crisis. Moscow does not have any other way out," he says.

"At the moment, it is still a problem of distribution, not of production," Degtyarev says. "But if one does not take measures at the right time so that the black forces do not take everything to the black market, it will also be a problem of production."

"Western experts accuse president Gorbachev of not being consistent in introducing the market economy," I say. "Does he hesitate because he is afraid of social unrest or because he wants to preserve socialism?"

Degtyarev's answer is of a rarely heard frankness. "The market economy is not an instrument for Gorbachev,"

Degtyarev says. "The socialist orientation is preserved; this is rooted very deeply in our society." [passage omitted]

Bakatin on Gorbachev Relations With Democrats

LD1104175491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] A talk about democracy and democrats is continued in the conversation between Andrey Karaulov, observer of the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, and Vadim Bakatin, member of the USSR Security Council. The latter is wondering why Gorbachev has terrible relations with democrats. I am surprised at Gorbachev's speech in Belorussia, Vadim Bakatin says, in particular, that part of it where Gorbachev criticizes democrats.

I must say that the conversation with Vadim Bakatin published in the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is of a certain interest, as it allows a better understanding of the processes that take place in the upper echelons of power. Thus, on the question of whether Gorbachev removed Bakatin from the Ministry of Internal Affairs because some opposition insisted on it, the present member of the Security Council, Vadim Bakatin, said: Undoubtedly, it is so. That is exactly why Gorbachev did it.

TASS Reviews Central Press for 12 Apr

LD1204064191 Moscow TASS in English 0626 GMT 12 Apr 91

["Press Review"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—The press highlights the 30th anniversary of the world's first orbital space flight made by Yuriy Gagarin on board the Vostok spaceship on April 12, 1961.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA devotes one of its pages to reflections by Tatyana Kopylova, a publicist, who, on the strength of documents, relates the known and unknown episodes in the life of the world's first cosmonaut.

In KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper Yaroslav Golovanov, who knew Gagarin well, writes about interesting details about the preparation and realization of the first-ever flight on the strength of accounts by the cosmonaut himself and by those who were around him.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA carries reminiscences by Lieutenant-General K. Kerimov, who for ten years was the chairman of the state commission that issued clearances for the launch of manned spaceships, about the preparations of Gagarin's flight. TRUD also carries notes about the first-ever orbital flight and cosmonaut No. One himself.

Newspapers report a social function in Moscow marking the 30th anniversary of the world's first space flight and carry numerous photographs on the subject.

The press reports that the charter of the Soviet Communist Party was registered in the USSR Ministry of Justice on Thursday. Thereby, the Communist Party is the first among the country's political parties to be granted the status of an All-Union party and all rights of a legal entity.

PRAVDA carries a brief account by its correspondents of a news conference held in Moscow on the same day on this occasion.

The news conference was attended by Vladimir Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, who pointed out that the CPSU in its present state has become more democratic and there are various trends in it. At present there are 16.5 million communists in the country, he said.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and PRAVDA carry a summary of the speech made by Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov at a plenary meeting of the council of the General Confederation of Soviet Trade Unions on Wednesday. He stated that the government would insist on linking pay rises with an increase in the volumes of production.

The prime minister recalled that the state budget and all budgets of the Union republics endorsed as of today have a deficit. Besides, Pavlov said, over the first quarter of the current year the country's national income produced decreased by ten per cent. In this connection rather complex problems have arisen and have been aggravated by miners' strikes.

Today's TRUD is almost entirely devoted to the materials of the plenary meeting of the council of the General Confederation of Soviet Trade Unions in Moscow. The newspaper carries a report delivered by confederation president Vladimir Shcherbakov, in which the current reform of prices was strongly criticised.

It was emphasised that, despite assurances by state agencies, the reform during which "the people wittingly or unwittingly were simply deceived", "has brought about a sharp decline in the living standards of working people".

The newspaper carries the plenum's resolution urging the president of the USSR, the central and republican parliaments and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to immediately raise the minimum amount of compensation and raise wages and salaries in all branches of the economy by 70-100 per cent. Other demands were also put forward.

The confederation's council reserved the right "to organise working people's struggle for the satisfaction of the demands that have been set out".

Strikes are going on at the country's coal mines. Miners' strikes have put in jeopardy the operation of the entire metallurgical sector where overall losses have already amounted to about two billion roubles. A. Ivoditov, Soviet deputy minister of metallurgy, told PRAVDA.

Export-oriented deliveries have been frustrated. If the delivery of coal will continue to be upset, a disaster would be unavoidable, Ivoditov said.

At the same time newspapers report that the strike that began in Belorussia as a reaction to the April 2 price increases has ended. After the Republican government signed a document on the start of negotiations with the strike committee, the rally in the central square was discontinued and strikers went back to their workplaces.

The situation in South Ossetia does not change for the better and still remains strained, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA writes. According to the newspaper, a large convoy of trucks with food and humanitarian aid supplies for the population of Tskhinvali was attacked by Georgian militants on Wednesday. USSR Interior Ministry forces are carrying out an operation to break the economic blockade of South Ossetia.

PRAVDA frontpages an interview with Alfred Rubiks, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and Latvian Communist Party chief, who voiced firm conviction of the leadership of the Republican party organisation that "Latvia is on the verge of a coup d'etat". Political forces' confrontation has reached peak, he said. Rubiks demanded immediate introduction of "temporary presidential rule".

Leonid Nikitinsky, new analyst at KOMSOMOL-SKAYA PRAVDA, has come out in defence of Mikhail Gorbachev from attacks by political opponents.

"An inconceivable thing has occurred: the most diehard conservatives and neo-Stalinists have joined hands with the most radically-minded democrats in a desire to get rid of Gorbachev as soon as possible," Nikitinsky writes.

The news analyst reminded the critics of the Soviet leader about the fact that it was precisely Gorbachev who had given them freedom and opportunity to voice criticisms without risking anything.

The state of and prospects for Soviet-Japanese relations have become the leading international topic in newspapers on the eve of the Soviet president's visit to Japan.

Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo will undoubtedly create "a qualitatively new atmosphere in Soviet-Japanese relations", which will open up prospects for new, "even most unexpected solutions" including a solution to the so-called problem of "northern territories", RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA writes.

At the same time SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspaper calls on people not to be carried away by euphoria in the hope for economic aid, since "it is very doubtful that, upon ceding the Kurile Islands to the Japanese, we would succeed in resolving some vital problems of ours".

PRAVDA carries a feature story by Kira Vladina about Daisaku Ikeda, a prominent Japanese public and political figure, philosopher and president of the Soka Gakkai International.

Economic

TASS Updates National Strike Situation

LD1204084991 Moscow TASS in English 0826 GMT
12 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—A session of the Supreme Soviet of the Komi Republic (northern Russia) today issued an appeal to the miners of the Pechora coal fields, the leaderships of the USSR and the Russian Federation. The document expresses understanding of the objective reasons behind Pechora coal miners' economic and political demands and supports many of them.

The Komi parliament demanded that the Russian leadership, which was vested with extraordinary powers by the third Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, should urgently start a constructive dialogue with Vorkuta and Inta miners. The appeal urges the miners to stop the strike in light of the crisis that has hit the USSR, the Russian Federation and the Komi Republic.

Twelve out of thirteen pits are still on strike in Vorkuta, TASS correspondent reports from that Arctic city. Six pits have stopped coal extraction completely and all shipments of fuel to consumers have been suspended. All Inta pits and other enterprises of the "Intaugol" concern have resumed work. Their personnels intend to make up for the losses caused by the strike.

Thirty-six pits of Donetsk basin, the Ukraine, are still on strike, the newspaper "IZVESTIYA" reports. The largest number of pits, 25 in all, are now on strike in Donetsk region. Only one pit out of seven is in operation in the "Pervomaiskugol" coal mining association, Lugansk region. The others are on strike for the seventh week now. Due to coal shortage the situation is growing increasingly tense in the Ukrainian coke chemistry industry and metallurgy. This refers particularly to the plants of Mariupol, Makeyevka and Komunarsk.

TASS reports from Kemerovo, southern Siberia, that the commissioning of reconstructed blast furnace no. 1 at the Kuznetsk metallurgical complex, scheduled for Thursday, had to be postponed due to the strike of Kuznetsk miners and resulting lack of coal. Forty-six out of 76 pits are still on strike there. This unforeseen postponement will, according to the most modest estimates, result in the loss of 7,000 tonnes of pig iron.

A regional meeting of representatives of the greater Urals mining and metallurgical industries was held in Chelyabinsk (central urals) on the initiative of metallurgical trade unions. The meeting fully supported the miners' economic demands. At the same time, it noted that most metallurgical enterprises are about to be brought to a standstill by shortage of coking and power-generating coal. This is fraught with a grave danger for the national economy.

The meeting also noted that the plight of Urals miners and metallurgists was comparable to that of the strikers—they are also underpaid and their social programmes are not being carried out. The meeting addressed a package of demands to the government. The Urals miners and metallurgists reserve the right to take actions they see fit, up to and including strikes, if these demands are not considered before April 20.

Donbass Miners' Strikes To Continue

LD1104210691 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Gennadiy Kondaurov from the Donbass]

[Text] As I was told at the state committee for coal of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 43 mines are not working in the Ukraine today and, according to strike committees, considerably more. The major mines of the Ukraine, Stakhanov and Krasnolimanskaya, have been idle since 1 March. It is difficult even to imagine the condition of their underground equipment now and whether they will be able to resume work at all. Coal losses have increased greatly compared to March. Over only 10 days in April the extraction of fuel in the republic dropped by 1.5 million tonnes. It would have been difficult to imagine this some time ago. All the same, strike committees are giving permission to unload coal for the enterprises badly needed for some vitally important aims. Coking coal supplies to metallurgical enterprises have dropped one-third every day.

Mass meetings of the participants in the strike are taking place each day; today one took place in Makeyevka, and the day before yesterday there were meetings in Donetsk and other mining towns. Very active mass meetings. The most difficult situations in foodstuffs and industrial goods in towns and mining settlements are under discussion there, and the new, extremely high, prices; I can give you an example: Meat was 27 rubles, even in state shops in Donetsk, but the oblast executive committee reacted at the proper time and categorically prohibited the sale of meat at these prices. All these high prices have nullified everything miners achieved during the three years of strike struggle. An insistent demand to call to account those who are to blame for destroying the economy of the country has been expressed.

The Donetsk strike committee had to decide a very important and crucial question today: should we come to work tomorrow or continue the strike? Many mines have been on strike for a month and 10 days. Collectives are tired, the economy is destroyed and there is no money at the mines. What is to be done? But those who spoke at a session of the strike committee were talking about the fact that the increase of prices has very sharply fuelled the discontent of labor collectives, and therefore, there is a striving for a struggle in labor collectives, and a general

decision was taken to continue the strike and, moreover, to designate a town action, and all striking collectives will take part, for 15 April.

However, the economic strike started on 1 March and has completely changed, it has turned into a political strike; now only political demands are heard. These are, demands for the president's resignation, the resignation of the government, the formation of a government of popular confidence, and the whole number of other political demands supported not only by collectives of striking mines but also those that are working.

Pavlov on 'Grave Consequences' of Strikes

LD1104191591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1803 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 11 Apr (TASS)—The government will insist on linking wage increases with increased volumes of production. This was stated by USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov when he addressed the plenum of the council of the country's Confederation of Trade Unions on Wednesday.

In his speech—the official text was disseminated here today—he recalled that at present the state budget and all the budgets of the union republics have been approved with a deficit. Moreover, the prime minister said, it is essential to consider too that in the first quarter the volume of national revenue produced in the country went down by 10 percent. Very complex problems are now arising, and they have been exacerbated by the miners' strike. This has resulted in metallurgical production units being taken out of operation. Five coke batteries and 21 blast furnaces have already been halted. The prime minister noted that at least 5 million tonnes of rolled metal alone will have been lost by the end of the year.

Speaking of the grave consequences of the miners' strike, Valentin Pavlov drew the attention of the trade union forum's participants to the fact that in the Donetsk coalfield special brigades of 200-250 men are travelling around in buses, blockading operating mines, and not allowing miners to get to them. Representatives of the Rukh movement (radical nationalists) are active there and calling on people to strike. At mines in the Kuzbass there are also "strike directors" of a kind, and these teams are headed by certain deputies of the Russian Federation supreme Soviet and the oblast soviet, the prime minister noted.

Touching on the issue of price reform, he recalled that the Cabinet of Ministers had set only the minimum amount of compensation in connection with the increase in retail prices. Resolution of the question concerning the level of prices has been handed over to the republics. Valentin Pavlov also noted that the government has decided to hold a dialogue on combining two reforms, those of pricing and earnings. The cabinet is prepared for any increases in earnings provided there is increased production.

The cabinet's head then dwelt in detail on the problems of fixing a minimum wage and on a proposal that a wages reform be prepared during 1991. He analyzed the demand for the question of sources of compensation for the increased price of catering for the working people be tackled in April. "We have," he said, "tackled it with the enterprises, but it will be necessary to tackle it further, because not everyone indeed may have sufficient money for this. However these approaches will only occur in relations with enterprises that are operating on firm and fixed state prices. We are not intending to extend any assistance to those operating with uncontrolled prices. The market is the market."

Pavlov Prepared To Talk to Resolve Crisis

LD1104203391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] In this tense situation the country is experiencing the activity of our trade unions, aimed at consolidating society for the sake of the defense of the People's vital interests and the implementation of mutually acceptable, agreed ways of getting out of the crisis, is becoming especially important. Here is what Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov, chairman of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers said in this connection in an interview with our commentator, Yakov Smirnov:

[Begin Recording] [Smirnov] Valentin Sergeyevich, how do you assess this plenum? How do you see the government's future relations with the trade unions?

[Pavlov] In general, in the past we were such good friends with the trade unions that I think people even started levelling the accusation that the trade unions had been made into state unions. You know, in general, we are prepared today to cooperate with any public forces and movements, especially with the trade unions, as a mass organization. We should like to be clearly understood. The USSR Government, with its 53 members, might be replaced or eliminated altogether, if that is better for the country. I also admit that. We want all cooperation to be constructive and, most importantly, we want to understand each other: That it is not the width of the throat but the height of the forehead that makes the country rich, as one miner told me; and it is rich when it has goods, something to offer to people, you see. People have grown tired of slogans and all manner of promises, while at the same time the shelf is empty and there is nothing at home to make cabbage soup. I do not want us to look for ways of demanding something from somebody; I do not want us to look for ways of demanding something from somebody; I want us to seek ways of finding where and how output can be produced.

[Smirnov] Incidentally, the country can see that the trade unions have recently grown more active, very much so. Does that impress you?

[Pavlov] This fact does impress me personally, for one simple reason. I should say, for example: Gorbachev has awakened at last. I have observed very clearly our trade

unions failing to grasp—forgive me, the way anybody who feels like it—has begun assuming their direct function. [sentence as heard] As a result, many irresponsible groups have appeared, all saying for some reason that they know best the interests and needs of the working people, that they are expressing their interests, and that we should talk only to them.

I can tell you this on the basis of the example of the miners. It may be awkward to talk about this, perhaps—oh, to hell with it. I have been receiving 40-45 telegrams and letters each day demanding that I should sit down for negotiations. What signatures have there not been? They have all been speaking on behalf of the miners. Then, when you start checking what sort of person has signed it, it turns out that he has not only not been in a mine, but he does not know what one looks like or where it is. But he is already saying that he is demanding this in the interests of the miners, and let's do it as quickly as possible. Therefore I have openly stated, and I can repeat it once more: Such people, forgive me, will betray as they are betraying today, and will betray the whole country as well.

It is totally clear. We simply know, even in terms of figures and concrete examples, in what way the situation is developing. We know that what exists could, generally speaking, turn into a national catastrophe. But all of you who are present here understand what it means to cripple the metallurgical industry. This means, in essence, bringing the country to its knees without machinery. A country without machinery is a raw materials appendage. Then we are finished as a great country. If we are ready for events to develop in such a way, and understand where this will lead, there can be only one summons: Citizens, let's come to our senses before it is too late. Let's recognize that if today someone needs to be replaced, or to put it simply, to be kicked out as unsuitable, well, let's kick them out. There is no question of this. At the same time, we must realize something else. No one will do anything for us. No one will bring us anything. We will have to do it ourselves, and only by ourselves. What is the best way to do this? I am ready to talk about this wherever and with whomsoever. [end recording]

Strike Leader Criticizes Government Concessions

AU1104195191 Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 8 Apr 91 p 5

[Interview with Anatoliy Grigoryev, member of the office of the independent USSR Miners' Union and strike leader in western Donbas, by correspondent Klaus Joachim Herrmann in Moscow; date not given: "The Pavlov Government Is Fobbing Us Off Just With Promises"]

[Text] [Herrmann] What is your view on the conflict between the miners and the government?

[Grigoryev] The government has proved again that it is not in the right place; Pavlov is just repeating the year

1989. Our demands are well-founded and dictated by life: resignation of the government because it does not have any program.

[Herrmann] But there have been concrete concessions after all.

[Grigoryev] The 25-percent wage raise per quarter of the year, for instance, is a lousy fraud. The inflation is not 25 but 400 percent. Compared with 1989, the wages of the miners declined by 14 rubles [R].

[Herrmann] In autumn 1989 it was particularly the miners from the Donbas who demanded that one should give the government time.

[Grigoryev] After the strikes in summer 1989 many demands were made and were summarized in the well-known government resolution 608. This resolution has not been implemented. Very often they say from the platforms: We have given you pensions, vacations, money for work under ground, and night differentials. Here one has to say that night differentials were paid everywhere, not only in coal mining. When the strike was held, the miners had the shortest vacations. According to the statistics they have an average life expectancy of 49 years—but their retirement age was 50. The questions were solved only on paper. With our wages we occupy 14th rank among the professions in the country.

When the miners' demands were formulated in resolution 608, Deputy Prime Minister Lev Ryabin said: If they are not fulfilled by 1 January 1990, I will go with you to Red Square to hold a strike. If so, he would have had to be on strike for a year already.

[Herrmann] The strike first had purely economic reasons; the political ones were of secondary importance....

[Grigoryev] At first the miners in the Ukraine went on strike—this involved mainly a linking of the wages to the price index. The government ignored the strike for more than two weeks and said that it would negotiate only with those who do not strike. Then the political demands came from the Kusbas. Only then did the government start to think about the matter.

The people are dissatisfied. Prices are rising by three or four times, but the compensation is only a miserable R60. Or: The increased costs for children were supposed to be compensated 100 percent. In the past a place in the kindergarten cost R18, now it costs R70. This is R52 more, but only R40 are compensated for. Gorbachev has to apologize to the people for his deficient policy.

[Herrmann] Did you really think that Gorbachev now says: You are right, I will resign?

[Grigoryev] I doubt very much that Gorbachev will do that on his own if he is not asked to do so. Pavlov has decided to destroy the miners' movement. I do not deny that I am in favor of a general strike. This might achieve quite a lot.

[Herrmann] Can one say that your organization is among the radical organizations?

[Grigoryev] This should not be the issue. Probably, it is closer to the people because all of us come from the shafts. I myself worked on site for eight years. We do not support any specific politicians. We represent the grassroots demands toward any politician in power.

Coal Industry Situation Viewed

PM1004110191

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 9 April 1991 Second Edition carries on page 2 under the headline "Talk Won't Get the Job Done" a feature comprising a 300-word letter from Zh. Daribayev, miner at Karaganda's mine named for the 60th anniversary of the October revolution, and a 400-word commentary by Yu. Medvedev under the subhead "Our Commentary."

The letter says that Karaganda's miners are seen as strikebreakers by striking miners in other regions and that the Karaganda workers committee is fueling the situation, concluding that "the complex economic situation can only be rectified by action," not words.

"Our Commentary" reads as follows:

"For more than a month we received joyless reports from a number of mining enterprises. Over the last two or three days there have also begun to be reassuring reports among them. Thus, at the decision of a general meeting, for instance, the collective at the 'Intinskaya' Mine in the Komi SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] has resumed work. There is also pleasant news from other mining regions. This is in many respects the result of the miners' meeting with the country's leaders.

"It is of course naive to imagine that all miners would return to work 'in unison' at the end of the meeting. It is equally naive to assume that, when the USSR Cabinet of Ministers adopts a number of resolutions and orders, they will all be implemented immediately, the next day. That is the opinion held by most miners.

"There is a disparate attitude toward the miners. This is convincingly illustrated by the letter from Zh. Daribayev, a miner at Karaganda's mine named for the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. Very many miners may subscribe to all of their colleagues' words. Incidentally, I must remind you that all 100 percent of the Karaganda coalfield's mining collectives are at work. Although labor conditions there are by no means perfect.

"M. Shchadov, minister of the coal industry, announced that all enterprises in the sector are currently studying and discussing most carefully the documents adopted as a result of the Kremlin talks. Every point is being weighed up pencil in hand, so to speak.

"On the first day of the week the list of the collectives that had set to work was joined by the 'Yesaulskaya' Mine in the Southern Kuzbass and Rostov Oblast's

'Sholokhovskaya' and 'Krasnodonetskaya' Mines. Many mines in the Ukraine have scheduled days off through Monday. Reports from here indicate that here too a number of collectives intend to call a halt to their strikes."

Ryabev Commission Visits Troubled Tyumen

91P50158A Moscow TRUD in Russian 11 Apr 91 p 1

[Report attributed to Postfaktum: "Ways out of the Crisis"]

[Text] A commission headed by USSR deputy prime minister Lev Ryabev and USSR Oil and Gas Industry minister Leonid Filimonov arrived in Tyumen Oblast.

During the course of five days the commission will visit Noyabrsk, Surgut, Nefteyugansk, Nizhnevartovsk, and other northern cities and settlements. A concluding meeting will be held in Tyumen on 13-14 April.

The commission has to work out measures for getting the West Siberian oil and gas complex out of the crisis brought about by the breakdowns in the deliveries of material-technical resources and foodstuffs from other regions of the country. As Yuriy Shafranik, chairman of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, stated at a news conference for journalists, the union government has made a decision to place at the oblast's disposal five million tons of oil and one billion cubic meters of gas to begin bartering for the necessary material resources and foodstuffs from beyond its boundaries.

Finance Minister Orlov on Budget Issues

PM1104130591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Finance Minister V.Ye. Orlov by R. Lynev; date and place not given: "Where Our Money Goes"]

[Text] [Lynev] Vladimir Yefimovich, we can scarcely examine here all the criticism that has been leveled of late at the retail price reform. It seems to me that one theme merits special attention: The obsolete command system, that does not want to go away, taking money off people to prolong its own existence.

[Orlov] If you don't mind my saying so, exactly the opposite is true.

[Lynev] So let me ask you—can you say how many rubles the state will get from the retail price increases?

[Orlov] By the end of the year revenue from increased prices will total approximately 327 billion rubles [R]. R300 billion in the republics and R27 billion in the Union economy. Or, as they now say, in the center.

[Lynev] What will the money be spent on?

[Orlov] First and foremost on reduced subsidies to farms. I would point out that until recently R230 billion was being spent on subsidies—nearly half of the country's budget.

[Lynev] So the overall goal of the reform is to try to replace an ineffective mechanism of economic subsidies with a more effective price mechanism.

[Orlov] You might put it this way. Of the R327 billion in revenue I mentioned above R134 billion will actually go on reduced subsidies. There will be R117 billion from fixed price rises. Plus R64.5 billion from free prices. Plus a small income from imports (approximately R1 billion) and sales tax of R10 billion.

[Lynev] Ten?

[Orlov] Yes, the 5-percent tax levied on the retail trade and on the services sphere. I want to stress that R7 billion of the R10 billion I mentioned above will remain in the republics and the Union will have R3 billion.

[Lynev] Right. How will the rest of the R327 billion be distributed?

[Orlov] Above all on compensation for working people—R60 each—and pensioners—R65 each. The total for working people in the production sphere is R86 billion. The R60 currently paid irrespective of labor contribution will be transformed in the future into salary and wage rates. Already many enterprises are able to pay extra from their own spare money on top of the R60.

[Lynev] But not everyone has spare money.

[Orlov] I agree, not everyone has. Look at the figures. Until this year, on average 37 percent of the profits remained with enterprises. From this year, according to the new tax legislation, the state starts taking 45 percent, leaving the enterprise with 55 percent. New wholesale prices were introduced on 1 January this year. This increased enterprises' profits by R90 billion. 55 percent automatically passing to the enterprises. On 2 April, I would remind you, the profit tax was reduced by 10 percent. As a result, enterprises increased their income by R50 billion without doing anything.

[Lynev] But let us return to the increase in retail prices and to those who need to be helped.

[Orlov] Fine. Some R40 billion will go on extra payments for working people in the nonproduction sphere. Some R35 billion of this will go to the republics. Then there are the children. Some R40 per month per child plus R200 per year to purchase goods might seem a very small amount. But it is R63.5 billion in total. Another R18 billion will go on higher pay for cultural and health workers and teachers. Some R14 billion must be added to the Union Pension Fund and to the republics' pension funds. Some R7.5 billion is added to student grants. Some R1.2 billion will be spent on pensions for inducted

personnel of the armed forces. Finally, R25 billion will go on military expenditure and on the upkeep of law-enforcement organs.

[Lynev] You say R25 billion?

[Orlov] Yes, it gave rise to many questions and much criticism. There was a special investigation. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] finance minister checked the figures—we have revealed everything, we have nothing to hide. Indeed, we are not interested in paying people over the odds. In the end, all the planned expenditure was confirmed. In the main it will go on the increased cost of accessories and supplies. There is compensation here too, of course: R60-80 a time.

[Lynev] I am sure many readers will want to know how much more is being spent on the upkeep of other budget organizations: schools, hospitals, kindergartens.

[Orlov] I will give you a figure of R13 billion. R12 billion goes to the republics and R1 billion to Union organs.

[Lynev] No doubt many will want to know what our 18 million managers are going to cost us.

[Orlov] That figure, 18 million people, includes managers in the production sphere, including foremen. In state service, however, and in the soviets there are 2 million people at the moment. The extra payments to them will come to a little more than R1 billion. Which ever way you look at it, their numbers and their pay are not great. In local soviets where the secretary also keeps the accounts, I believe both staff and pay need to be increased. But in a number of city soviets staffs and salaries are rising rapidly, driven on by criticism of past incumbents, whereas the treatment of ordinary people and their needs gets worse rather than better.

[Lynev] Alas, that is true. What is still going to need subsidies?

[Orlov] Medicines—more than R9 billion. It is possible too that the sum will have to be increased. Extra payments to kolkhoz and sovkhoz working people will come to R20 billion. Finally, you have the compensation for the unemployed—R2.2 billion.

[Lynev] Is that it? Nothing else?

[Orlov] That is everything in this department. But I would add that changes were made to income tax rates by presidential decree on the eve of the price increases. The tax-free earnings level was raised from R100 to R160. Earnings between R160 and R1,000 are taxed at the rate of 13 percent. Progressive taxation comes into play after R1,000, but after R3,000 the progression eases off. If you compare all this with the former taxation system, the state again loses approximately R10 billion. But the population receives as it were extra compensation—approximately R18 per month per person.

[Lynev] What is the upshot?

[Orlov] The upshot is what we were intending to do in the first place—compensate the population for only 85 percent of the increase in prices.

But now an overall balance emerges: Of the R300 billion that will be obtained as a result of the price increase the state budget receives zero.

[Lynev] Apart from the abovementioned subsidized areas, there are others that need help.

[Orlov] That is yet another acute question. One must talk frankly about it. The point is that six of our southern republics cannot lead a normal existence without subsidies. They are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. It was preliminarily agreed that their subsidies would come from the income of R54 billion from the earnings of all the republics. It is no secret that the main providers of income are Russia and the Ukraine, producing and exporting more goods than they consume and import. This certainly does not mean that someone is "feeding" someone else. It is not the fault but the misfortune of the southern republics that their economies have in the past undergone one-sided development, based on raw materials. This distortion is now being corrected, but it will take years of work to establish a balance.

[Lynev] But what if one tried to economize here too?

[Orlov] Maybe. But then Uzbekistan might raise cotton prices to such a degree that the entire textile industry of Russia and the Ukraine would come to a halt. So what I would like is for B.N. Yeltsin's statement in Leningrad, where he confirmed Russia's readiness to pay R30 billion into the state budget for the abovementioned purposes, to be listened to by the RSFSR Finance Ministry. Not to mention the Baltic republics.

[Lynev] This is not the first reform in living memory. But I do not think it came as such of a shock before.

[Orlov] That was because the reform of purchase, wholesale, and retail prices was not carried out all at once, but in three stages, so to speak: In the fall purchase prices were raised, then came wholesale prices, and it was not until April that retail prices went up. It was all spread over six months and a bit and it made the problems much worse.

[Lynev] How could that have happened?

[Orlov] In my view, as a result of the previous government's inconsistent and indecisive policy. I would go further than that and say that it was due to a failure to understand the rudiments of the economy. The upshot was that the delay in adopting unpopular measures placed a heavier burden on the people and on the present leadership.

Moreover, increasingly fierce attacks are currently being made on the sales tax from the same positions. They call it the president's tax, investing these attacks with a political purpose. But I will say frankly that we, the

Finance Ministry, not the president, initiated the tax. I explained to deputies why the tax was necessary: Because the social programs they had adopted were not linked to any sources of finance. That is, they were another example of kindness that tomorrow turns out to be unfulfilled promises. Again, with the next leadership taking the blame. As for the sales tax—still called value added tax—it becomes, in market relations, one of the chief sources for forming the budget. It is elementary economics, but, alas, it has to be spelled out.

Economic Reform Commission's Orlov Interviewed

On Price Reform Effects, Future

914A0605A Moscow *TORGOVAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 9 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with A. Orlov, deputy chairman of the State Commission on Economic Reform, by Ye. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "Prices Have Been Raised; What Is Next?"]

[Text] [Khokhlov] Andrey Vladimirovich, the retail price reform is pursuing quite specific aims. One of them is to stabilize the consumer market. How, in your opinion, are relations shaping up between supply and demand now, since 2 April?

[Orlov] First of all I would not call this set of measures a reform, even though it is also helping in the transition to a normal market. It is a matter of a long overdue regulation of prices. It is important to emphasize that it is being done with the anticipation of social support.

There were price increases even before the present one-time increase, but they were random in nature and speculative in form, and they brought people to despair. Moreover, to a total deficit and absolute decline in the production of goods and purchases of agricultural output. Pent-up demand, that a year ago had reached 160 billion rubles [R], has increased sharply. It is now approximately R250 billion. Following the exchange operation with large-denomination bills, about R130 billion of "hot" money remains in the hands of the population.

As a result of the price rise, the actual value falls by a factor of two or three. So that the strain in the consumer market is easing somewhat.

On the other hand, something on the order of R400 billion remain as deposits, including R120 billion that could be immediately put into circulation and ruin our economy once and for all. The situation is not totally clear in this regard, although a kind of compensation has been established at 40 percent so that people do not take that money since they know that their savings are protected against inflation. But perhaps this measure will be inadequate.

Finally, additional cash will appear, namely what the population will receive in the form of compensation.

Therefore, I cannot claim that supply and demand will be brought immediately into balance. Moreover, money is only half the problem. The other and no less complex part of it is goods and the supply of goods. A strong foundation of resources is essential. Provisions have also been made for this.

[Khokhlov] Is a "commodity intervention" envisaged?

[Orlov] Well, a commodity intervention is really very serious in nature. We know from the history of the Marshall Plan how that worked in the West European countries, particularly the FRG, during occupation and postwar devastation was trying to break away from an administrative command system and switch to market rails. The experience of South Korea and others is well known. In general, where a transition is effected from one type of economy to another, they have resorted to this method, pumping goods into the market quickly.

Let us look at the opportunities available to us. Some 60 to 65 percent of the consumer market depends on agricultural output. The situation here is very bad. Purchases of produce have fallen 13 percent in a year. The number of head of cattle has declined, milk yields are falling, the position with respect to potatoes and vegetables is complicated. So that in this basic sector it is impossible to find additional resources. They must be purchased as imports. What is absolutely needed is a range of foodstuffs that could be sold constantly in the stores. For example, we have bought canned stew meat, tea, and rice from China. In Europe we have obtained credits and we are beginning to use them.

As far as other goods are concerned, the position there is more favorable. First, there is admittedly small but steady growth in the production of household and everyday goods—television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and so forth. Second, the potential of the defense sector is quite great. If we restore economic links, introduce new incentives, and put a stop to the strikes, I am sure that it can help significantly in building up output. Here, commodity intervention is associated with our own possibilities.

About the same reserves can be seen in the production of clothing and footwear. Of course, deliveries of cotton, hides, and wool may hold up the work; this is agriculture again. In the textile industry the position is very difficult because of the shortages of raw materials. It seems to me that if we just nudge the situation slightly things will work. Incentives for the new price regulation will also play their part.

[Khokhlov] It is not very clear how, is it? Literally on the day that the documents about the price reform were published I spoke with experts from the light and food industries, and they were interested in knowing whether or not this reform will have any effect on production. They are saying that it will not. Everything depends on raw materials. If there are raw materials, there will be goods.

[Orlov] That is all correct, but let us follow the chain to its end. Of course you do not harvest cotton in the spring. However, surely some is available, is it not? Just like the Ukraine is holding over metal and Kazakhstan is holding over grain, and are in no hurry to part with their reserves and deliver raw materials for the textile industry. Neither has there been any special interest to accelerate deliveries among those who make cotton fabric. Now we have a new situation. It is possible to use contract prices and free prices. A game is starting whose aim is to transfer as many of one's own articles into the sphere of free prices. The goods will appear. Not from the store-room, where there are virtually none, nor from the bases, where relatively few have been stored, but from the producers. Nevertheless, fewer will be bought because of the high prices, especially at first. There will be a short-lived sluggishness in the consumer market, a small shock that will last for a month or six weeks.

Incidentally, we experienced "shock therapy" here not so long ago, and it was, moreover, prepared and carried out not too badly. I have in mind the price increases for nonessential goods dating from 15 September 1981. After just two or three months the stores were filled with carpets, crystal, and delicatessen items, and expensive suites of furniture and some makes of cars were being freely sold, and above-normative stocks started to grow in trade.

This is the situation that must be taken advantage of to develop and deepen the reform. To regard a temporary decline in the burst of premium hunting as a normalization of trade, and even more as a general improvement in the economy, would be a colossal mistake.

[Khokhlov] Does the government have a clear-cut program for actions that should follow the price increases?

[Orlov] Of course. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has prepared a program of emergency anticrisis measures, first and foremost to normalize food supplies. Here it is a question of special-purpose deliveries of equipment, fuels and lubricants, and polymer sheeting, to ensure the upcoming harvest. Then there are economic measures—more flexible regulation of hard currency, tax advantages, special support for farms. The struggle against losses of produce already harvested is being intensified.

The key question is normalization of economic links. We must resort to strict economic and administrative sanctions. Fines 10 times as big will be introduced for violation of contractual obligations. You understand: These are not market measures, but there is no other way at present—administrative enforcement must be used to keep production going.

De-state-ization and privatization programs will follow, and the development of entrepreneurial activity. Laws passed by the country's Supreme Soviet need practical elaboration and implementation. The government is also busy with this. For example, in agriculture and small-scale production and trade it is very important to support small-scale forms and family enterprises, including

the private sector, and to unfetter personal initiative. In addition to everything else, the important condition of social guarantees must also be taken into consideration. When money is short, people look for additional income. We must find employment for the extra manpower that will inevitably become available.

Provision has also been made for the important task of helping trade to deal with the disorganization, and for transport workers to deliver cargo from ports and railroad stations more quickly, and to create a "through street" for goods. There is one more important condition, namely, with the help of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Committee for State Security to block the criminal medium. Economic measures will not suffice, for example, when all the trade in motor vehicles is squeezed between the shadow economy and the criminal world.

[Khokhlov] It has taken a long time to prepare for the retail price increase. The decisive factor was the need to reduce the burden of subsidies that the state bears. The prime minister recently gave the overall sum for subsidies—R220 billion just for this year. How many subsidies will remain following the reform?

[Orlov] I think about R50 billion to R60 billion. This is primarily subsidies for livestock farming products.

[Khokhlov] In this connection will there be an opportunity to reduce turnover tax? For like the subsidies, it is disproportionately great within the structure of retail prices for many industrial goods—from 30 to 70 percent. If the government is to be rid of an excessive burden, it would be logical to relieve the public also.

[Orlov] There will be no opportunity for that, at least this year. We make no secret, and for the experts it has not been a secret for along time, that in terms of its content, turnover tax is a purely fiscal measure. A more "correct" version of it appeared recently—sales tax. We have to consider how these systems can be combined. I do not exclude the possibility that both these taxes will perhaps "die off" in the new prices if they develop in a normal market direction. But that is not something for the immediate future.

At present everything is too indefinite. We are only beginning to shape an economic mechanism for the transitional period, and we do not yet know how the new prices will operate or whether they will lead to a better balance between supply and demand. If there is a positive result then we can also take a look at the anomalies in the trade taxes.

But in principle we must change the entire system of trade discounts and markups. Under market conditions a concept that we never had before will emerge—prices for trade services. The same discount will operate in quite a different scenario.

On Budget Payments Shortfall

914A0604A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with A. Orlov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Budget, Plan, and Finance Committee, by Olga Berezhnaya; place and date not given: "But for the Center—Zero: Why the Union Budget Is on the Verge of Bankruptcy"]

[Text] *I remember the difficulty the Union budget for this year was formed. After long debates in parliament and heated arguments with leaders of the republics, it was finally adopted in January with a deficit of 26.7 billion rubles [R]. But as early as the first quarter of this year the hole in the state treasury assumed enormous dimensions—R31.1 billion. What are the main reasons for the financial imbalance? I addressed this question to A. Orlov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Budget, Plan, and Finance Committee.*

[Orlov] Fulfilling the state budget turned out to be much worse than we expected. One of the objective reasons was the unforeseen drop in production: Not by three percent, as we supposed in January, but by five to six percent. Therefore, there was a sharp reduction in the volume of profits and, naturally, in the amount deducted for taxes.

There are also purely subjective reasons. Despite assurances by the leaders of Russia and the Ukraine of devotion to a renewed Union federation, the economic system was actually being undermined. All of the republics, including the Baltic republics and Georgia, signed an agreement on economic issues, but by far not all of them are fulfilling it.

For example, at the end of December and beginning of January the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Russia gave instructions to all banks and enterprises that of a 45 percent tax rate on profits of enterprises of Union subordination, 32 percent was to be entered in the republic budget and 13 percent in the local budget. For the center—zero. You see, it was assumed that according to the agreement the Union budget would receive 22 percent of the profits of enterprises of Union subordination (republic budgets calculate taxes only for republic and local budgets).

The managers of the Ministry of Finance, the Gosbank [State Bank], and the Ministry of Trade of Russia issued instructions on how to divide the tax from sales: 85 percent for the republic budget and 15 percent for the local budget. Thus, they called the tax presidential, but in reality nothing came from the RSFSR for the Union budget. The republic did not transfer one kopek to the all-Union unappropriated stabilization fund either. Meanwhile, it was also supposed to share in the same proportion as the tax from sales: 30 percent for the Union, and 70 percent for the republics.

All told, on 1 March R7 billion came in from the Union republics instead of R23.4 billion, or less than one-third of the income of the Union budget. At the same time, revenues for the republic budgets increased by a factor of 2.3, and for the local budget by a factor of almost two in comparison with last year. The main sum of nonpayments falls on the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and the Baltics.

[Berezhnaya] Perhaps the situation is not quite that alarming? That the republics did not transfer money to the state treasury means that it remains in the localities, and the republic and local authorities will be able themselves to take over some of the expenditures.

[Orlov] Today, Russia's debt, its own debt, amounts to about R48 billion. Where did it come from? For example, the compensation sum was not placed in the price policy of the republic. This is R26 billion more or less. While not having the resources to do so, they increased teachers' salaries sooner than in the Union. They increased expenditures on the maintenance of the administrative apparatus and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and on deputies' salaries.

Other republics are also distinguished by excessive appetites. They prefer to satisfy these appetites in one way—by requesting newer and newer sums of cash funds from the USSR Gosbank. Fearful of nudging the republics toward the creation of their own currencies, the USSR Gosbank satisfies these demands. As a result, while in the first two months of last year the amount of money in the country increased by R11 billion, for the same period this year it increased by R88 billion. The avalanche of money not backed up by commodities is spreading around the country, leaving behind only empty shelves. In such a situation no kind of price increase will save the market from being ransacked.

There are no resources to finance the development of the national economy, the social sphere, the upkeep of the Army, and the fulfillment of the "Aral" and "Chernobyl" programs. The financing of important construction projects, the allocation of subventions to the republics and subsidies to enterprises, and the carrying out of conversions are threatened... What does it mean to refuse subventions for Central Asia? Only one thing—tomorrow the economic units of this region will increase prices for cotton, wool, silk, and hides—they have nothing to pay out compensation for the price increases. What the consequences will be, if we abandon subsidies for low-profit and unprofitable production, and for those miners...

[Berezhnaya] But, you see, one of the demands of the miners is to switch to the jurisdiction of Russia and to obtain independence. Then, perhaps, instead of allocating enormous subsidies, meet them half way. Perhaps Russia will bring order to the mines.

[Orlov] The agricultural industry has been turned over entirely to the republics. And so, has the situation improved? Construction, including housing, has become entirely the republic's. Has it gotten better? There is total

failure in Russia. Municipal services have been under the jurisdiction of the republics for a long time. Public education, including 500 VUZ's [higher educational institutions], was assumed by Russia. Is there progress? It is hardly likely that it will become better for the miners due to a change of jurisdiction. And for the same reason. The Russian government declares the priority of republic laws over Union laws, and the autonomous organizations in turn proclaim the primacy of their own decisions over the decisions of the Union republics. As a result, Bashkiria does not supply Chelyabinsk Oblast with grain and meat. The situation in the Urals is stretched to breaking point.

We are not opposed—if you wish, take everything you need. But let us do everything on legal grounds. Accept the Constitution, and let us share the property. But also assume responsibility. There are economic ties that have evolved—they have to be implemented. Otherwise 80 percent of the enterprises will stop. And when they stop for a month—not for half a year, and not for a year—and the people do not receive their salaries, and when 50 million are without work, there will be neither a Gorbachev nor a Yeltsin.

The coal industry. Now the prices for coal have been increased by a factor of more than two, but still the miners are in a difficult situation. Increase prices five times, as they are insisting? But this means that it will be necessary to increase prices for electric power, fuel, and metal five times. And there along the chain will go machine-building, agricultural products, and all commodities. We say: Wait until the end of the year. Let the situation stabilize at least a little. If we are able in the first to second quarter not to permit a sharp drop in volumes, there is a hope that by autumn matters will gradually begin to sort themselves out. If we do not succeed, the crisis will drag on into the next year too. It is unlikely that the people will stand this.

[Berezhnaya] Aleksandr Kondratyevich, what do you see as the way out of the situation that has developed?

[Orlov] The way out has been indicated: urgently consider the situation in the Council of the Federation and suspend the fulfillment of that part of the laws adopted in the republics that contradicts the all-Union system, including the tax system, the Union budget, and the banks, until the signing of the Union treaty. Obligate the republics to make all payments to the Union budget and the unappropriated stabilization fund in accordance with signed economic agreements. In order to stop unforeseen issues forced upon us by the republics it is necessary immediately to establish a USSR Gosbank central council which will have representatives from all the Union republics. On the basis of agreement, they will determine the quota for issuing cash to the republics and will implement a single credit policy.

We approved an appeal to the republics in the USSR Supreme Soviet, and we hope that their leaders will hear

us and understand what kind of an abyss they are plunging the country into with their impulsive decisions.

PRAVDA on Gorbachev Speech at Gagarin Meeting

PM1204104291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Apr 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Report by TASS correspondents V. Bezbrezhnyy and N. Zheleznov: "Union of Reason and Accord: Ceremonial Meeting in Moscow"]

[Excerpts] The people who came to the Hall of Columns of the House of the Unions on 10 April to commemorate the 30th anniversary of Yuriy Gagarin's space flight did not hide their pride in and admiration for the selflessness of the pioneers of space. The audience included those who built the space center, designers of space equipment, workers and engineers from space industry enterprises, Soviet cosmonauts, and foreign guests. M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president, A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and V.S. Pavlov, USSR prime minister, were in the meeting's presidium.

The opening address was delivered by M.S. Gorbachev. He said:

We have gathered here to mark an outstanding event in our country's life and, it is no exaggeration to say, the history of all human civilization.

On a spring day in April 30 years ago Yuriy Alekseyevich Gagarin, a citizen of the Soviet Union, opened the era of manned space flight.

The story of Gagarin's personal exploit may be set out in two or three sentences: A working boy from Russia's Nonchernozem Zone, he became a first-class pilot. He mastered the latest equipment of the highest world standard. And from the Baykonur space center built in the expanses of Soviet Kazakhstan he was the first to lift off to an unprecedented altitude above the earth which he orbited in just 108 minutes.

This event, which many people then considered a "Russian miracle," was indeed the logical continuation of the creative thought of Tsiolkovskiy, Korolev, Keldysh, and many other outstanding Soviet scientists and designers. This was also the result of the tireless inventive work of tens and hundreds of thousands of engineers, technicians, workers, and specialists in virtually all spheres of knowledge...

Gagarin's flight embodied one of the greatest feats of our entire multinational Soviet people. It is doubly appropriate to recall that here today. Because no matter how much some people might want, we cannot be like "Ivan the Forgetful." No one can cancel out the faith in the strength of the people of a great country, spirit of patriotism, or noble memory of those who created the fatherland's might and glory!

Soviet space research remains a universally recognized fusion of science, technology, and industry. Many thanks

to all who are involved in the development of this leading area of the country's scientific and technical progress!

The motherland's special gratitude goes to the entire detachment of spacemen. Health and courage to each of you, dear comrades! I warmly congratulate your wives, your families, and all your relatives and friends on Cosmonaut Day!

I hope that our good wishes will also reach Viktor Afanasyev and Musa Manarov who are today keeping watch in near-earth orbit. May they hear the greetings from this ceremonial hall...

The successes of space research and the useful return which it brings to various spheres of the national economy are the product of cooperation and the common asset of all the republics and all the peoples of our Soviet Union.

As USSR president I must stress in particular the great contribution of space research to the reliable defense of the country and the monitoring of the fulfillment of international agreements on arms reduction and confidence-building measures.

Our space science and technology is now more wide open than ever before to international cooperation. The Soviet Union favors access for all countries to space information under UN auspices and is ready to make its resources available for that.

We support the continuation and development of joint space research with the United States, European countries, China, India, and Japan and literally all interested states and organizations.

In this connection I warmly and cordially congratulate the cosmonauts and astronauts here who have come to our celebrations from many foreign countries!

The prospects for international cooperation are mutually beneficial. Particularly in connection with the conversion of the vast intellectual and production potential of a number of leading sectors of our defense complex...

On the eve of International Space Year I would like to express the confidence that Soviet space science, technology, and industry, with the necessary state and public support and working in conditions of peace, will be able to bring our people—and not just them—increasingly tangible and useful results in all spheres of human life. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, Yu.D. Maslyukov, USSR deputy prime minister, who is chairing the meeting, once more expressed congratulations on the celebration to all those who by their labor have created space equipment and increased the fatherland's glory.

Space Expenditures Defended, Praised

917Q0075 Moscow TRUD in Russian 5 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by B. Olesyuk, specialist at the Center for Flight Control, and B. Chertok, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and deputy general designer of the Energiya Scientific Production Association: "Cosmic Heights and Gaping Abysses—Two Views on the Development of Cosmonautics"]

[Text] On 12 March it will be 30 years since that happy day when Yuriy Gagarin was the first person from earth to fly in space. This was a truly historic event which opened up to mankind the path beyond the confines of our planet. Thirty years is a "round" figure. It is time for us to look back and see: How have we managed to advance along this path, what have we done and what have we not managed to do, and have we always been true to our intentions? TRUD is offering the readers the opportunity to learn about two largely opposing views of the development of space science. Two views, two fragments from a multicolored mosaic of opinions. An occasion for reflection... But this subject is inexhaustible.

"In an Unnecessary Race for Prestige"

By B. Olesyuk

Yu.A. Gagarin's flight was a triumphant victory for mankind, his thought, and his talent over the force of gravity. But the breakthrough into space was not solely for the purpose of demonstrating this. To open up to man new secrets of nature and the universe and to produce considerable advantage in concrete, practical affairs—these are the goals of space science. And we have managed to do a good deal in this direction—both in our country and abroad. But a great deal has also been left undone, a good deal of energy and money has been spent inefficiently and sometimes for no purpose—out of considerations of prestige, the battle of ambitions, the rivalry of design bureaus and designers, and the sometimes incorrectly selected goals and strategic tasks.

I will express my own personal opinion, with which, possibly, not all of my colleagues will agree. I will give one clear example. The Americans have created a variety of space ships whose launching and operation costs somewhat more than it costs to launch single-launch rockets. Out of prestige considerations, we have decided to do the same thing: Spending more than 15 billion rubles [R], we built the Buran, but now we do not know what to do with it or how to use it.

In general, until recently we spared no expense—the money flowed, as they say, like water.

There were more and more new launches, in many cases not for the sake of improving the life of the people but in the name of the prestige of a country of "developed socialism." The program was basically purely propagandistic in nature and was divorced from the crucial tasks of the economy and frequently from fundamental science as well.

Soon a label was attached to the program for manned flights—"international." Our country's kind leaders, mindlessly handing out billions of rubles of the people's money, also gave them expensive space gifts: Almost free of charge, they took all comers for a ride in space. (The cost of the imported equipment was incommensurate with the overall expenditures.) Before the Soviet-Japanese flight, which was conducted for the first time on a commercial basis, 15 representatives of various countries had spent time in orbit on Soviet space equipment.

I will give a couple of figures related to this. A space flight with a man on board is a very costly undertaking. It is approximately 10 times more expensive than an unmanned flight if one calculates according to kilograms of useful load. Yet specialists obtain basic information from space about our planet and distant stars from satellites. The satellites do an excellent job with all the tasks set on this plane.

Let us return to expenditures again. The flight of one cosmonaut on the Mir station for one hour (!) costs R50,000. A day's flight costs R1.2 million. If you multiply this figure by the number of days in a year, it is easy to imagine approximately how much it cost to keep V. Titov and M. Manarov in space for just one year.

And another thing. The training of one foreign cosmonaut costs R2.6 million, and one Soviet—R1.3 million. And expenditures on ground equipment are also considerable—R10 million for the spaceship Soyuz TM.

And the return? But that, apparently, has not been the main thing. Economic interest was sacrificed for political competitiveness. And was only with the launching of the Mir station did we seem to awaken, remember the economic side of the matter, and begin to think in different categories. To put it simply, we began to keep track of money. We began, but we did not learn how.

A third-generation Mir station has been traveling the earth's orbit for six years now. But the national economic effect from the implementation of the complicated and costly Mir program, hard as it is to admit it, was nil. The immense amount of money did not produce any kind of advantage for the national economy. And God only knows how many billion the program "ate up." In any case this information has not been made public yet.

As a rule, our space expenditures are kept secret. There is no organ which could translate space achievements into the national economy. On the other hand, our anti-market economy in general is **unreceptive to scientific and technical progress**.

During the past five years, taking our space science as a whole, not a single space program has been fulfilled completely. Even the Mir program is on the verge of failure. What are the reasons?

In the first place, we have not yet managed to find an optimal, reasonable ratio between manned and automated space projects. As was already said, the lion's share of the scientific and practical tasks (and for national economic tasks—the whole 100 percent) could be carried out with automated equipment. But in our drive for prestige and spectacular achievements in space we assigned inappropriate functions to the Mir station.

For example, when conducting astrophysical experiments the Mir complex requires permanent orientation, and very precise orientation at that. With people on board it is impossible to meet this requirement (the movement of the cosmonauts has a negative effect on the orbital complex). Experience shows that extraterrestrial observatories can conduct these investigations without man.

In the second place, micro-accelerations also impede space technology: obtaining crystals and other materials. Increasing the number of attached elements degrades the resistance and dynamic characteristics of the Mir multi-block system. In particular, the top of the Kristall module rolls from side to side (like the spire of the Ostankino tower in the wind), especially when the cosmonaut is on the treadmill.

But even those semiconductor materials obtained in the electric warming furnaces of the Kristall module—where are they? Show me even one computer in which these crystals are used...

So far we know that the situation in the Mir "metallurgical shop" is pathetic. Of the five smelting furnaces only one more or less works and the rest "are on their last legs." The cosmonauts repair them and then they break down again... Many of our problems on the Mir are caused by the poor quality of the electronic equipment.

In the third place, there is a shortage of electric energy. The Kristall module has five smelting installations, but because of the shortage of electric power no more than two can be turned on at the same time.

In the fourth place, there is the problem of increasing the size of the crew. Since immense sums have already been spent on creating Mir, and the station is in orbit, we must be concerned about its effective utilization. Now this will be less expensive than it would be to create new satellites and put the station in mothballs. With Mir it would be possible to conduct an important ecology program and solve a number of other problems. But for effective use of the complex and for real work on Mir even now it is necessary to have a crew of six people.

It turns out that today this is not possible, even though Mir was intended for six to 10 cosmonauts. Only two are working on it. Why? The spaceship Soyuz can carry a maximum of three people. But then it is impossible to bring anything back from orbit when it returns. So two people fly in it. And a second ship cannot be sent: There will not be a free docking facility for it for a long time since they are always having to make room from the

Progress cargo spaceship bringing supplies of food, water, and other things. So there can be only weekly "guest" flights to the main expedition, but they are completely ineffective.

So that is the sad picture. In this connection a question arises: Did we need the Mir at all? I will answer this way: We undoubtedly needed it. Only for different purposes and tasks.

I have discussed only one example of the mistakes related to the Mir station. We have made many even more glaring mistakes in our space science. While recognizing its achievements (and they are undoubtedly considerable), on the threshold of its anniversary I would still like to concentrate attention on its shortcomings, for the burden of these is becoming excessively heavy—too much for our economy.

Space science is a very promising branch and it should do a very great deal for the country, the more so since we have a good foundation. This is precisely why we must have a well-thought-out strategy and tactics here.

Expenditures Could Be Recouped Ten-Fold By B. Chertok

There are events which leave a special mark on people's memory and history, and they are a powerful impetus for the rallying of the people, the appearance of a kind of emotional upsurge that unites society and cements it together. The first flight of man in space, that of Yuriy Gagarin, was such an event.

Today the country is divided and the people are hostile and worked up. Yes, we have many problems now. And they can be solved only by working and consolidating society for the sake of what nations and people have in common. One of these goals, in my view, is space science—that global field to which we must apply the energy, intelligence, and creativity of millions.

Let us recall how, in response to our achievements, the Americans developed the program for a manned expedition to the moon. This program was realized brilliantly.

And we have seen that man's participation in the societies that carried out such grand projects as the first space flight and the first landing on the moon awakens feelings of national pride, of one's own worth, and of universal solidarity. This was manifested fully both in the USSR and the United States.

The launching of space equipment to investigate the atmosphere, the solar system, and now even its limits, has led to many fundamental discoveries, and space systems are capable of developing new branches of an effective economy, without which progress in the national economy is impossible (television, telephone, and other communications and the weather service are unthinkable without satellites).

But today it is not creativity but the chaos of destruction that threatens to swallow up society. And space science

does not escape this. We must get space projects off the ground and insist on an immediate economic return from assimilating space that exceed expenditures on space science many times over. They say that 6.9 billion rubles [R] "for space" is extravagant. But almost two-thirds of this money was used for military applications in space. Or do problems of protecting the homeland not interest us any more? The war in the Persian Gulf has shown that we are still a long way from complete harmony in the world... And what are R6.9 billion spent on space when unproductive expenditures and direct losses in the USSR national economy in that same year of 1988 amounted to hundreds of billions.

On the other hand, space science is a basic science. And as with all other basic research, one cannot count on an immediate return from funds invested in it. So far a large amount of work has been stockpiled. A new environment for mankind is being assimilated—space (and along with this, its possibilities are being utilized with ever increasing effectiveness). Or do we intend to live for today without putting anything aside for tomorrow? In this connection one recalls Yuriy Gagarin's excellent statement: If throughout our history mankind had been guided only by immediate advantages and aspirations, we would be living like cavemen to this day.

Of course, in the assimilation of space money must be invested with intelligence and maximum effectiveness—nobody would argue with that. Alas, we have not managed to avoid mistakes here. But with hindsight it is not difficult to point out mistakes and failures. They are on the surface. When doing a large amount of work it is impossible to avoid them. But all this certainly does not mean that the development of Soviet space science was a long series of mistakes.

In this connection I would especially like to deal with an issue that is being discussed extensively today: Why did we spend so much money on the Energiya-Buran system? I will answer like this: This work was by no means done for considerations of prestige and not at the whim of the leaders of the military and industrial complex. One can argue about how effective and competitive this system is compared to others like it. Even the Americans, who have achieved undoubted success in the operation of the multiple use space shuttle system, have various viewpoints regarding this. But the beginning of the creation of a similar system in our country, following the Americans who took the lead, was brought about by the possible and quite real threat at the time that the space shuttle aircraft would be used for military purposes. The desire to have military and technical parity during the Cold War required the creation of a similar system. This was the origin of the idea of the Buran in 1974.

At the same time the desire to combine the qualities of rocket- space equipment and the aircraft into a single system is an unconditional and predictable requirement of the time. Many countries, following the example of the USSR and United States, are working most actively on the development of "cruise" manned spaceships—

multiple use air-space systems. What is this—a misunderstanding, repetition of "mistakes"? One could hardly agree with such a conclusion.

Unlike the American space shuttle, our Energiya booster rocket is capable of taking a multifunctional communications satellite weighing 18 tons into geostationary orbit. All other carriers, including the American and French, are still unable to deliver equipment weighing more than 2.7 tons into this orbit. There are difficulties not only in delivering an ultra heavy satellite but also in providing for normal operation for a long period of time. We have both the Energiya booster rocket and experience in creating large elements and control and stabilization systems accumulated during the development and operation of the Mir complex.

A system based on satellites like this will make it possible to fully satisfy the country's demands for main telephone communications channels before the year 2000. There will be communications among many thousands of rural villages and for regions which are hard to get to and far away (we have fallen decades behind the developed countries in this). The republics will receive multi-channel and multifunctional intrazonal and local communications and access to international communications channels. Each region of the country will realize the possibility of receiving directly, using antennas from 0.9 to 1.5 meters in diameter, no less than four Union channels and two to three regional ones.

The plans for such a system, which creates a new communications infrastructure by taking advantage of the unique possibilities of the Energiya booster rocket and the scientific and technical stockpile from the Mir complex, provide only one example of how the funds spent on manned systems produce a significant effect.

Returning to the discussion of mistakes, one cannot but admit that there were mistakes and failures, particularly in the creation of the Mir orbital complex. But on the whole many problems were solved here which seemed almost impossible before the complex went into operation. Among other things, the problem of man's spending more than a year in space was solved. The reliability of closed life support systems was proved. The problem of obtaining electric energy from the sun was solved successfully. And the very fact that the orbital station has been in operation for five years without major emergencies and that Soviet crews have been constantly present and constantly working in space are one of the achievements of which our country has a right to be proud.

Costly? Yes, in 1990 the operation of Mir cost R1 million a day and not more than 400 million in 12 months. But this is approximately one-tenth of our losses from crops during that same year of 1990...

And, finally, a couple of words about the so-called indirect return from space science for the national economy. The transfer of experience and achievements to other branches, which could repay expenditures tenfold, now that all secrecy restrictions have been

removed, is proceeding extremely slowly—one might say like pulling teeth. There is no economic incentive. This is a problem for our entire system and space science is not to blame.

But we have something to give the national economy. When creating that same Energiya-Buran system we completed about 600 significant technological developments. Their assimilation will more than pay for expenditures on creating the system, even if we never launched it into space...

One can only regret that the immense scientific and technical potential created by space science is frequently left unclaimed.

Military

'Komsomolets' Sinking Investigation Reopened

LD0904142791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1000 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] Certain newspapers have reported that the main military procuracy has reopened the investigation of the accident involving the atomic submarine "Komsomolets" because the report of the government commission, which completed an investigation into the circumstances and causes of the loss of the boat, did not manage to cast light on this tragic story.

At the main military procuracy, a TASS correspondent was informed that the preliminary investigation into the accident involving the atomic submarine "Komsomolets" was reopened on 25 March this year because a large volume of work has to be done by the time of completion of the operation to raise the submarine, planned for 1992. In the course of the additional investigation, a more thorough examination is to be made on the transfer of the submarine for use, the level of training of its crew, and also of the issue of ensuring its unsinkability and safety in case of explosion or fire, and a number of other situations.

Arkhipov Comments on Arms Conversion Policy

LD1104170291 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0750 GMT 11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 11 Apr (TASS)—"Already in 1990, 40 percent of the defense complex output was for peaceful purposes. This year, the proportion will amount to 46 percent and by 1995 it will exceed 60 percent. This does not, however, signify that arms production has been replaced by the manufacturing of saucepans," stated Army General Vladimir Arkhipov, deputy USSR minister of defense, and chief of Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces in an interview given to a TASS correspondent." [passage omitted]

"I must be blunt and state that the transfer of resources from the military establishment to serve the needs of all the citizens, and a rational utilization of military equipment becoming available as a result of the reductions, once it has been modified as necessary, do and will continue to yield a considerable economic gain," the military commander emphasized. [passage omitted]

The general focused attention on the fact that "It is economically groundless, politically shortsighted and dangerous to regard the curtailment of defense spending and conversion as being almost the only way to get rid of the budget deficit and to tackle all the social problems of today." The defense of the country, Vladimir Arkhipov said, continues to be an area where fundamental and vital interests of the people converge, and the sensible sufficiency principle should be backed up by further transformations and technical reequipment of the armed forces on a qualitatively new basis. "We are dealing with this now, and will continue to do so. So any unilateral disarmament is out of the question altogether," General Arkhipov said in conclusion.

Military Reform Reviewed

*LD1204085291 Moscow TASS in English 0815 GMT
12 Apr 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—"the main purpose of the military reform is to ensure highly efficient military development and minimum expenditure of means and

resources," deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff Colonel-General Grigory Krivosheyev told TASS in connection with the forthcoming discussion of the reform's progress by the USSR Supreme Soviet Defence and Security Committee. Krivosheyev said that the military reform was not only an expression of the new political thinking, but "an exceedingly important component of the entire process of our society's renovation."

Krivosheyev believes the principles of the Soviet Armed Forces are formed should remain immune: the Army must be regular. It must be formed on an extraterritorial mixed voluntary-compulsory basis. "The Army must defend the interests of the Soviet people and remain really internationalist, but its professional standards must not be undermined," Krivosheyev stressed.

The general believes the Army's professionalisation should primarily envisage the personnel's proper combat, technical and special training, ensurance of its moral and psychological preparedness for combat action.

"All elements of defence must be revised in the course of the military reform," Krivosheyev said. "First of all, it is necessary to ensure a reasonable sufficiency of military production. This also refers to the Armed Forces' structure and equipment."

"Special attention must be given during the military reform to the perfection of the legislative basis of defence development, to the creation of an efficient system guaranteeing legal and social protection to servicemen and their families," Krivosheyev stressed.

Baltic Republics

Pugo Names Internal Affairs Baltic Representative

LD1104211291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian
1900 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] According to a decree of Soviet Union Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo, Colonel Nikolay Goncharenko has been appointed representative of the ministry in the Baltic republics.

At an interview with the DIENA agency Goncharenko announced that so far he has not received specific instructions from the center but, probably, he will have to coordinate the activity of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] and the interior troops and their cooperation with the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Baltic republics.

Reportage on Latvian-Soviet Talks in Moscow

Gorbunovs Views Prospects

LD1104103991 Riga Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Excerpt] On Wednesday an authorized Latvian delegation left for Moscow to meet the members of the delegation confirmed by the USSR President. In the Latvian delegation are representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Department of Defense, and the Ministry of Economics, and Deputies Juris Dobelis and Sergejs Dimanis of the Latvian Supreme Council. Our delegation is led by Ilmars Bisers, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers. What does Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, think the results of the talks will be? We reproduce a fragment of an interview which you can hear in full in the review section later.

[Begin Gorbunovs recording] As long as the USSR Supreme Soviet and president do not clearly state their attitude to the Baltic states—despite our latest polls, the results of our polls—as long as they do not state their attitude clearly and say yes, let the Baltic states be independent and let us start talks as to how best to shape this process, this feeling of uncertainty will continue. In practice in these talks, as has been the case up to now, we will mostly be trying to convince them how badly we will fare if this independence is [word indistinct]. [end recording]

Those were the thoughts and experiences of Anatolijs Gorbunovs on talks with the USSR. Taking part in the talks with the representatives of the Soviet Union will be Sergejs Dimanis, the leader of the equal rights faction in the Latvian Supreme Council. Talking to radio legislative correspondent Anta Busa, Dimanis assessed the possible results of the talks.

[Begin Dimanis recording] (?The mood is fragile). I do not expect anything from these talks. I think that to talk now to the Soviet Union is completely senseless. First

the Union must stabilize its state structures, and only then can one succeed with it. At the moment the Union is not able to guarantee Latvia anything. That is very clear. No material resources of any kind, say; that is perhaps the price of suffering. Nor can we talk here of any political forms. I think these talks will simply be consultations, nothing more. Serious talks can only begin some time next year. I do not think that the political situation will stabilize before the end of the year.

[Busa] Do you have any information about how our neighbors the Lithuanians got on in their talks of the same kind in Moscow?

[Dimanis] There is nothing in that. Any talks are better than wrestling, aren't they? That is just why I assess these talks positively. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Background, Meeting Detailed

LD1104161791 Moscow TASS in English 1048 GMT
11 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Delegations from the Soviet Union and Latvia, led by First Deputy Prime Ministers Vladimir Velichko and Ilmars Bisers, met in Moscow today.

Like the two other Baltic Republics, Latvia adopted a declaration on restoring its state independence in May 1990. The Soviet president's decree dated May 14, said the act had "no legal force". During the March 1991 poll in Latvia, over 66 per cent of participants favoured a "democratic and independent Latvian Republic".

Last year, the centre held consultations with Lithuania at state delegation level and with Estonia at expert level. The dialogue was interrupted after tragic events in Vilnius and Riga in January, 1991.

On February 1, the Soviet president appointed delegations "for discussing the whole complex of political, social and economic issues" with representatives from the three republics. In March, Soviet delegations met Lithuanian and Estonian representatives and agreed to continue the dialogue, although a specific date for the beginning of talks has not been determined.

A spokesman for the Latvian mission in Moscow told TASS that the meeting scheduled for Thursday, "cannot be considered as the beginning of official talks".

In a televised address on Friday, Bisers said the delegations "have broad powers to discuss any issues without restrictions". He expected that in addition to other issues, participants in the meeting will discuss the deployment of Soviet Army units on Latvian territory and Latvia's participation in repaying the Soviet Union's foreign debt.

Commenting on the forthcoming meeting before his departure to Moscow, republican parliament minority leader Sergey Dimanis said he believed that the sides will

discuss the property issue. According to Dimanis, delegation members consider it inexpedient to discuss mutual money claims. At the same time, the delegation believes that all economic objects on Latvian territory should be in Latvia's jurisdiction, Dimanis said.

Dimanis expected that the delegations will discuss the border issue and the status of central and republican interior ministries and procurator's offices.

Goals of Talks Reported

LD1104130191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Apr 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A few hours ago in the Kremlin the Soviet Union and Latvian Government delegations met. The meeting is expected to deal with Soviet Army units on the republic's territory and also Latvia's proportional participation in repaying the Soviet Union's foreign debt. Ownership problems and the question of bilateral monetary claims will be raised. It is possible that the question of borders and the status of Union and republican ministries of internal affairs and procuracies will also be examined.

To Meet Again in May

LD1104150291 Moscow TASS in English 1440 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Soviet and Latvian delegations met in the Kremlin today to work out basic principles and procedures for further discussions of economic, social and political problems.

They agreed to create joint expert groups and to hold the next meeting in May.

The delegations were led by Vladimir Velichko, first deputy federal prime minister, and his Latvian counterpart Ilmars Bisers.

Official Assesses Success

LD1104212991 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Telephone report from Moscow by correspondent Pet-eris Austrums on talks between Latvian and USSR officials on 11 April—recorded]

[Text] Immediately after the end of the talks with the Soviet Government delegation at the mission of the Republic of Latvia, Ilmars Bisers, the leader of the delegation, Juris Dobelis, and Janis Peters gave a news conference to Soviet and foreign correspondents on the results of the talks.

Ilmars Bisers read a joint announcement signed by him and USSR Deputy Prime Minister Velichko, which states that both sides met (on the occasion) in order to tackle social, economy, and political questions. They

agreed on the date of the next talks and also on the questions which will be discussed.

Bisers noted that in the talks today, three principal questions were discussed.

First questions of procedure, and the delegations agreed that talks will be held at least twice a month. In between the talks groups of experts will work. The talks will alternatively take place on the territories of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Latvia. The talks will be chaired each time by a representative of one side agreed by the other side's delegation.

The next aspect in the questions of procedure was the following: What type of delegation from a state will the Soviet Union really conduct talks? With a delegation from the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic or from the Republic of Latvia? And for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union the Republic of Latvia has appeared in an official document. This is in the joint announcement to the press.

The second question which was discussed today at the talks was the subjects of the talks. The sides agreed on 20 questions which will be prepared by the time of the next talks by the groups of experts and which will be discussed. The list of these questions unfortunately has not yet been made public. It must be assumed that this will be done in the nearest future.

Ilmars Bisers, however, noted that the principal questions will be economic relations and questions concerning the normal functioning of the national economy; second, questions on the relations of finances and budgets; and third, on the status of law protection organs and the problems of ensuring law protection in the Republic of Latvia.

Although the Soviet side placed more emphasis on economic questions, many political questions which are of interest to the Latvian delegation were successfully included among the subjects of the talks.

The next round of talks will take place around 20 May Latvia.

The delegations, as Ilmars Bisers noted, are not authorized to sign any cardinal decisions, but only to prepare them for signing.

'Most Topical' Issues Identified

LD1104205291 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—Ilmar Biser, first deputy prime minister of the Latvian Republic, described today's meeting in the Kremlin between Soviet and Latvian delegations as the beginning of official talks.

Speaking at a press conference after the end of the meeting which lasted for more than five hours, the head

of the Latvian delegation said that the sides had managed to single out 20 "most topical political, social and economic issues." According to Biser, these include the restoration of Latvia's state independence, proclaimed on May 4, 1990. Mixed groups of experts will be created soon to examine these issues.

Biser said that the sides had agreed to hold meetings of the delegations twice a month alternately in Latvia and Moscow. The next meeting is to be held in Riga on the third decade of May. The sides will discuss measures to stabilise economic relations, financial and budget relations, as well as the status of central and republican law enforcement agencies.

According to Biser, today's meeting was held in a "benevolent" atmosphere. He stressed that, despite the difference in stands on about all problems discussed, both delegations showed willingness to settle them by means of talks.

Our delegations are ready to discuss any problems, Biser said. At the same time, he continued, their task consists in working out decisions, "which will be approved on a higher level."

The head of the Latvian delegation believes that the forthcoming meeting between USSR Vice-President Gennadiy Yanayev and Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis will make some changes in the programme of the talks. The date of the meeting is being fixed now.

Union delegations met in March with representatives of two other Baltic Republics which announced the restoration of their state independence—Lithuania and Estonia.

Landsbergis Airs Problems With Gorbachev

*LD1104180391 Vinus Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian
1536 GMT 11 Apr 91*

[News conference given by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis in the Supreme Council building in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] [Landsbergis] I had an interview today with foreign journalists, and I told them about my telephone conversation today with President Gorbachev. Therefore I thought I should tell the same to our journalists.

First of all I have to say that on 7 April, on Sunday, I sent a letter to President Gorbachev, and today I phoned him to ask whether he received my letter and how he regards the problems it contained, because both these matters are interlinked.

In my letter I put forward one problem, the problem which is very well-known to us, that is, the seizure of the Lithuanian TV buildings carried out by the units of the Soviet Army; some of them occupied the buildings and others started guarding them. At present that army is occupying them.

Nobody in Moscow, even high-ranking officials, can provide any explanation why the Soviet army has to occupy the buildings of Lithuanian TV. Even high-ranking officials admit that this is incorrect behavior, an incorrect situation, an unlawful situation, but various officials have stated that they are not competent to take a decision on this issue. Then I wrote to the Soviet president and asked him to take a decision; because why should the Soviet Union itself or the Soviet Army should play a plundering role by seizing somebody else's property? This discredits the state and the beginning of the process of negotiations or the possibility of a political maneuver, since we are in a position of being attacked and robbed. It is difficult for us to talk because of this.

Today I asked on the telephone about this, and received a reply that this issue and its possible solution have been entrusted to Vitaliy Doguzhiyev, chairman of the commission for the negotiations with Lithuania, who used to say that he did not have any authorization; and now, it seems, he has received some authorization.

On this occasion I asked President Gorbachev about a new seizure in Vilnius. I explained that this is a driving school built with funds of the Republic of Lithuania, that it belongs to the Lithuanian Government irrespective of the fact that a few years ago it was used by the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] and that the question of property is clear. Our Foreign Ministry has sent a note about this seizure and the question arises whether this is the beginning of new attacks and seizures, or the torpedoing of the dialogue that has started; in some sense, this would be against the policy of President Gorbachev himself.

I asked him to pay attention, to clarify, and since from the conversation I could understand that President Gorbachev continues to be tendentiously and erroneously informed about the Lithuania's stand and our actions, I proposed to meet and talk directly. After the exchange of several sentences, President Gorbachev proposed that I should phone him about this after his return from Japan.

Thus such a meeting, it seems, is possible. One has to prepare for it so that it will be useful. So much about this.

[Unidentified journalist] I would like to ask you to comment on an article in today's GIMTASIS KRASTAS [Native Land] which relates to our relations with Moscow and even with your telephone conversation today in the sense that we all are concerned about the negotiations and how to come to them. Esteemed Algimantas Cekuolis proposes in his article to begin a general strike in Lithuania and stop the supply of food products, industrial goods and their components to the Soviet Union. [passage omitted] This is motivated by the fact that the miners are striking, that Georgia is threatening political strikes, that there is trouble from Chukchiya to Baltiysk etc.

[Landsbergis] I should not like us to feel being somewhere between Chukchiy and Baltiysk. I should like to regard our problems in a state-like manner, and our

relations with our neighbor in the east also in a state-like manner. It would seem strange to me to strike against a neighboring state. Those who are on strike attempting to change that state from the inside, improve its government and so on, they are in a different situation. [passage omitted] We have no grounds. If we, for example, are not satisfied with Poland's or Germany's policy, would we start a strike or some blockade of those countries? I would like to advise the readers of this weekly and the people of Lithuania to regard this article with reservation, as a journalistic essay, but not as a political document. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified journalist] About your tete-a-tete meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, have the circumstances changed, or have the poles of sympathies and antipathies changed?

[Landsbergis] I should not like to link the problems of these future possible meetings with some emotions or some guesses about who likes whom. This is the sphere of journalistic speculation. Political problems must be regarded simply and in a businesslike manner. If meetings are useful and both sides want them, one must strive for them. Today, since the conversation had a positive moment, the possibility of meeting, I told you about this as a positive moment in our political life. [passage omitted]

Commissar Warns Lithuanian Communications Ministry

LD1104183991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian
1800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Will there be new provocations tomorrow in Vilnius? Correspondent Edvinas Butkus phoned Lithuanian Minister of Communications Kostas Birulis:

[Begin recording] [Butkus] I would like to ask you to confirm information received from a foreign journalist. Allegedly, you received a telephone call today from a high-ranking local officer, who threatened that tomorrow [passage indistinct].

[Birulis] General Vysotskiy phoned. He said that he was warning me not to be surprised when tomorrow, together with 100 officers, he would be coming to introduce order in the ministry.

[Butkus] Whom did he represent?

[Birulis] He is the Lithuanian military commissar. He represented himself, so to say. The situation is as follows: On 7 March, the government adopted a decision to reorganize the present government telephone exchange, removing all who are not connected with the government structures: Public organizations, editorial offices, trade unions and soviet structures. [passage indistinct]

[Butkus] You (?have no doubt) that some prevention measures will be taken?

[Birulis] We are thinking, we are doing something organizationally. [Words indistinct] devil knows. [end recording]

Lithuanian Contacts With Europe, Moscow

LD1104161191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian
1100 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] An eight-person delegation of the Dutch legislature, almost the entire Commission for Foreign Affairs, is due in Vilnius. They will stay here from 12 to 13 April. This is a delegation of great importance to us because we have not previously had visitors of this rank from the Dutch legislature. [passage omitted]

For the first time since our declaration of independence on 11 March last year an invitation has been received from the German Bundestag to an official group from our legislature. Such a group, headed by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, will visit the Bundestag from 15 to 20 April. Kazimieras Antanavicius, Emanuelis Zingeris, and Saulius Peceliunas will be included into this group.

I think it is difficult to overestimate the significance of this invitation because we know that until today, close contacts between the two legislatures—the Bundestag and the Lithuanian legislature—did not exist. We can even say that in comparison with Iceland and Denmark, the Government of Germany showed restraint toward the independence of Lithuania. Therefore, we pin great hopes on this visit of our legislators to Germany. [passage omitted]

In conclusion I would like to give a brief comment on a report by TASS. It says that a delegation of the Soviet Union and Latvia is to meet in the Kremlin today. This is a meeting roughly on the same level as the one which took place on 4 April between our delegation, the delegation of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Soviet delegation headed by V. Doguzhiyev. Of course the very fact is of interest; however, what is more interesting is that the TASS report includes a historical review of all our meetings with Moscow since 11 March [1990], and here is what it says: Last year consultations with Lithuania were held by the center at the level of state delegations, and with Estonia at the level of experts. The dialogue was disrupted after the events in the Baltics in January when blood was spilled on the streets of Vilnius and Riga.

I would like to promptly state that this is absolutely not so, because the contacts of the work groups, contacts of groups of experts were unilaterally disrupted from the Soviet side in December last year, at the beginning of December. At first this was explained in a way by the illness of then Prime Minister, N. Ryzhkov, and later there was no chance for the Lithuanian side to resume these negotiations, although attempts were made to do this on more than one occasion. We can also recall that on 7 January, V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, sent a telegram to Gorbachev appealing to him

to grant him an informal personal meeting, and said that consultations and negotiations should be resumed.

But there was only one answer: military actions in Vilnius. I think that at the time when the consultations were disrupted the use of military force in Lithuania was already being prepared in Moscow. This is what happened; therefore, we can say that the dialogue was disrupted not after the bloody events in Vilnius on 13 January, but significantly earlier.

Landsbergis on Territorial, Political Issues

PM1204093691 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 9 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis by correspondent V. Zarovskiy; place and date not given; under the "Without Commentaries" rubric: "V. Landsbergis: We Have No Claims on Magadan Mines"]

[Text] [Zarovskiy] A year has passed since the adoption of the Act of Independence. A difficult year, a tragic year. Could events in and around Lithuania have developed differently?

[Landsbergis] Yes, of course. Both in Lithuania and in interstate relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. The course of the Lithuanian Republic legislature and its legislative activities could hardly have been different. But what is associated with settling the problems stemming from the fact of the occupation and annexation of the independent Lithuanian state by the Soviet Union in 1941 could have developed differently. First, the Soviet Union's current leadership should adhere more to common sense and principles of international law and justice, and not to great-power ideological postulates. Second, having bluntly said "a", it should be able to say "b" just as bluntly, that is: Having declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret protocols invalid at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it should likewise declare that Lithuania's being part of the USSR has no legal basis whatever. Given such a realistic and fair approach events could have developed differently. After all, the rulers of the British Empire had enough common sense to realize that the empire had no long-term future. The USSR needs radical restructuring. Lithuania and the other Baltic countries (Mr. Landsbergis means Latvia and Estonia—author's note) are moreover a special case. Therefore we hope that sooner or later a realistic and legal approach will prevail in the Kremlin.

[Zarovskiy] But the center is standing firm: Lithuania is de facto part of the USSR. But Lithuania says that it is de jure an independent state. Maybe the Lithuanian side needs to build a policy based on these features: De jure independent, de facto part of the USSR?

[Landsbergis] To be precise, Lithuania claims the following: It is an independent state which was occupied and annexed 50 years ago by another state. And now it is

once again realizing, despite interference and violence, its inalienable sovereign rights.

Based on this, we cannot settle for the ambiguous wordings cited in the question. Without going into details, I will say this: Any relations with the USSR or a different state formation which may possibly take its place in the future will be developed on the basis of the principles of partnership and choice. But at this moment, alas, there is rather more cause to talk of a returning occupation: The Army continues to hold Lithuanian Republic installations seized in January. The first sign of the Soviet Union's adherence not only to international law but to any law at all would be the return of the seized buildings to their rightful owners. As yet this has not happened.

[Zarovskiy] In my view, it is just a reaction to the attempt to secede from the Soviet Union in the form in which it is being accomplished. So will Lithuania be able to secede?

[Landsbergis] Lithuania never joined the Soviet Union. I repeat, it was forcibly incorporated into it, and now is gradually freeing itself. During the year Lithuania has freed itself from what was foisted onto it and alien to it. Lithuania's parliament is adopting such laws as it deems necessary. Only Lithuanian Republic laws are valid for Lithuanian citizens on its territory, and the Lithuanian Republic General Prosecutor's Office monitors the application of Lithuanian Republic laws. A social structure distinct from the USSR's has been created in the political sphere. An example of this distinction is that, deprived of a monopoly, the Lithuanian Communist Party carries negligible weight in Lithuanian society. The formation of a politically structured multiparty and self-determining civic society is virtually complete. Citizens enjoy all rights in the spheres of culture, freedom of conscience, and personal choice. Were it not for another state's military force on the Lithuanian Republic's borders, Lithuania's independence could already have been legalized at international level. True, this legalization is occurring anyway. Here mention should be made of Iceland, whose legislature decided to resume diplomatic relations with Lithuania, and Denmark, which recognized Lithuania's de facto independence as well as the need to restore diplomatic relations at the earliest opportunity.

And if we are talking about economic problems, then not a single country in the world can be completely economically independent from everyone and everything. And so Lithuania intends to cooperate with everyone, provided that this benefits the interested parties.

[Zarovskiy] I have repeatedly heard: After the war the Soviets built everything for the Lithuanians, and now the latter are "leaving"...

[Landsbergis] Let us investigate this... Nobody builds on their own or out of charity. In the postwar years, when people from Russia and other republics went to Lithuania to help create heavy industry here, 300,000

Lithuanians also went. But in an entirely different direction—to the very heart of Russia, to the remote northern regions. And they went not because their hearts called them but by order, in cattle wagons. They went there to work to the point of exhaustion and die. They dug copper, cut lumber, mined coal, laid railroads... Let us recall Solzhenitsyn, who wrote that for a long time one of the most important economic factors was the work of the "zeks" [prisoners]. So a considerable amount of Lithuania's and Lithuanians' labor has been invested in the USSR economy. But we do not intend to dismantle and ship back to Lithuania the rails which were laid on the bones of Lithuanian exiles. Likewise we do not intend to call Magadan and other mines, where thousands of our fellow citizens ended their lives, Lithuanian property. I think that here, too, things should not be made complicated. Let us restore the simplest human justice and we will be able to agree on everything else.

[Zarovskiy] If the matter nevertheless reaches the point of talks, how, in your opinion, should the division of property in the national economy between Lithuania and the USSR be carried out?

[Landsbergis] In the final analysis it is possible to agree on everything, only the restoration of independence itself cannot be the subject of bargaining.

It is, of course, possible to estimate how much the Soviet Union owes Lithuania. It is also possible to estimate how much the Soviet Union has invested in Lithuania. And to draw up a balance on these grounds. But it seems the closest to the optimal is an amicable decision after consideration of each specific case. In especially complex cases, as for example with the Ignalina AES [nuclear electric power station], the form of joint enterprises where part of the capital is Soviet and part is Lithuanian can be utilized. There is a multitude of variations. Economic problems are fully capable of being settled on a mutually advantageous basis during talks.

The key questions are still political and legal ones. And economic claims, which are being put forward rather abstractly by the Soviet side, more often than not have an underlying political cause, and are used as a means of putting preliminary pressure on.

[Zarovskiy] I hope that it is not economic claims that are holding up the execution of economic reform in Lithuania. There is a kind of feeling that both the idea of economic accountability and the creation of Lithuania's own market have no basis. I am judging simply by store shelves. Is there really a plan to reorganize the economy?

[Landsbergis] Such a plan, or more precisely a program of transition to a market economy, was discussed for several years in academic, management, and other circles. We have now reached the point of implementation. However, the reform is encountering difficulties. The reason is the hypertrophied and abnormal integration of Lithuania's economy into the economy of the USSR, which is on the brink of catastrophe. Every tremble in the Soviet Union's economy reverberates in Lithuania's

economy. The peculiar "experiments" in the USSR—the case of the exchange of money—also affect the state of affairs in Lithuania. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's ruling structures are hindering in every way possible, for example by means of economic levers, the very rapid execution of reform in the republic. Of course, there are also difficulties in Lithuania itself. The partocracy's 50-year edict rule cannot fail to leave a trace. All Central and East European states are encountering similar difficulties. Nevertheless, in the last month we have taken a decisive step toward privatization.

[Zarovskiy] But why did Prunskiene's government resign then? After all, it was pursuing the same policy?

[Landsbergis] The prime minister decided to tender her resignation, and under the Constitution the whole government resigns along with the prime minister. The reason for the resignation of the prime minister herself is the noncorrelation of economic steps with political steps or with their social consequences, and indifference to the political situation and Supreme Soviet decisions. At the Supreme Soviet sitting 8 January, when the government's activities were discussed, Vice Premier Brazauskas acknowledged that it was necessary to raise prices, but the way in which it was done was a mistake. The resignation of a whole government is an entirely normal phenomenon. In civilized countries it occurs almost painlessly. Only in states where former leaders have remained in power for life is the resignation of a government figure seen as the end of the world. txt

[Zarovskiy] And yet many people in the republic saw the old Cabinet of Ministers as the guarantor of considered, unhurried actions in all spheres. In what form will the Law on the Return of Property to its Former Owners now be adopted? Will it not lead to unrest among the population?

[Landsbergis] Lithuania's legislature has long discussed how to deal with private property which was once nationalized by the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the return of property will cause tension in society. Because different people are now living in homes which were once confiscated, and fields belonging to someone are being cultivated by others. All this is true. However, to pretend that nothing happened when property was unceremoniously and forcibly seized would be to sympathize with the illegal actions of the Soviet leadership of that time.

In consequence of the debates this was decided: To recognize the right of former owners to confiscated property, and to return it as far as is possible. To return it where possible, or if this is not possible to pay compensation. Furthermore, property is returned only to the owners themselves or first generation descendants.

[Zarovskiy] But was it for the sake of justice that it became necessary to adopt the Law on Parties, which outlaws Communists? Indeed, as Jermalavicius himself, the Lithuanian Communist Party ideologist, correctly noted, the law is only a piece of paper. Was this law not a tactical mistake, which also led to "bloody Sunday?"

[Landsbergis] The Law on Parties is one of the laws which assists the political structuring of society. Nobody will dispute that a state's political life must be regulated by laws. The Law on Parties is one of the main laws in the system of regulating social life. Sooner or later this law had to be adopted, since in the absence of such a law all parties would be outside the law. Is that not true? Well, the Lithuanian Communist Party has the right to exist and operate, but must be registered in accordance with the law. This party's leadership is, alas, evading the legal process, preferring armed methods. They have chosen violence, which, incidentally, is traditionally and historically intrinsic to this party.

[Zarovskiy] In recent months, especially just before and after the referendum, the Lithuanian Communist Party has been saying increasingly frequently that it alone can defend Lithuania's territorial integrity. They also talk about "territories" from the highest rostrums in the center. Can you justify Lithuania's right to Klaipeda, Vilnius, or the Vilnius region [Vilniusskiy Kray]?

[Landsbergis] It is virtually impossible to answer this question exhaustively in a few words. But I can say in brief: The Soviet Union's claims on Klaipeda have as much "legal basis" as those of the prewar Hitlerite Germany on Austria or the Czech Sudetenland. Klaipeda was a sovereign part of the Lithuanian Republic before spring 1939 and never belonged to Russia. The situation with the Vilnius region is similar from the legal viewpoint. In 1939 and later the Soviet Union handed Lithuania only part of what it recognized as Lithuania's in the 1920 treaty. Furthermore, the statement by the Soviet Union's leadership about the alleged contentiousness of some current Lithuanian territories must be seen by the world as a dangerous signal toward a revision of borders. The USSR, as a country that signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, must not permit that, especially so as not to involve Belorussia—a UN member—which has corresponding obligations.

If some questions concerning Lithuania's territory might arise, they are exclusively with Germany and Poland. From the legal viewpoint the Soviet Union has nothing to do with it, and the states referred to consider their borders final.

RSFSR

Unions To Hold Red Square Rally on May Day

LD1104153191 Moscow TASS in English 1430 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 11 TASS—A demonstration and a rally will be held in the Red Square on May 1 under the slogans "No to unrestrained growth of prices, speculation and attempts to rob Moscow working people," "No to anti-people steps taken by the government" and "Yes

to a well-considered and effective programme of overcoming the economic crisis," M. Nagaitsev, deputy chairman of the Moscow Trade Union Federation, told TASS.

"We are not at all calling for confrontation. We favour progress and civil accord and hope to find a way to it within the framework of the existing federal and republican laws, as well as the latest resolutions of the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation which envisage, among other things, the negotiations as a way to prevent strikes. But there seems to be no proper response to our demands on the part of the federal and republican parliaments and governments. Prices have been set free, but the legislators are in no hurry to adopt laws on the indexation of incomes and to meet our other demands," he said.

So far as political demands are concerned, the trade union federation has not put them forward so far, but they are put forward in some labour collectives. If we fail to begin negotiations with legislators and representatives of both governments before May 1, the federation plans to hold a warning all-Moscow strike.

Komi Supreme Soviet Urges Miners To End Strikes

LD1104202991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] The Komi Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet today passed an appeal to the Pechora coal basin miners and to the leaderships of the country and of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The deputies stated that they realize the objective causes which have led to the demands of the miners. They also demanded that the leadership of the RSFSR urgently begin constructive dialogue with Vorkuta and Inta miners. The people's deputies appealed to the miners to take into account the extreme gravity of the crisis in the country and in the republic, and to call off the strike.

RSFSR Officials on Future Republic KGB

91UFOU12A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with MVD Colonel S. Stepashin, chairman of the Security Committee of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, and his deputy, KGB Lieutenant Colonel B. Bolshakov, by correspondent P. Lukyanchenko; place, date not given: "What Kind of KGB Should Russia Have?"]

[Text] [Lukyanchenko] At the end of last year B.N. Yeltsin, informing a session of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of understandings with the USSR president, stated that the center had agreed to transfer to Russia's jurisdiction many thousands of KGB territorial organs. If we are to believe the press, however, just 250 individuals have been transferred to you.

[Stepashin] The figure 250 bears no relation whatsoever to the future Russian Committee for State Security. Apparently the journalists did not really understand something—that the topic of discussion was the staff of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security, headed by Colonel General K. Kobets, for full manning by Ministry of Defense personnel. But for the time being we see no decision by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. It is being deliberately dragged out.

With respect to the RSFSR KGB itself, its structure as a state committee will consist of a central apparatus and territorial organs. According to a preliminary understanding with USSR KGB Chairman V. Kryuchkov, this apparatus will consist of 300 individuals in the first stage. The numbers of territorial organs subject to transfer to Russia will remain at the current level for the time being.

[Lukyanchenko] Who is to blame for dragging out the process of creating the RSFSR KGB? Discussion on this issue has been under way for some time now.

[Stepashin] We ourselves are partly to blame for this, since we displayed sluggishness and only one month ago established the appropriate legislative Security Committee and analogous executive organ under the Russian Council of Ministers. It is at that point that talks with the Center essentially began.

Of course, not everything has been going smoothly during the course of these talks. Different approaches were noted on two issues—firstly, the candidacy of the Russian KGB chairman; and secondly, the status of the KGB Directorate in Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

We proposed that Major General N. Shama be appointed RSFSR KGB chairman, taking into account his experience working both in the KGB territorial organs and in his present job capacity as deputy head of the USSR KGB Sixth Directorate, which oversees industry.

[Lukyanchenko] But according to press reports, the USSR KGB chairman rejected this.

[Bolshakov] The USSR KGB leader asked that the decision regarding Shama be postponed and suggested that we work on other candidacies. We reached agreement at our meetings that cadre selection would be done on a reciprocal basis, and that candidates would begin executing their responsibilities only when agreement between the parties was reached. As a result of talks with the Center, a compromise decision was arrived at for the time being—Lieutenant Colonel V. Ivanenko, presently the deputy head of the USSR KGB inspectorate, would be appointed acting chairman of the Russian KGB. The nomination of Ivanenko was also considered by our legislative committee, but to the post of General Shama's first deputy.

[Stepashin] In insisting on the candidacy of General Shama, we were proceeding from the consideration that

the central mission of the future Russian KGB must be to protect Russia's economic sovereignty. The notorious "Filshin affair" is on everyone's lips. If today we had our own republic security service, this "affair" would never have taken place and information regarding the insolvency of certain Western partners would have been directed to the RSFSR Council of Ministers leadership, not to the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Bolshakov] I would like to add that all republics, with the exception of Russia, have their own KGB organs. These are relatively independent of the center and provide the leadership of their republics with all necessary information.

[Lukyanchenko] As we know, the top layer of the USSR KGB has quite a number of former CPSU Central Committee functionaries who obtained high rank and position right away, often not possessing the slightest idea as to how to conduct operations work. Will it not turn out that in transferring territorial organs to you, all these people will again occupy leadership positions in the KGB and—whether you like it or not—the republic KGB will remain the "armed detachment of the CPSU"?

[Stepashin] I believe this does not revolve around somebody's party past—incidentally, the majority of the deputies of Russia today have such a past. Without a doubt the most important thing for us is high professional competence, integrity, and a readiness on the part of future employees of the Russian KGB to serve the RSFSR Constitution and its laws, and not the interests of one party or another—whether it be the party of Polozkov or Travkin.

[Lukyanchenko] But where is there any guarantee that only decent people will be among those you select?

[Bolshakov] Naturally there is no 100 percent guarantee. We select people not by virtue of their personal affairs or application data, but through careful study of the service they have performed in territorial organs. We have established a special analysis group for this purpose which deals with cadre selection.

[Lukyanchenko] But will people come to you if the salaries are half as much as those in the Union KGB, as was reported in the press?

[Bolshakov] All pay scales for Russian KGB employees this year will be the same as in the Union KGB. We intend to raise the question of increasing salaries for next year. We believe these will constitute at least the amount earned by Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] employees who, by the way, receive significantly more than their colleagues in the Union MVD.

[Lukyanchenko] If the Center gives Russia that which is its due, what then will remain for the Union KGB? Just to defend the Kremlin?

[Stepashin] Demarcation of functions will be stipulated in the protocol which is presently being prepared—taking into account our positions in the signing of a Union treaty.

[Lukyanchenko] Where will the central apparatus of the Russian KGB be located?

[Bolshakov] The USSR KGB is examining this question favorably, and has offered us one of its buildings in Lubyanka.

[Lukyanchenko] One final question. To whom will the KGB chairman be subordinate? Will he be in the USSR KGB collegium, accountable to the USSR KGB leadership?

[Stepashin] The KGB chairman will become first deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security, headed by Colonel General K.I. Kobets, and which, by resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, is part of the USSR KGB collegium.

Western Republics

Further on Minsk Protests Against Higher Prices

Car Workers' Wages Increased

LD1104195291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1400 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Unidentified correspondent's report from Minsk]

[Text] A considerable increase in wages at a number of highly profitable industrial enterprises has become the response to the Belorussian Government's decision envisaging additional measures for the population's social protection in connection with the price reform. The administration and trade unions of the Minsk car factory were the first to react to the strikers' demands. They decided to double wages of workers, specialists, and other personnel. This measure will be implemented in stages during the year, and will require over 10 million rubles [R]. Wage rates, piece-workrates and post-related salaries will be increased by 30 percent, beginning this month. Food expenses are also covered with the car factory's personnel receiving R2 for lunch each day.

The financing of these programs is ensured by halving the charge paid by the factory to the republican and regional social programs fund, and also at the expense of the road fund and other charges.

Resolution on Reform Problems

LD1104184291 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 0300 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] The presidium of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [BSSR] Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on the address of the working collectives in connection with the retail price reform and securing of the social protection of the population.

Having heard the report of Mikhail Myasnikov, first deputy chairman of the BSSR Council of Ministers, on the Council of Ministers' reaction to that address, the presidium of the BSSR Supreme Soviet decided in part: to recognize that the situation which is objectively taking shape in the republic's economy rules out an alternative to the retail price reform; to approve in general the adoption by the BSSR Council of Ministers—in response to the address of the working collectives—of additional measures for social protection of the population of the republic in connection with the retail price rise. The BSSR Council of Ministers is charged with the task of enlivening the work of implementing the program for the transfer of the BSSR to market economy and securing social protection of the republic's citizens.

A number of officials have been warned for unsatisfactory control over activity of leaders subordinate to them, who made serious errors in organizing work.

The BSSR Supreme Soviet commission on consumer goods, trade and services to the population is charged with the task of considering the question of personnel policy in the BSSR Trade Ministry and the Belorussian cooperative Union and with putting forward their proposals to the BSSR Supreme Soviet. The BSSR Council of Ministers, local soviets of people's deputies and their executive committees, and leaders of enterprises, organizations, and establishments are charged with the task of finding additional resources for the social protection of invalids and war and work veterans, who receive the lowest pensions, as well as students, with considering the question of providing them with a number of additional privileges, and also with helping young families to acquire basic household goods.

The BSSR Council of Ministers, local soviets of people's deputies and their executive bodies, and leaders of enterprises and associations are to inform the population on the essence of the measures being taken in the republic for its social protection. They must carry out a wide range of explanatory work, use to the full the granted rights and available resources for compensation payments, and make use of other guarantees and privileges in the interest of all categories of the population.

Movements Turning 'Radical'

AU1104133091 Paris AFP in English 1227 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, April 11 (AFP)—Strike movements among industrial workers and coal miners have begun to turn radical, as the strikers put political demands above economic conditions.

"We have had enough of working while shops get emptier and emptier," said one woman worker at a demonstration Wednesday in Lenin Square in Minsk, the capital of Belorussia.

Her complaint reflected a wide-spread sentiment among strikers that promises of pay raises will not end the

country's economic crisis, and that only sweeping political changes can make a difference.

At Vorkuta, in northern Russia, miners have decided that the economic concessions offered last week by Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov were insufficient and voted to continue their strike until Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Government stepped down.

The movement has also directed its hostility against government officials: "Down with food-stuffed bureaucrats" chanted some 10,000 miners at a strike meeting in Donetsk, in the Ukraine.

Workers in Minsk have also demanded the elimination of Communist Party cells in state institutions such as the Army and the KGB, the nationalization of Communist Party property and the granting of broadcasting time to all political forces on state radio and television.

A fresh rally was held on Thursday at Lenin Square in Minsk, the capital of Belorussia. On Wednesday, some 100,000 workers at a rally organized by the local strike committee decided to continue their strike until the Belorussian Government entered into negotiations.

Negotiations began early Thursday between strike leaders and Belorussian officials, but there were unconfirmed reports that Soviet Interior Ministry special forces had landed at Minsk airport.

Strikes have forced the closure of 20 businesses in Minsk, including the MTZ tractor factory, which employs some 40,000 workers.

Strike committees have been set up in 82 businesses in Minsk, according to the Soviet news agency TASS.

The unofficial news agency INTERFAX reported that strikes and demonstrations had spread to other cities in Belorussia. Strike organizers said that the municipalities affected included Soligorsk, Zhodino, Gomel, Borissov, and Baranovich.

In Moscow, the vice-president of the official Soviet trade unions, Mikhail Nagaitsev, said that the unions would hold a warning strike on May 1 in Red Square if the government did not enter into negotiations on pay raises by that date.

May 1, or May Day, is celebrated as an official workers' holiday in the Soviet Union.

Earlier, trade unions President Vladimir Shcherbakov, said that the April 2 price rise had been prepared "in an extremely unsatisfactory manner". Despite assurances by government agencies, he said, "the reform led to a radical decline in standards of living."

INTERFAX on 11 Apr Events

AU1104154091 Paris AFP in English 1528 GMT
11 Apr 91

[Excerpts] Moscow, April 11 (AFP)—A general strike in the Belorussian capital Minsk was suspended Thursday after local authorities agreed to open talks with strikers' leaders, INTERFAX news agency said.

But in southern Siberia, miners decided to harden their six-week-old movement from staggered strikes to a general strike throughout the Kuznetsk basin. [passage omitted]

Strikes had forced the closure of 20 businesses in the city [Minsk], including the MTZ tractor factory, which employs some 40,000 workers, and strike committees were set up in 82 businesses.

Stoppages and demonstrations were earlier reported to have spread to other parts of the western republic, including major industrial towns. [passage omitted]

Under the just signed agreement, which took effect immediately, the republic's leadership pledged to open talks on issues "that fell within its jurisdiction", INTERFAX said.

The phrase indicated that calls for political change at federal level would not be covered during the talks.

However the strike committee spokesman maintained the negotiations would center "first of all" on political as well as economic demands.

Meanwhile in Kuznetsk, strike committee member Piotr Popov said that "all mining installations, including mines, open pits, drilling and transport operations stopped work Thursday morning".

Miners began their strike March 1. By early this week, when they decided to extend it, more than 90 mines were idle.

INTERFAX quoted Mr. Popov as saying eight mines however were supplying metalworks and electric plants with enough coal to meet the region's needs.

He said miners voted for an all-out strike in protest against "the government's refusal to sit down at the negotiating table".

Strike committees planned to extend the strike until the authorities met their demands for Mr. Gorbachev's resignation and that of the federal leadership, he added.

Officials Discuss Signed Work Accord

LD1104202791 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] This afternoon a roundtable was held between [Belorussian] Supreme Soviet representatives and the

strike committees. We have just received another report from our correspondent in the capital of Belorussia.

[Unidentified correspondent] Well, here is the roundtable that has just been crowned, you might say, by the signing of a long-awaited document. It is given here in Belorussian and immediately also in Russian. This agreement confirms the willingness of the Supreme Soviet of Belorussia to negotiate with authorized representatives of the Minsk strike committee on issues which are within the competence of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium. The agreement comes into force at the moment of its signing.

[Begin recording] [Shushkevich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium] The simple question of no confidence has in effect been decided. This document need never have existed. We agree to such talks, but in our society, based on our history, there is a no-confidence syndrome. We have gotten rid of that stance. In other words, we trust the strike committee, whose representatives are sitting here with us now, and I think they will now stop the strike.

[Antonchik, strike committee member] I think, or rather I regret, that this resolution was not passed yesterday. Then we could have started work again today. I think the labor collectives will be happy with the progress and the signing of this document. [end recording]

'Intensive' Military Plane Movements

LD1104202291 Moscow Radio Rossi Network in Russian 1900 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] The number of strikers is growing in Belorussia. Today in Minsk, the capital of the republic, a many thousand-strong rally was held. According to a report received by the Minsk strike committee from residents of the village of Mochulishchevo in the suburbs of Minsk, some intensive movements of military planes have been observed at the military aerodrome there. Local people are not allowed to approach the aerodrome. Therefore, we still do not know whether this is connected in any way with a transfer to the Belorussian capital of any additional Soviet troops or USSR interior troops contingents. The strike committee staff is trying to check the information received. No soldiers have yet been observed marching through the streets of Minsk.

Strikes Suspended for 10 Days

LD1204104891 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] A report has just been received from Belorussia, where all enterprises are operating today.

The Minsk city strike committee has decided to suspend the strikes for ten days. During this time, talks on political and economic demands will take place with Belorussia's leadership. If they are not crowned with success, the strike will resume.

An organizing committee to form a strike committee [zabastkom] has been set up in the republic. And on Saturday, members of the strike committees [stachkomy] of other towns of Belorussia will arrive in Minsk to hold elections for this committee.

As cochairman of the Minsk strike committee Mukhin noted, political demands are moving to first place inasmuch it is impossible to resolve economic demands without them. On Monday, the Presidium of the Republic's Supreme Soviet will assemble in the capital of Belorussia—it will determine the composition of the participants in the talks on political questions.

12 Apr Talks Set; Rally Halted

PM1104214991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Correspondent M. Shimanskiy report: "Minsk Strike Committee Puts Forward Demands"]

[Excerpts] Minsk—The Minsk strike committee is constantly receiving reports from enterprises of the city and the republic about support for the demands put forward at the city rally on 10 April and the continuation of the strike. [passage omitted]

On Thursday, 11 April, Lenin Square was seething with another rally. A number of enterprises stopped work.

M. Myasnikovich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, informed journalists at a news conference on Thursday that he had met with S. Antonchik, cochairman of the Minsk strike committee, and expressed the desire to start talks. However, according to Myasnikovich, the strike committee leaders declined talks and then made accusations against the government.

At 1500 hours a report came in: An agreement to hold talks had been signed between the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic government on the one hand, and the strikers on the other. They will start on Friday. The rally has ended.

As a TASS correspondent reports, truckloads of internal troops had appeared on the streets adjoining Minsk's central square on the morning of 11 April.

Work Resumes; 'Anxious' Atmosphere

PM1204105491 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 91 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondents A. Simurov and A. Ulitenok: "The Square Is Empty and the Shops Are Operating"]

[Text] Minsk—Lenin Square in the Belorussian capital was empty at 1500 hours yesterday. The strikers had gone back to work.

But the day began in an anxious atmosphere: Once again thousands of marchers from the industrial suburbs of Minsk are heading for Government House. Another

tumultuous rally. Passions were inflamed when a rumor started going around to the effect that troops had been sent into the city and had surrounded the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee building. But the rumor turned out to be a canard, pure and simple: Soldiers, cadets, and Suvorov school students had gone to the Officers' House to pay a final military tribute to a deceased general.

Either this sad announcement was a sobering one or the whole inner logic of the street phenomenon that has gone on for many days led the opposing forces to acknowledge the need to adopt a sober decision. It was in the offing yesterday, but the quick temper of some and the obstinacy of others blocked the path to a compromise. Agreement was reached today, when representatives of the city strike committee and republican leadership gathered around the microphone together.

There was an immediate and unpleasant exchange of gibes. But when M. Myasnikovich, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, opened the republic's "purse," so to speak, for the meeting participants and showed there was nothing in it, many people started thinking. And there was food for thought: Additional measures on compensation benefits and payments will cost more than 14 billion rubles [R], while R13.7 billion are expected to be obtained as a result of increased prices. Plus the already meager republican budget's R3.5 billion deficit. The strike cost Minsk R61 million yesterday alone. Meanwhile the government has already lifted all pay restrictions—just earn away...

S. Shushkevich, first deputy chairman of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, officially announced that the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium is prepared to hold talks with the strike committee on the strikers' political demands and the Council of Ministers on their economic demands. This made it possible to elaborate and sign a joint document on the commencement of talks. An hour later the rally was over and the second shift was already switching on its machine tools.

So the first step had been taken. The city sighs with relief. Although, of course, everyone knows that the path to accord will be hard. But everyone must travel it with dignity and a sense of responsibility that befits Belorussians.

A report from Minsk published in our paper on 5 April and listing the strikers' demands said, due to a technical error, that they favored the disbandment of the Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies. The editorial office apologizes to readers for this.

Moldovan President Rules Out Early Secession

LD1104165891 *Moscow World Service in English*
1600 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] The president of the southern Republic of Moldova, Mircha Snegur, has said that his republic is not

going to seek early secession from the Soviet Union in order to unite with Romania.

Speaking in an interview, the Moldovan leader said that his republic's parliament had refused to take part in the referendum on the future of the USSR because the central authorities ignore the sovereignty of the republics.

Mr. Snegur promised a republican plebiscite in which each citizen The Moldovan leader called for the free partnership of the Union republics on the basis of their sovereign interests.

Crimean Obkom Relieves First Secretary

LD1104183691 *Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian*
1745 GMT 9 Apr 91

[Text] A plenum of the Crimean Communist Party obkom was held today which dealt with an organizational question. The plenum released Bagrov from the post of first secretary of the oblast party committee to enable him to concentrate his efforts on his other post—chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet.

The post of first secretary was filled by Hrach, the former second secretary.

Ostrozhymsky, Politburo member and secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

Caucasus

Unrest After Georgian Independence Move Continues

Gamsakhurdia Addresses Media

AU1104120091 *Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian*
0400 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] What is the Kremlin's reaction to the republican legislature's decision to restore Georgia's state independence?

This was the question that began the 10 April news conference held by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, for Georgian journalists and representatives of the foreign media.

Mr. Gamsakhurdia said: Apart from a telegram sent by the USSR minister of internal affairs that sounded like an ultimatum, we have not received any other communication from the Kremlin. In the telegram, the minister emphasizes the illegality of the creation of the national guard and, as evidence of this, he mentions the USSR president's known order pertaining to the disbandment of illegal armed formations. As we can see, we have to expect in the near future anti-Georgian actions on a wide scale from Moscow. We also cannot exclude intervention.

Then, by way of an example, he mentioned the action of armed Soviet subunits on Georgian territory as a result of which the rights of the indigenous population of Georgia are being ignored. In the villages of Okona and Tamarasheni, Georgian militia workers are being disarmed and placed under arrest. In the village of (?Eregvi), the military has destroyed various buildings. In the event of an escalation of violence, the local inhabitants could soon find themselves unprotected.

To counter the aggression of the Soviet empire, we must use only peaceful means, such as mass protest actions, national disobedience [word indistinct]. Mr. Gamsakhurdia added: A strike by railway workers has already begun in Georgia and they will probably soon be joined by transport workers and workers at sea ports and other Union installations.

Touching upon the U.S. State Department statement that stresses the desire to resolve the problems between Georgia and the USSR by peaceful means, the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet expressed the hope that the West would not leave our republic without moral and economic assistance because its unparalleled struggle requires every kind of support.

Of greatest interest to the journalists was Mr. Gamsakhurdia's statement that Georgia will have its own currency and that a law on the protection of the republic's national minorities is being prepared (?and that) Georgia's future constitution will be based upon the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia of 1918-21.

At the news conference, which lasted approximately one and a half hours, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet analyzed in depth the political situation that has been created in the Soviet Union as well as the actions of the USSR president and his opponent Boris Yeltsin. He informed the journalists that, in connection with the 9 April declaration on the restoration of state independence for the Republic of Georgia, he had received a telegram of congratulations from Spain from His Highness Giorgi Batonishvili.

Georgia will, for all intents and purposes, become independent when the world's last empire, the USSR, is toppled, concluded Mr. Gamsakhurdia. I hope that the measures taken by us, including methods of economic [word indistinct] will force the Soviets to make concessions [word indistinct] therefore, we have to be patient.

Troops 'Marching' to West Georgia

LD1104174791 Berlin ADN in German 1717 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Text] Tbilisi (ADN)—Troops marching eastward have been noticed in western Georgia. A spokesman for the Georgian news agency, SAKINFORM, told ADN in

Moscow that the units have artillery and heavy equipment with them. The troops are presumably to take part in punishment operations in Southern Ossetia and other parts of eastern Georgia.

The Georgian Supreme Soviet has proposed in a letter to President Gorbachev starting talks without delay on vital issues relating to the USSR and Georgia, the spokesman added. The result of the talks should be good-neighborly relations between both states. A consultative meeting between representatives of the USSR and Georgia should be called to set up working groups on individual problems and to prepare the talks.

Transport Workers Ready To Strike

LD1104195891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Apr 91

[Report by unidentified TASS correspondent from Tbilisi; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The major transport junction of Samtredia finds itself paralyzed because of a railroad workers' strike.

A readiness to join the strike in connection with the situation in South Ossetia was also expressed by motor transport workers.

Troops must be withdrawn immediately from the territory of the former South Ossetian oblast—that is the strikers' main demand. It is not ruled out here that Georgia may stop transit transportation of freight and passengers by motor, sea, and air transport which will lead to a paralysis of transport links between the Transcaucasus and the Northern Caucasus.

Thus, having just proclaimed its state independence, Georgia has found itself in a blockade by its own desire or, more correctly, by the desire of the Roundtable-Free Georgia bloc. In the view of its leaders, such a step will force the union leadership to abandon interference in the republic's internal affairs.

Transport Blockade To Continue

LD1104222391 Moscow TASS in English 2139 GMT 11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi April 11 TASS—A transport blockade in Georgia, which proclaimed its state sovereignty two days ago, is not the center's punishment for Georgia's refusal to sign the Union Treaty.

The blockade was organized by the ruling political block "Roundtable-Free Georgia", which hopes it will force Moscow to abandon the policy of "interference in the republic's internal affairs".

The abolition of Ossetia's autonomy by Georgia four months ago provoked an inter-ethnic conflict between Ossetians and Georgians.

The block's leader Zviad Gamsakhurdiya last December gave the go-ahead to bringing Soviet Interior Ministry troops into South Ossetia. He now alleges that they "are defending Ossetians and assaulting Georgians" but provides no evidence.

The blockade is the usual tactic that was often used by the block when it was in opposition, stripping the republic's budget of hundreds of millions of roubles.

Georgian leaders call the current blockade a "political strike". It paralysed auto, sea and railway freight and passenger transportation in the republic and cut it off from the outside world.

"This is our ultimatum," said Gamsakhurdiya in Moscow.

He said the blockade would continue until Soviet Interior Ministry troops leave South Ossetia.

Strikers Protest to Gorbachev

AU1204100791 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian
0400 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Text] Yesterday morning, dockers gathered on the territory of the port in Poti near the monument to Niko Nikoladze. Together with Georgians, there arrived Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Greeks, and representatives of other nationalities. They unanimously condemned the Kremlin's aggressive policy. Speeches were delivered at the meeting by David Goia, dock workers' committee chairman, dockers from the second production section [names indistinct], Tengiz Baramidze, the prefect of Poti, and his deputy [name indistinct]. A protest resolution was adopted at the meeting and sent to Gorbachev. A [word indistinct] strike has begun. Today, also, meetings have been held and strikes have been called at Union enterprises in Poti.

Presidium Appeals to Gorbachev

AU1204092091 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian
0400 GMT 12 Apr 91

[Appeal to "His Excellency, USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev" from the Presidium of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet dated Tbilisi, 11 April]

[Text] Your Excellency,

As you know, expressing the will of the Georgian nation that was manifested in the referendum of 31 March 1991, the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet adopted the act of the restoration of the state independence of Georgia on 9 April 1991.

The Presidium of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet proposes to immediately start negotiations on resolving a whole range of issues that are of vital importance for both states. The logical outcome of these negotiations would be the establishment of good-neighborly relations between our countries.

In preparation for negotiations, we propose that a consultative meeting between plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR and Georgia be held and also that working groups be set up. Any delay in the holding of negotiations or any attempt to resolve the problems that have been raised by the use of force could further aggravate the already tense situation and lead to unpredictable consequences.

[Signed] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia
Tbilisi, 11 April 1991

Gamsakhurdiya Replies to Gorbachev 30 Mar Letter

AU1204104091 Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
2 Apr 91 p 1

[Reply of Zvia Gamsakhurdiya, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia, to message from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev dated 30 March 1991: "To USSR President M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] Sharing your anxiety over the situation that has developed in the town of Tskhinvali and the adjacent region, we report that we have taken immediate measures "in order to stop the bloodshed, halt the actions by the militants, and frustrate their intentions to seize and destroy population centers." Thanks to resolute actions, the republican militia has managed to disarm a considerable number of the militants and dislodge them from their occupied positions, so that for the past week relative calm has been established in the region. I wish to assure you that we share the same attitude toward the militants, irrespective of their national affiliation, and that the Georgian militants throughout the country were disarmed even earlier.

The premeditated tendentious coverage of the events occurring in Georgia by the central press organs and Central Television further threatens to make Soviet society the victim of its own propaganda. In response to your proposal "to commence negotiations," we have the honor to note that we have begun talks with the leaderships of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and of Northern Ossetia on a wide range of issues, and that it is absolutely impossible for the Georgian Government to hold negotiations with militants and terrorists. Taken overall, the shooting has stopped and relative stability has been achieved in the Tskhinvali region. Regarding cases of arson, in Tskhinvali, Georgian schools and the houses of most of the Georgians were burned down, a fact which, for some reason, you fail to mention.

We express the hope that the Soviet leadership will refrain from further destabilizing the situation in this region, inasmuch as following your telegram, the situation in Tskhinvali has again worsened.

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdiya
Tbilisi, 1 April 1991

Georgia Protests RSFSR Resolution on Ossetia*AU1204103391 Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
3 Apr 91 p 1*

["Address to the Third Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic"; date not given]

[Text] On 31 March 1991 the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] adopted a resolution on the situation in South Ossetia.

This resolution, quite apart from being a gross interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Georgia, is worded in an unacceptable imperious tone that does no honor to so lofty a forum.

One's attention is also drawn to the fact that the resolution was adopted without due discussion. The RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted the resolution, relying only on the reports by the central mass media, without even deigning to give a hearing to the representatives of the Republic of Georgia, without familiarizing itself with the true state of affairs in the republic, and without establishing the reasons for the conflict and the guilt of the leaders of the anti-Georgian putsch in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast who encroached upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia.

Regarding the substance of the resolution, it is necessary to point out the following:

1. The people responsible for the events that developed in 1990 and 1991 in Shida Kartli, the historical homeland of the Georgian people, which in 1992 the Bolsheviks, in contravention of all moral and legal standards, turned into the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, are the Ossetian extremists, who are supported both morally and materially, including with the most up-to-date weapons, by the reactionary forces that are increasingly gaining ascendancy within the Union government.

2. The so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is the result of the blatant armed intervention by the Red Army and the occupation and virtual annexation of Georgia carried out by the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the RSFSR Government, who grossly violated the treaty of 7 May 1920 concluded between the RSFSR and the Georgian Democratic Republic. During the 1918-21 period the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) repeatedly used the Ossetian population of Shida Kartli to wage a struggle with the lawfully elected Government of the Georgian Republic, which had thrown off the yoke of the Russian Empire and started on the road toward genuinely democratic development, rejecting the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, the time bomb, planted in the twenties by the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), has gone off. Everything is developing according to the old principle.

We thought that democratic Russia, together with the Georgian people, would rise to defend the sovereignty of our states, and would not give the Center and other forces the chance to disrupt the territorial integrity of our republics in favor of the unitarist tendencies of the supporters of the "renewed federation," who in practice are leaving our republics captives of the Union government.

3. The problem in Shida Kartli (for there is no such concept as "South Ossetia" or the "south of Ossetia") is the internal affair of the Republic of Georgia. The latter, however, is ready to cooperate with the RSFSR insofar as the interests of the North Ossetian Republic are affected; the way toward this is opened by the protocol on the meeting and talks between B. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and Z.K. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia on 23 March 1991. However, the Government of the Republic of Georgia regards as inadmissible the gross interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Georgia through presenting ultimatum-type demands for the restoration of the status of an autonomous oblast and the release of T. Kulumbegov and other "illegally arrested persons" (who determined that the arrest of these people was illegal?!), and so on, and so forth.

The impression is created that a united front of imperially oriented forces is being formed to fight the legally elected legislature of the Republic of Georgia, which is striving to restore Georgia's state independence, forcibly abolished in February 1921, and to restore the historical justice that was trampled underfoot. This position is held by the overwhelming majority of the population of Georgia, as demonstrated by the result of the referendum, in which about 95 percent of the total registered electorate took part. This fact, namely that 99.6 percent of those who voted supported the restoration of an independent Georgia on the basis of the 26 May 1918 Declaration, bearing in mind that 30 percent of the population is made up of non-Georgians, provides evidence of the justice and irreversibility of the processes taking place in the Republic of Georgia, as well as of the genuinely multinational nature of the social base on which the legislature of the Republic of Georgia rests.

The referendum held on 31 March was a historic event that opened the real path toward Georgia's freedom and independence. On the same day, the RSFSR congress adopted a resolution that can only be interpreted as support for the imperial ambitions of the Union government, as is confirmed by the appeal by the RSFSR congress to the USSR president and the USSR Federation Council demanding the adoption of "urgent measures to normalize the situation in South Ossetia...."

The possible consequences of urgent measures by the central government to restore order can be seen from the events that occurred in Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, Riga, and other regions.

One is surprised that the resolution was adopted by a majority that includes representatives of the democratic forces in Russia, which, allegedly, are struggling against the dictatorship and imperial intentions of the Union government.

Believing in the justice of our cause, at the same time we realized that, following the referendum, the Union government would harden its position, and would use the events in Shida Kartli precisely for this purpose.

The resolution of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies assists the Center in these designs, which under the pretext of "urgent measures" may end in unforeseeable and tragic consequences.

In actual fact, a further act of aggression against the Republic of Georgia is being prepared. Unfortunately, by adopting the resolution the Russian Congress sanctions the use of military force against a sovereign republic.

Thus, by adopting this resolution, the RSFSR people's deputies assumed moral responsibility for possible actions by the Union government against a legal democratic government that is leading its country along the road toward independence.

[Signed] Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia.

Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia.

Azerbaijani Moratorium Against Violence Violated

LD1104175391 Moscow TASS in English 1729 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert April 11 TASS—A moratorium on the use of violence, announced on the initiative of Azerbaijani President Ayaz Muttalibov on April 9, did not last even one day in Nagorno-Karabakh. Three military posts and a Nagorno-Karabakh village were fired at and an Interior Ministry soldier was wounded on the night of April 9. One more person—a 12-year-old Armenian boy—was killed on the night of April 10 during the shelling of the village of Chaikend, Khanlar region of Azerbaijan, from the Azerbaijani village of Kushchu-Armavir. Chaikend was shelled during the whole of the night. An Interior Ministry unit, dividing the warring parties, is deployed there.

Martuni, a district administrative centre in Nagorno-Karabakh, was brought under mortar fire last night. Interior Ministry soldiers opened reply fire. The Azerbaijani village of Lesnoye was shelled from the Armenian village of Badara early in the morning.

'Militants' Shell S. Ossetia Residential Areas

LD1104123191 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz April 11 TASS—Tensions reached new highs in South Ossetia on Wednesday as Georgian militants shelled residential areas in Tskhinvali from Nikozi village, outside the emergency area. Luckily, no one was hurt.

More than 15,000 militants are besieging Tskhinvali and reinforcements are arriving in the area from Georgia.

New fighting has been reported in Balta and Keleti villages, where several civilians were injured.

Electricity supply to Tskhinvali was cut five days ago and there is a shortage of water and gas. Doctors said an epidemic could erupt in the city and suburbs as the weather becomes warmer.

A special commission of Soviet Interior Ministry investigators and experts is working in South Ossetia, gathering materials about crimes committed by militants in 30 ravaged Ossetian towns.

South Ossetian residents denounced Georgia's April 9 declaration of independence. The document, passed by the Georgian parliament, is based on the republic's May 26, 1918 declaration of independence.

The declaration guarantees an autonomous status to Abkhazia. A referendum will decide which status the Adzhar Republic will get. It, however, does not mention South Ossetia's status.

Earlier, the Georgian parliament, in violation of the USSR Constitution and the will of local people, abolished South Ossetia's autonomy.

Georgia wants to secede from the Soviet Union while Ossetians favour staying in the Soviet Union.

After the deployment of more Soviet interior troops in the region and the disbandment of several illegal armed groups in the area, the Georgian parliament denounced this as interference into internal affairs of an independent state and threatened to hold a general political strike.

Meanwhile, Tskhinvali residents and numerous refugees in the city demanded the imposition of a state of emergency in South Ossetia by Soviet peace-keeping troops.

Task Force Disarms 'Militants' in South Ossetia

LD1104151191 Moscow TASS in English 1428 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent V. Gondusov]

[Text] Tskhinvali April 11 TASS—Servicemen of the special task force in South Ossetia performed an operation to disarm local militants on Thursday morning.

A brief clash occurred near the Georgian village of Eredvi where a 15-men-strong group of Georgian militants was surrounded and made to surrender their firearms, explosives and rounds of ammunition.

Ossetians have responded to the appeal to disarm addressed to them by representatives of the USSR Interior Ministry and local authorities: many people have voluntarily given in weapons and ammunition.

No shooting was reported in and around Tskhinvali last night.

Unfortunately, Georgian authorities continue efforts to discredit interior troop activities in the region. They refuse to admit that troops are acting in the interests of people tired out by violence and lawlessness and disarming not only Georgian but also Ossetian militants.

Peace Committee Ready To Mediate in South Ossetia

LD1104223191 Moscow TASS in English 2133 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow April 12 TASS—Yelena Petushkova, first deputy head of the Soviet Peace Committee, has urged South Ossetian and Georgian leaders to begin talks with the aim to find ways for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in South Ossetia. She came up with this appeal at the Thursday meeting of representatives of the South Ossetian public with Soviet and foreign journalists.

Petushkova stressed in her report that the Soviet Peace Committee was ready to act as a mediator and to organize such talks, which at the beginning could be unofficial, if both sides agreed to take part in them.

Ludvig Chibirov, Dr.Sc. (history) and head of a delegation of the South Ossetian public, told about the situation in the region. He believes that "violence, plunder and killings in Ossetian villages can be stopped only with the help of imposing the state of emergency in the whole of South Ossetia and sending neutral Interior Ministry troops there for protecting the population against genocide on the parts of Georgian fighters."

The information on the current situation in the region was supplied by Deputy Head of the Executive Committee of the Regional Council of South Ossetia Yevgenia Zagoeva. According to this information, by today the conflict claimed the lives of 60 Ossetians, 58 villages have been burned, water and electricity supply to the city of Tskhinvali has been cut, a water supply system of the city has been destroyed.

USSR Interior Ministry troops, deployed in South Ossetia, continue to disarm Georgian militia and demand a complete withdrawal of some of its units from the area of

the conflict, the IBERIA news agency (one of the three Georgian news agencies) reported on Thursday with reference to the press centre of the Georgian Interior Ministry. However, the militia, according to its commanders, is not going to remove its posts located around Georgian villages. The Georgian Interior Ministry has stated that USSR Interior Ministry troops, supported by helicopters, shelled and burned on Thursday the building of the local council in the village of Dvani, Karel District, and burned two Georgian Orthodox Churches near that village.

Azerbaijani Villages Shot at From Armenia

LD1104222291 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By AZERINFORM-TASS correspondent S. Mirzoyev]

[Text] Baku April 12 TASS—The villages of Avush and Akhura in the Sharur district of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Region, which is part of Azerbaijan, were subjected to intensive fire from the settlement of Khachik of the Ekhegnadzorskiy district of Armenia, an Azerbaijani Interior Ministry spokesman told AZERINFORM-TASS.

All shooting stopped after local militiamen and Soviet Army servicemen responded with fire to the fire. No killed or wounded people have been reported.

Over the past two days, the village of Alibeliy in the Tauzskiy district of Azerbaijan was repeatedly fired at. The intervention of militiamen and army servicemen ended the shootout. No damage or loss of life has been reported.

Central Asia

Attempts To Form Tajik Islamic State Stopped

LD1104200491 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT
11 Apr 91

[By TAJIKTA-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe April 11 TASS—"Secret services of some foreign countries, primarily the Pakistani service, seek to further destabilise the public and political situation in Tajikistan," Vladimir Petkel, chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) of that Central Asian republic, told TASS.

He expressed serious concern over the incessant attempts of foreign extremist-minded Muslim organisations and armed Afghan opposition units to establish illegal contacts with politically-minded nationalist groups in Tajikistan aiming to overthrow the existing social system and create an Islamic state in Tajikistan.

According to Petkel, the Tajik counter-intelligence service rendered harmless recently eleven spy groups trying to smuggle weapons, subversive literature and narcotics

across the Afghan border. He recalled that on the days of the notorious developments in February, last year, the Dushanbe thugs had been supplied with hemp and other drugs, a large consignment had been smuggled shortly before that across the neighbouring republic to the Soviet bank of the Pyandzh River. "Soviet and foreign mass media reported that on those days armed Afghan opposition units came close to the Soviet border, waiting for a call for help from 'Tajik Muslim brothers.' They continue to hang around the Pyandzh border area, staging small armed provocations," Petkel said.

The head of the republican security service stressed the importance of enhancing the efficiency of counter-intelligence operations, improving operations work, especially the one dealing with obtaining preventive information and its timely assessment, and strengthening ties with the population of border areas of the republic. Pointing to the effectiveness of such ties, Petkel said that peasants from a border village had helped recently arrest a frontier intruder. He was carrying a large consignment of narcotics and leaflets urging "Tajik

brothers" to "take up arms" and to restore in Tajikistan "a truly Muslim state without Soviets and Russians."

Kyrgyz President Issues Decree on Prices

*LD1104040191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 2230 GMT 10 Apr 91*

[Text] Additional social guarantees and compensation for the population are being introduced in Kyrgyzstan by the decree of Akayev, the republic's president.

From 15 April, the retail prices for flour that were in effect before the increases will be restored. The five percent sales tax on meat, milk and their products, and also on bread, groats, children's meals, and school uniforms is being abolished. The former prices will be retained in school and student cafeterias.

In addition, the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers is instructed, before the end of the month, to seek opportunities to raise the earnings of workers in public education, health care, social security, and culture, and to lift restrictions on benefits for children from one and a half to six years of age.